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Since computers are relied upon to run critical infrastructures – from nuclear power plants to 
electronic battlefield simulations – the concept of a ―trusted‖ or tamperproof system has 
become even more important. Some applications have become so critical that it is imperative 
that they run as intended, without interference.   The consequences of these systems not 
running as intended could be catastrophic.  This research offers a solution for a key element 
for protecting these critical servers – validating process invocation sequences.   
The purpose of this research is to increase operating system security by detecting, validating, 
and enforcing process invocation sequences within a critical system.  If the processes on a 
critical system are not those that are intended to run or support the critical system, or if a 
system is able to run processes in an unauthorized sequence, then the system is compromised 
and cannot be trusted.  This research uses a computational theory approach to create a 
framework for a solution for the process invocation sequence problem.  Using the Program 
Pathing Trust Model, a solution capable of identifying both valid and invalid process 
invocation sequences is developed. 
 1 
Chapter  1: Introduction 
Computer security emerged as an area of interest around 1967 [SCC70] [CST72] [Schr74-1] 
[Schr74-2].   As computers became increasingly utilized in government and private industry, 
they became indispensable.  The need for computer security has become more evident with the 
increased prevalence of malware combined with societal dependence upon computers. As 
computers are relied upon more to run critical infrastructures – from nuclear power plants to the 
electronic battlefield – the concept of ―trusted‖ or tamperproof systems has become even more 
important.  Critical applications must run as intended, without interference, or the consequences 
could be catastrophic.  Power grids could go offline, transportation systems could fail, battlefield 
controls could black out or the nation‘s financial transactions could stall, resulting in scenarios 
such as loss of human life and financial losses. 
1.1 Overview 
Early investigators discovered that to be effective security systems must work in a symbiotic 
relationship with the operating system (OS).  The OS relies upon the security system to ensure 
that OS integrity is maintained.  And the security system relies upon OS integrity not to let other 
facilities interfere with or circumvent it.   
The purpose of this research is to develop a security solution model for maintaining system 
integrity, meaning that system integrity is maintained by permitting a system to execute only 
normal processes in valid process invocation sequences.  The terms normal process and valid 
process invocation sequence are explained in detail later in section 2.2.  OS security is increased 
by ensuring that only trusted process invocation sequences are executed within the system.  If the 
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processes running on the system are not those intended or if the system is able to run processes in 
an unacceptable sequence, then the system is compromised and cannot be trusted.   
1.2 Contributions 
This research takes a unique approach to the problem of insuring the integrity of a critical 
system. While other approaches (described in chapter 5) focus upon determining whether a 
previously encountered sequence of processes is valid, the approach in this research validates 
each process‘s authority to invoke a subsequent process, thereby adding a new dimension to 
access control. Prior approaches to access control do not address the validation of a process‘s 
authority to invoke other processes.  
The program pathing trust (PPT) model developed provides a theoretically sound framework 
for assessing the validity of process invocation sequences.  While other research has employed 
theory-based structures such as automata without explicit discussion of the required 
computational power, this research develops a theory-based approach with respect to the security 
issue of validating process invocation sequences.  This research shows that the computational 
power of a Finite State Automaton is sufficient because process invocation sequences have the 
structure of a Regular Language. 
The PPT model resulting from this research is more compact than several previously 
suggested models. In the PPT model each process is represented only once. This is not the case 
in other approaches. Furthermore, where other approaches provide only a method determining 
whether a previously encountered sequence of processes is valid, the PPT model can be used not 
only to similarly assess whether some candidate process invocation sequence is valid, but also to 
reject a set of invalid process invocation sequences, whether or not previously encountered, and 
also to infer the possible validity of some process invocation sequences that have not been 
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previously encountered.   
 
  
 4 
Chapter  2: Background Terminology and Distinctions 
The terminology and distinctions made in this section are used to describe and define the 
problem and the proposed solution.   
2.1 Processes 
The basic function of a computer is to execute programs.  A program is a set of machine 
instructions that are organized in a logical sequence to perform a task or process [Stall92]. A 
process is a program that is loaded into main memory and executed [Silb05].  The operation of a 
computer may be modeled as a series of processes invoking other processes [Stall92].  Other 
than physical threats to a computer, a process is required in order to pose a threat to a computer.  
Therefore, it is a fundamental premise of this research that all threats to a computer that are of 
interest are associated with processes and the invocation sequences of processes. 
2.1.1 External Processes 
External processes are processes that have not been explicitly installed by a system 
administrator.  These processes might be applets loaded by users visiting a webpage, scripts or 
programs written (or downloaded) by users,  macros in an application (like Mircosoft Office
®
), 
or malware that has otherwise infiltrated the system.  External processes can pose a danger to a 
system because they may come from unknown sources.  For this reason they are generally not 
desirable [CSI03] [Eete08]. 
External processes tend to be a security concern more for workstations than for critical 
servers.  However, even critical servers can be susceptible to external processes.  Poor access 
control can allow a user or a process to install an external process into a restricted directory.  Or, 
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system vulnerability can be exploited to implant an external process into a directory or into an 
execution sequence.  External processes pose an obvious threat. 
2.1.2 Internal Processes 
Internal processes are processes that have been intentionally installed on a computer system 
by a system administrator.  Internal processes are often part of a vendor-supplied software 
package.  They are usually purchased from and supported by a commercial vendor but may be 
open source software.  On a critical server, ideally only software that is critical to the function of 
the system should be installed.  There may be, however, processes included in the installed 
software that are not used as part of the critical function of the system.  Many software packages 
have features that are not needed by a particular enterprise and are therefore not used.  The 
processes that support these features may be installed on the computer, but may not be executed.   
2.1.2.1 Operating System Processes 
Operating system processes are internal processes that are responsible for the management 
of computer resources (hardware, memory, I/O and intercommunication), the coordination of 
system activities and the sharing of the computer resources. The operating system acts as a host 
for all other processes that run on the machine [Stall92].  The OS is composed of a number of 
processes (such as services), not all of which are needed by a critical system – although in a full 
installation they reside on the system. 
2.1.2.1.1 OS Kernel 
The OS kernel is a set of core OS processes.  They perform the most critical functions of the 
OS, and without them no other processes could execute.  The OS kernel is made up of those 
processes that manage the execution of other processes in the OS.  They perform process, 
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memory and I/O management and other OS support functions such as interrupt handling, 
auditing and monitoring.  Kernel processes with the highest authority execute in ―system‖ (or 
―kernel‖) mode.  System mode allows kernel processes to execute privileged instructions and be 
exempt from access controls [Stal92].  Any process that maliciously modifies a kernel process is 
referred to as a rootkit. Rootkits are designed to allow another process to gain elevated authority 
to circumvent the system‘s data and system security [Hogl05].  If an OS kernel process is 
compromised, the entire OS is generally un-useable and has to be reinstalled, unless the 
compromised process is identified, and removed (or replaced). 
2.1.2.1.2 OS Utilities 
OS utilities are also internal processes that are part of the operating system.  These processes 
are usually invoked by terminal commands or through a user-initiated GUI.  The processes are 
loaded from the installed operating system directories.  These directories usually require elevated 
authority to update, and are therefore considered reliable.  OS utilities may or may not run with 
elevated authority.  These processes are also vulnerable to rootkits. 
2.1.2.2  Application Processes 
Application processes are internal processes that a system administrator has installed on the 
system and expects to run as an integral part of the system‘s primary function. These application 
processes may or may not run with elevated privileges.   
2.1.2.2.1 System Application Processes 
System applications (sometimes referred to as middleware) can be defined as application 
processes that are installed to support a user application.  These applications are neither part of 
the OS nor the user applications (described below) that they support.  System applications such 
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as a database or a data transport system add more sophisticated functions than the OS alone is 
designed to provide.  These processes, like OS processes, usually require elevated access and the 
directories they reside in are restricted.  However, as in the case with OS processes, there are 
generally unnecessary features, utilities, application program interfaces or sample code that 
could be used to interfere with the processes within the application‘s primary function.  These 
extraneous processes pose a possible threat if run, as they can steal CPU cycles or otherwise 
interfere with the application [Bre89] [Gogu82]. 
2.1.2.2.2 User Application Processes 
User applications are application processes that provide the reason why all the other 
processes exist.  On a critical system, only necessary user applications should be installed.  
These processes may or may not need elevated access to execute.  The directories in which they 
reside must be protected with appropriate access control techniques.  
User applications can be vendor supplied or developed in-house.  Vendor-supplied user 
applications can cause the same concerns as system applications and OS processes with respect 
to their including extraneous content.  An in-house developed user application, however, is 
likely leaner in its deployment and only deploys those processes that are required by users of the 
system.  Therefore, in-house developed applications would be less likely to contain unnecessary 
processes that might be executed and compromise the system.  However, in-house user 
applications require good version control because poor version control can introduce 
vulnerability. 
2.1.3 Process Behavior 
Each of the preceding process types are classified as either having normal or abnormal 
process behavior.  In this research, a process’s behavior is defined as the execution of its 
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sequence of machine instructions.   A process can manipulate memory, invoke OS services or 
invoke other processes.  The process‘s logic may provide multiple execution paths, not all of 
which may be desirable in a particular environment.  Desired behavior is that behavior that is 
designed into the process to fulfill the mission of the organization.  Every process has a function 
that an organization intends it to accomplish.  In this paper, a normal process is defined as a 
desired process running on a critical server. 
2.1.3.1 Normal Process Behavior 
The problem is broader in scope than previous related security research in intrusion 
detection, which focuses only on malware intrusion.  This research focuses on the larger problem 
of system integrity.  What would normally be a false positive for an intrusion detection system 
may prove not to be such in this research.  The distinction lies in the definition of normal 
behavior.  Normal behavior for an intrusion detection system generally means the execution of 
any software that is intentionally installed by authorized users.  The purpose of such an intrusion 
detection system is to identify any other software that has infiltrated the system.  For a critical 
server, however, that definition is insufficient.  This research defines normal behavior as 
resulting from only those processes that are intended or are necessary to run on a system to 
achieve its intended function.  Thus, a process that may be considered part of normal behavior in 
another system may not be considered normal in a critical system.  For example, because only 
processes that are necessary for the fulfillment of a critical system‘s function should be allowed 
to run, it may not be acceptable for a critical system to allow SMTP (email) traffic processing.  
This reduces superfluous processes executing and taking up valuable system resources or 
otherwise interfering with critical functions. 
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2.1.3.2 Abnormal Process Behavior 
Abnormal processes are defined as the complement of the set of normal processes.  All 
processes are assumed to be abnormal unless they are determined necessary and appropriate to 
support the mission for which the server was built.  For example, a critical system created to run 
a company‘s accounting system probably shouldn‘t be allowed to execute processes to run the 
company‘s emails. Even an internal process installed as part of the OS or an application can be 
considered abnormal, if it is not a process necessary to achieve the system‘s intended function.  
Thus it is not necessary that a process be external in order for it to be labeled abnormal. 
Abnormal processes (internal or external) can also be new processes that infiltrate the system, 
or ones that masquerade as normal processes.  New processes that infiltrate the system would 
most likely be external processes.  They can be a validly loaded process such as an applet which 
might be an unknown process loaded into a JAVA virtual machine from across the network.  
When an abnormal process masquerades as a normal process, it is generally malware or possibly 
a variant of a normal process.  A system does not maintain its integrity if it runs any abnormal 
processes. 
2.2 Process Invocation Sequences 
A computer system executes a sequence of processes.  As part of a normal process’s 
behavior, it might invoke one or more processes for OS system services or another application 
process; at some times, for some processes, this sequence is significant.  The execution of some 
processes should not occur in an unconstrained order, but rather within a range of acceptable 
orders.   
The OS provides a process scheduler that manages all process invocation sequences.  From 
the time the OS is booted, the computer executes a process sequence.  The various orderings of 
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processes that may be scheduled for execution by the OS scheduler represents a set of process 
invocation sequences.  Ensuring that some process invocations execute in order is as important 
as ensuring that a process executes its machine instructions in the correct order.  Determining 
whether a process invocation sequence is valid or invalid is the central theme of this research. 
2.2.1 Valid Process Invocation Sequences   
Valid process invocation sequences are defined as those process invocation sequences that 
invoke a set of normal processes in an order that accomplishes or supports the system‘s intended 
primary function.  In defining normal processes, a server dedicated to running accounting 
functions should run only accounting processes and those processes necessary to support those 
accounting functions.  However, in addition, every normal process supporting this accounting 
function should be coded to invoke only certain processes in a limited range of order.  A 
process‘s logic may support different logic paths, but the number of processes it may invoke is 
finite (although, perhaps large), whether these processes include another application process or 
an OS process.  As the critical server executes its primary function, only a subset of all possible 
process invocation sequences supports the intended functions of the system.  This subset consists 
of exactly the valid process invocation sequences.   
2.2.2 Invalid Process Invocation Sequences and System Integrity 
System integrity can be compromised by normal processes running in an invalid process 
invocation sequence.  The set of invalid process invocation sequences is the complement of the 
set of valid process invocation sequences.  A system is said to maintain its system integrity if it 
runs only normal processes in valid process invocation sequences.   
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The classic example of a valid and invalid invocation sequences is illustrated in z/OS 
MVS
1‘s AMASPZAP.  AMASPZAP is a program that allows a system program to modify 
machine instructions at the binary level.  The system program can verify the binary instruction 
codes and change them using AMASPZAP.  AMASPZAP, which modifies machine instructions, 
is a normal maintenance process.  If that process is invoked from the SMP/E
2
 process, the 
process invocation sequence is considered valid.  The SMP/E process provides restricted access 
control that AMASPZAP alone does not provide.  Therefore, any invocation of AMASPZAP 
that is not made directly from SMP/E is considered a system integrity breach.  If the 
AMASPZAP process is invoked directly from a TSO/E
3
 process or some other process, then the 
process invocation sequence must be considered invalid.   
The normality of a process invocation process can also be dependent on the wall-clock time 
at which it is executed.  For example, a process invocation sequence may be valid if it runs 
during a system maintenance window (say: Saturday evenings 10:00PM to 4:00AM), but 
execution at another time should be considered an invalid process invocation sequence.  
  
                                                 
1
 z/OS MVS is IBM‘s MVS operating system  which runs on the z10 chip and is the most recent  descendent of the 
System/390, System/370 and System/360 chip series.   z/OS is the most current version of the MVS operating 
system that runs on the z10 chip.  MVS is the standard operating system used on the IBM mainframe for the last 40 
years. [Webb08] 
2
 SMP/E is IBM‘s System Modification Program/Extended.  SMP/E is a tool for installing and maintaining software 
and for managing the inventory of software that has been installed on a Z/OS machine. [IBM08] 
3
 TSO/E is a z/OS Base Time Sharing Option/Extensions (TSO/E) element that provides an interactive terminal 
interface. Equivalent to Putty or terminal services in Unix. [IBM09] 
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Chapter  3: Problem:  Why System Integrity is Important 
When addressing the problem of maintaining system integrity, it is important to understand 
what might cause a system to become compromised.  The OS does provide some system 
integrity internally that is effective as long as programmers and administrators create and execute 
only internal processes according to some basic security principles [Harr03]. Of course, the only 
reasonably sure protection from programmer mistakes is to require stringent reviews of their 
code and adequate quality assurance verification to ensure these principles have been followed.  
However, even if these basic security principles are followed, system integrity remains 
challenged by external processes and users.  Exposure to external processes can cause a system 
to be infected with malware.  System integrity can also be compromised by access from 
administrators with privileged access.   
3.1 Malware 
Nearly all computers have some exposure to the Internet and, as a result, are under constant 
threat of attack by viruses, parasites, worms, Trojan horses, adware, bots and other intentionally 
designed malware.  Symantec, a prominent security company, has tracked and documented the 
number of malware incidents per year is growing (see figure 3-1 below) [Syma10].  Almost all 
computers encounter outages or suffer poor performance due to malware.  Countless time and 
money has been spent fixing, reimaging or replacing systems that have been compromised.  Even 
with a defense-in-depth strategy using anti-virus, anti-spyware, anti-malware, intrusion 
detection, vulnerability assessment and access control security tools, new and innovative 
malware still penetrates through the defenses.  However most users accept the risk, and consider 
it part of the cost of doing business [Eete08]. Even application servers buried deep in an 
organization‘s infrastructure (such servers which are of most interest to this research) have some 
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Figure 3-1 New Malware Code Threats - Symantec 
exposure to the constant barrage of malware. 
Some critical systems not only have to be concerned with the possibility of random malware 
attack, but also with a relatively high likelihood of attacks specifically targeted by cyber 
criminals or terrorists.  Some systems support critical functions such as providing an electronic 
battlefield, balancing power grids, coordinating air traffic or regulating the money supply.  
Because of the critical applications they support, these systems cannot afford to be compromised, 
and therefore, warrant a stronger defense.  Therefore, some defenses that normally would not be 
cost-effective on other systems are required on these systems.  Fortunately, these critical systems 
are more likely to run on dedicated computer systems and can be more tightly controlled.   
Malware infects systems by either implementing themselves as a new process within a valid 
sequence of process invocations or by masquerading as a known process within an apparently 
valid process invocation sequence. Ensuring that all processes and/or sequences of processes are 
normal becomes critical to verifying that malware has not infected a system.  Preventing 
malware contamination is a by-product of ensuring system integrity.   
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3.2 Operator Error 
Most prior work in OS security has been focused on intrusion detection [Amm98] [Appf04] 
[Feng03] [Forr96] [Gho00] [Hof98] [Ko94] [Kos97] [Wag01] [Warr99] and has been a reaction 
to the emergence of malware. Malware, although an important aspect of system integrity, is not 
the only concern.  Operator error or internal threats can also compromise system integrity.   
 
Figure 3-2: IDC’s Survey of External vs. Internal Threats 
Computer operators and security practitioners know that external threats are not the only 
threats to critical computer systems.  In fact malware is not the main reason critical production 
systems fail or encounter production outage incidents. Production outage incidents are known to 
be caused more frequently by operator error or to occur after system maintenance or other 
changes are introduced to a system [Chri08] [CSI03] [Keen05]. Users with elevated privileges 
can pose a more serious threat to a system than malware because of their access using 
administrative authority.  Security professionals know that historically the most dangerous 
threats to computer systems are internal, particularly for critical systems located deep in the 
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infrastructure [CSI03].   In 2007, International Data Corporation (IDC) research found that most 
threat focus was on external threats.  A 2008 IDC report [Chri08] (figure 3-2) showed a shift of 
focus from external threats to internal threats.   
Since it is difficult to predict the variety of things a system administrator might need to do to 
a system, they are granted higher privileges to enable them to fix or tune a system, which also 
allows them to interfere with a system‘s intended function by mistake.  Even the best technicians 
make mistakes, sometimes with catastrophic effect [Chri08].  With a lack of understanding of 
how exactly the system works, or by simply hitting the ENTER key by mistake, technicians can 
unintentionally interfere with a critical system.  Or technicians could submit a task that, although 
otherwise benign, could consume valuable CPU cycles needed for intended execution of the 
critical application. 
System changes that may impact a critical system are normally reserved for a maintenance 
window, a time when production processes are not executing.  At these times, the critical system 
is more tolerant of executing non-production associated processes. Administrators, however, 
need a security mechanism that would allow them to maintain a system during maintenance 
windows or when a system needs their intervention, such as when a system exhibits problems 
and needs an emergency fix.  The security mechanism must not allow the administrator to run 
any process that may deviate from the normal production process during the hours when 
production processing is running.  Maintenance processes should only run at specific wall-clock 
times within specific process invocation sequences and not while production process and process 
sequences are running.   
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3.3 Research 
Other research in this field has taken a purely engineering approach.  Researchers define a 
solution by focusing upon intrusion detection [Feng03] [Forr96] [Gho00] [Hof98] [Ko98] 
[Kos97] [Sek01] [Wag01] [War99] and focus upon resolving the malware problem only.  These 
approaches are quick to formulate a solution to the problem of indentifying malware in process 
invocation sequences.  While existing research addresses an important aspect of the problem, 
there is far more to this complex problem.  ―The engineer's first problem in any design situation 
is to discover what the problem really is‖ [Beak69].  This research analyzes the problem from a 
different perspective and then defines requirements to solve the problem(s) by developing a 
solution model.   
There is a need for a security model to enforce system integrity by adding to the defense-in-
depth arsenal that protects against malware and provides safeguards against technician errors.  
The facility must adhere to some basic security principles: it must perform authentication and 
authorization, and provide accountability.  This research defines a solution model for a facility to 
provide system integrity controls, not only to mitigate malware intrusions, but also to provide 
control over technicians so that they can only apply changes during maintenance windows or in 
emergency situations.  This research analyzes the system integrity problem, analyzes which 
computational model is necessary and sufficient to address the problem, defines the 
requirements, creates a solution model, identifies the kinds of features needed in such a system, 
and tests a prototype of the solution. 
3.3.1 Requirements 
As part of analyzing of the problem of system integrity, the system requirements are 
identified.  In this research, these requirements are based upon the AAA security principle: 
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Authentication, Authorization and Accountability.  The AAA principle is an industry-accepted 
standard associated with all security solutions.  Although the principle became best known 
through the AAA protocol RFCs defined by the IETF [Ietf00], it has been a guiding principle 
since the first access control systems were developed in the early 1970s. AAA is an accepted 
principle in the development of all security controls [Fire03]. 
3.3.1.1 Authentication 
Authenticating the identity of processes is a prerequisite to verifying that a process is normal 
and that it belongs to a valid process invocation sequence.  Unless a process is authenticated, 
another process can masquerade in place of a normal process.  This is a requirement overlooked 
in other research concerned with mapping invocation sequences.  Process authentication is 
defined in section 9.3 and a discussion of authentication methods are discussed in more detail in 
Appendix D.  Although authentication of processes is very important, this component of security 
is not the focus of this research.  This research assumes all processes presented to the scheduler 
are correctly authenticated.   
3.3.1.2 Authorization 
Process authorization (validating processes and invocation sequences) is a critical element of 
this research.  An authenticated process is evaluated as to whether it is authorized to be invoked 
by the process that invoked it.  Each process corresponding to the entire prefix (the portion of the 
sequence preceding the process to be authorized) of the process invocation sequence must be 
authorized in order for the executing process to be authorized. If the scheduler determines that a 
process is not invoked by a process that is authorized to invoke it, then the process is not 
scheduled for execution.  If the process is abnormal, or any part of the prior process invocation 
sequence is invalid, then the invoked process is determined to be unauthorized.  This research 
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focuses primarily on developing a model for determining the authorization of valid process 
invocations.  Process authorization has two distinct functions:  (1) to learn or define a valid 
process invocation sequence and (2) to verify that a current running process is the product of a 
valid process invocation sequence.   
Determining a valid invocation sequence has been one of the most challenging aspects of this 
research.  Other projects have used a variety of methods (see chapter 5), resulting in mixed 
success.  One of the problems with determining the validity of a process invocation sequence is 
that today‘s systems are so complex that it seems no individual really knows what a valid 
process invocation sequence might be.   
3.3.1.2.1 Invocation 
To determine a valid process invocation sequence, this research must first define the phrase 
invoke process.  In this research, the statement, 'P1 invokes P2' means that the CPU has executed 
an instruction from P1 and that the executed instruction has the intent of requesting the OS 
scheduler to place process P2 on the dispatch queue for CPU execution.  An invocation sequence 
is an ordered series of process invocations.   
3.3.1.2.2 Static Process Invocation 
Others have made the distinction between statically and dynamically invoked processes 
[Feng03] [Kos97].  Statically invoked processes are those that are linked into an application; 
they are part of the same load module as the invoking process [Hof98] [Sek01] [Wag01].  These 
systems must have their source code or load module analyzed to determine the valid process 
invocation sequences.  Static process invocation sequences are not of particular interest to this 
research.  To modify processes within a load module would require in-depth knowledge of the 
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application and probably privileged access to make changes to the load module, so such 
processes pose limited risk to a system. 
3.3.1.2.3 Dynamic Process Invocation 
Dynamically invoked processes are processes not linked into the application‘s load module.  
These processes are invoked in a number of ways: explicitly, implicitly and symbolically.  
Explicitly invoked processes are invoked using fully qualified directory information.  Explicit 
process invocations cannot mistakenly invoke a process from the wrong directory.  Implicit 
process invocations use the ―home‖ directory.  However, the ―home‖ directory actually consists 
of a number of subdirectories, and the invoked process can be loaded from any one of these.  If a 
number of processes with the same name reside in multiple directories in the ―home‖ directory, 
the first found process with the name of the invoked process is used, regardless of which part of 
the ―home‖ directory it resides.  Implicit invocation using the ―home‖ directory can be dubious at 
best, because the ―home‖ directory can be changed dynamically.   
Symbolic invocations appear to invoke a process from one directory when in fact they are 
actually invoking a process in another directory.  Determining the directory where a symbolically 
invoked process actually resides can be accomplished, although it is not as straight-forward as 
determining where other external invocation processes resided.  Symbolic links are more 
confusing than they are problematic because their target process can be uniquely identified.   
This research is interested in dynamically invoked processes, because they provide an 
opportunity to subtly compromise a system. 
3.3.1.3 Accountability 
A security system requires a means to enable accountability.  When a security-related 
incident occurs, administrators must be able to determine its cause.  If a process invoking 
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sequence has not been granted authority to execute, the security system must be able to identify 
the reason for this situation.  At a minimum the system should provide the administrator with the 
invalid invocation sequence and its point of failure. The process invoking sequence can be 
analyzed to  determine the cause of the problem or to determine if the incident represented a 
false positive result (that is, a result in which a valid process invocation sequence was identified 
as invalid.)  If a false positive result occurs, the security system should be corrected to allow the 
process invoking sequence to be authorized in subsequent occurrences.  In other words, the 
security system must have the ability to report on the process invoking sequences that it 
encounters and report which are valid and which are invalid.   
Auditors need to review the security system as well, to verify that it is properly protecting the 
rest of the system, and they need to verify what process invocation sequences are authorized.  
Assurance that a computer system is adequately protected is essential to meeting government 
certifications such as FISMA [FISM02] [FISM08].  FISMA certification is mandatory for U.S. 
government computer systems.  The capability to report on the process invocation sequences is 
an essential function of accountability. 
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Chapter  4: Security Background 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this research is to increase operating system (OS) security by 
detecting and enforcing trusted process invocation sequences within the system.  The system 
must run as expected before any other security measures can be enforced.  Without good 
operating system integrity, any other attempt to secure data, resource, users, etc. is a hollow 
exercise.  If the processes on the system are not those intended to run on the system or if the 
system is able to run processes in an unauthorized sequence, then the system is already 
compromised and cannot be trusted.   
Operating system security has been an issue since the 1970s, [SCC70] [CST72] [Schr74-1] 
[Schr74-2] and has become even more so with the increased prevalence of malware and societal 
dependence upon computers. When referring to operating systems, often security is an after-
thought.  Operating system designers have focused on the functionality of the OS, not its 
integrity.  [Bish03] [Ravi04] [SHA99] [Smal01a] [Spen99] Various projects have undertaken the 
challenge of creating an OS with built in integrity [ACM99] [Smal01b]. Commercial OSs has 
continued to enhance existing OSs by adding or modifying security features in order to assist in 
maintaining system integrity [ACF99] [RACF03]. And there is a plethora of security add-on 
tools to further enhance the assurance of system integrity [Appf04] [Ford97] [Mcca05] 
[Syma05]. All of these approaches have met with various levels of success.  This research 
focuses on one neglected aspect of the system integrity problem, the problem of detecting invalid 
process invocation sequences and preventing their execution. 
4.1 The Program Pathing Problem 
Why focus on process invocation sequences?  The basic function of a computer is to run 
processes and, as the computer continues to operate, to invoke other process. To ensure system 
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integrity, it is important to verify that processes run in a valid sequence.  When a process runs 
out of sequence, the system is no longer operating as expected – and therefore can no longer be 
―trusted.‖  A process invocation sequence is the order in which processes are invoked in a 
system.  When the OS boots up, a single process is loaded and invokes a series of other processes 
until the entire OS is loaded.  The scheduler, memory manager, I/O subsystem, and all system 
services are inter-linked through a series of process invocation sequences. Whenever a user starts 
an application, another substring of the process invocation sequence is started.  Proper operation 
of an OS consists of only certain process invocation sequences being executed.  These process 
invocation sequences are referred to in this research as program paths.  When an OS or 
application deviates from a valid program path (PP), the integrity of that system has been 
compromised [Schr74-1].   
Previous methods to map PP use traces, compiled languages, and even coding PP sequences 
into programs [ACF99] [Mcca05].  These approaches soon become too difficult and too tedious 
to administer [ACF99] [Mcca05]. Administrators needed in-depth system knowledge and in 
some cases had to manually write sophisticated program languages to create new PP mappings.  
Such mappings either began to take up too much memory, or took too long to calculate [Schr74-
1].  As some sparser, more manageable, PP maps began to be used on systems, administrators 
found deficiencies in their function.  These systems could only determine process invocation 
sequences that were explicitly learned – they could not deduce implied process invocation 
sequences.   
Processes have a number of behavioral characteristics that make the mapping of process 
invocation sequences particularly difficult.  A running process has a unique process identity and 
location, and may exhibit a number of behaviors such as accessing resources, running privileged 
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instructions, and requesting allocation of executable and data memory.  These and other 
behavioral characteristics, although important for other considerations, may be added to the PP 
model in later research.  This research restricts itself to those characteristics that are relevant to 
mapping process invocation sequences.  The PP model is intended as a fundamental building 
block to which other behavioral system characteristics can be attached.   
Earlier attempts to map trusted program paths and identify some of the pitfalls encountered 
are discussed in chapter 5.  It is the not purpose of this research, to come up with a revolutionary 
approach, but to keep the solution focused on solving only the process invocation mapping and 
validation problem.  Particular focus is given to the computational theory behind the program 
pathing solution approach presented (see chapter 6).  This research focuses upon an approach 
that includes the necessary computational power to solve the problem, but no additional 
computational power.   
Before describing the proposed Program Pathing Trust (PPT) Model, it is important to 
understand the arena in which it participates.   Without a background in computer security, the 
impact of the PPT model may not be obvious.  Therefore, this paper first frames the context of 
computer security in which the PPT model is relevant.  The PPT model is not intended as a 
comprehensive approach to computer security, but as an added dimension to existing security 
systems.  Over the past three decades, the developing discipline of computer security has 
matured, but has taken many tangents.  What started out as enforcement of access control has 
developed into various other disciplines such as threat management, compliance, security policy 
and forensics [Harr03]. This research demonstrates that an automaton provides an appropriate 
computational model to solve an important system integrity problem in computer security, the 
identification of valid process invocation sequences.   
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4.2 Security and Program Pathing 
4.2.1 Detection and Protection Systems 
Computer security approaches can be divided into two distinct categories – detection and 
protection.  The detection branch of computer security developed as a result of computers 
becoming more accessible through the Internet [Harr03]. Public users had direct access to 
applications and the computers hosting these applications, making it possible for users to 
interfere with normal computer functions.  By virtue of being available to users, systems were no 
longer isolated and became more vulnerable to a long list of threats: viruses, Trojan horses, 
worms, time bombs and other malware.  Intrusion detection systems were developed to identify 
the infiltration of these threats [Harr03]. Such systems are traditionally signature based.  That is, 
they can only detect malware intrusions that are known and they are configured to identify 
[Appf05] [Syma05].   As malware becomes more polymorphic and adaptable, more research is 
being done on developing detection systems that can identify malware that has not been 
previously encountered [Kole05].  Research on intrusion detection has relevance to this research 
and is reviewed in chapter 5. 
The protection branch of computer security, about 20 years older, is concerned with 
regulating access to host computers and their applications.  Initially the threat population for 
computers was limited to the small group of operators and system programmers who had access 
to computers, isolated in secured data centers. So, much of the attention to security was based on 
limiting and defending computer resources against unauthorized internal access.  Such protection 
is known as access control and is primarily composed of authentication and authorization.   
Access control systems are at the core of a ―trusted‖ system.  A trusted system is one that can 
be relied upon to maintain its status as an uncompromised and reliable system.  The concepts of 
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access control and trusted systems have been tightly linked from the beginnings of computer 
security in the 1970s.  They continue to be issues with the prevalence of malware and society‘s 
interdependence upon computer applications.  In the 1960‘s and 70‘s the problem was dealt with 
by isolating computer systems in secure data centers, and physically restricting access.  But even 
then, there was concern that these systems might not be defendable against internal threats.   
4.2.2 Aspects of Access Control Systems (Protection System) 
Information security systems can be categorized into two types: data security and system 
security.  This is not a distinction that has always been made, because originally all information 
security systems either presupposed system security or both data and system security were 
integrated into access control systems.  As the discipline of information security matured, the 
distinction became clearer; government agencies began to define ―trusted‖ systems and the 
private sector developed commercial products that aided in implementing ―trusted‖ system 
integrity, using techniques such as anti-virus, compliance monitors and intrusion detection 
systems.   
Data security systems protect vital information stored and processed by the computer from 
unauthorized access.  System security systems protect the computer‘s resources and processes.  
System security is a prerequisite for good data security.  An access control security system 
requires two preconditions: (1) the operating system must have integrity (initially free from 
vulnerabilities), and (2) the operating system must be protected by a security system (to maintain 
integrity).  The security system and the operating system form a mutually enabling and 
dependent relationship.  The security system can permit damage to the operating system by 
allowing exposures, malware or malicious users into privileged areas of the operating system.  
The operating system can circumvent an access control security system by not implementing the 
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proper security intercepts, or by not properly enforcing the privileges required by system 
programs or personnel, enabling them to disable the security system. 
4.2.2.1 Data Security 
Data security protects the data being stored and processed by the computer. Data security 
protects the integrity of the user‘s data, but can be extended to encompass all kinds of data, files, 
directories, user applications and computer resources, such as printers, internet access and 
executable programs.  Data security is the ultimate goal of any computer security system. 
Data security has been implemented in most operating systems in a variety of ways, but 
generally as a discretionary access control (DAC) system which allows data owners to grant 
access as they see fit.  DAC systems traditionally require the defining of subjects (users) and 
objects (computer resources).  Subjects are granted access to objects through an enforcement 
mechanism. Subjects can be granted READ, WRITE, ALLOCATE or EXECUTE privileges to 
an object.   Subjects can also be designated as owners of objects and possibly grant other subjects 
access to objects they own. [ACF99] 
Mandatory access control (MAC) also provides data security, although it is enforced by the 
operating system using policies and only security administrators have the ability to grant access 
to objects.  MAC systems traditionally are multi-level security (MLS) systems tightly integrated 
into the operating system.  The U.S. Department of Defense Trusted Computer Security 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), also referred to as the DoD Orange Book, defines mandatory 
security as being associated with security labels (security attributes) associated with objects to 
reflect their level of sensitivity; security labels are also assigned to subjects [DoD85]. Under 
MAC, subject and object labels must match or the subject label must dominate (be of a higher 
authority than) the object‘s security label for the subject to have access to the object.   
 27 
4.2.2.2 System  Security 
System security ensures the integrity of the operating system.  Traditionally, the primary 
design goal for operating systems is functionality, not security.  It is often said that security is an 
after-thought in the design of operating systems [AFM99].  As described above, early attempts at 
system security consisted of simply removing the entire system to a physical environment where 
penetrability was acceptably minimized.  In the 1970s, with the arrival of interactive systems 
(timesharing, multi-programming, on-line, and multi-processing), securing the operating system 
became the primary focus of computer security [Schr74-1]. Physically isolating the computer 
and its access was no longer sufficient as a security strategy because the computer was being 
accessed by a larger population, sometimes remotely connected by a private network (SNA or 
LAN).  Access control systems, although primarily data security controls, were modified to 
provide some system security controls.   
As computer access extended beyond secure data centers across the world through the 
internet, maintaining a computer‘s ―trust‖ status became an imperative challenge for computers 
running critical applications.  In the context of computer systems, ―trust‖ has taken on many 
meanings over the past decades [DoD85].  This research focuses on the question:  can the 
process invocations in ―trusted‖ computer systems be validated?  Both discretionary access 
control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC) contain rudiments of this form of system 
security [ACF99] [Clar87]. Both protect the system executable files and directories.   
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Chapter  5: Program Pathing Background 
5.1 Trusted System 
One can easily imagine the failure of a nation‘s financial system, regional power grid or 
internet because of cyber terrorism, or accidental interference. A nation‘s central bank‘s 
applications, for instance, may run on a collection of servers, any one of which might process 
trillions of dollars a day and, if compromised, could cause catastrophic events.  Interference to 
one of these applications could damage the economy, reduce public confidence in the money 
supply and possibly cause the devaluation of the nation‘s currency.  Therefore, it is important for 
computers running these applications to maintain a ―trusted‖ status.  A ―trusted‖ system is not 
just free from malware; it also has only prescribed applications running on the system.  ―Trusted‖ 
machines are computers dedicated to run critical applications without interference.  Other 
applications, authorized to run on other systems, may not be authorized to run on the trusted 
system.  This restriction is required because untrusted (or unauthorized) process may steal CPU 
cycles, reduce performance, or create exposures, causing vulnerabilities and lead to system 
compromise. An application may be so critical that it is imperative it run without interference – 
and therefore it must run only on trusted computer systems. 
5.1.1 What is a Trusted System? 
What constitutes a ―trusted‖ system?  A ―trusted‖ system is defined by this research as a 
dedicated system that is certified to run a critical application and that runs only those processes 
necessary to support the critical application.  ―Trusted‖ systems are required to be locked down 
with the highest security requirements in order to ensure that the operating system, the 
applications and the security systems maintain their integrity. 
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Critical applications, as defined by this research, are any applications that are essential to an 
organization.  As a rule, these critical applications are necessary to fulfill the organization‘s 
mission; without them the organization would fail.  Critical applications have a requirement for 
high availability and resilience.  Examples of critical applications might be associated with 
nuclear power plant operations, military infrastructure support, central financial applications, life 
sustaining medical applications, communication systems and navigation systems.  The need for a 
―trusted‖ system is a function of the organization‘s tolerance for doing without the critical 
application(s).  If an organization determines that it can do without an application for a period of 
time, even when failover systems fail, and are willing to accept the risk, then the application is 
probably not critical and a ―trusted‖ system is not necessary. 
5.2 Program Pathing as part of a Trusted System  
Program Pathing is by no means the whole solution to the system integrity problem and by 
itself does not guarantee a system is ―trusted.‖  There are many aspects of a trusted system the 
program pathing model does not address.  However, it is an essential part of the solution.   
5.2.1 Conceptual Security Models Related to Program Pathing 
A number of computer security models have been developed over the past 30 years.   
Although they are all important, a specific few provide a good background to this research and 
have an influence upon it.   
5.2.1.1 Goguen-Meseguer Model 
Goguen-Meseguer took the military lattice approach to information security and created a 
model to define a ―security policy‖.   They make a distinction between security policy and 
security model.  By their definitions a security model is a description of a security system, 
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whereas a security policy is the set of requirements for a security system. The approach identifies 
the need to administer a security policy that is not static. [Gogu82] 
The concept of security policy allowed for the definition of policies such as multi-level 
security (MLS), capability passing, confinement, compartmentalization, discretionary access, 
authorization chains and downgrading.  The existing concept of ―trusted processes‖ was not that 
the processes were restricted from running, but that they were restricted from access to sensitive 
data.  Most operating system processes were considered ―trusted processes‖ because they needed 
universal access to all resources.   Goguen-Meseguer considered ―trusted processes‖ such as 
these to be unnecessarily dangerous, since they could perform any action upon any of the system 
resources.   Their model intended to define precise security policies for subsystems by creating 
domains, and hence restricting the access of processes to resources. 
The Goguen-Meseguer model is important because it introduced two concepts. First, it 
introduced the use of an automaton to model a security solution.  The present research goes 
further and actually uses automaton theory to implement a solution.  Secondly, the Goguen-
Meseguer model introduced the concept of compartmentalization to security policy, with regards 
to operating system integrity.  This concept arises numerous times in solutions proposed for the 
system integrity problem.  The PPT model restricts valid sequences to only specific authorization 
paths. 
5.2.1.2 Clark-Wilson Integrity Model  
Clark-Wilson recognized that the traditional military model of computer security proposed in 
academic circles at the time was not well suited to the commercial realm.  In the mid to late 
1980s the military was focused upon mandatory access control systems whereas commercial 
systems were focused upon discretionary access control systems.   The Clark-Wilson model 
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noted the fact that the problem of data integrity existed for both military and commercial 
environments.  The goal of the Clark-Wilson model was to ensure that no user, not even an 
authorized one, should be permitted to corrupt data, either by accident or with the intent to 
commit fraud or to be malicious.  To this end, Clark-Wilson‘s model focused upon two concepts: 
(1) the well-formed transaction, and (2) separation of duties.  [Clar87] 
The well-formed transaction stipulates,  
…that a user should not manipulate data arbitrarily, but only in constrained ways that 
preserve or ensure the integrity of the data.  A very common mechanism in well-formed 
transactions is to record all data modification in a log so that actions can be audited later. 
[Clar87] 
 
In other words, a user may have access to a resource only indirectly through a particular program 
(or set of programs), written specifically for manipulating the data.  Giving access only to the 
program, without identifying the user would not be sufficient, as ―individual accountability‖ 
would be lost; it would be known that the program modified the data, but who used the program 
to modify the data would not be known.    
The Clark-Wilson model sets up a data integrity problem to which the program pathing trust 
model is a solution.  That is, the Clark-Wilson model presupposes that all application developers 
code their applications with this security concept in mind.  However, not only do some 
application programmers not use the Clark-Wilson model, it has an inherent flaw.  It assumes 
that if the program that has access to the data and the user is valid, then the transaction is a ―well-
formed transaction.‖   It is possible, however, for a malicious user or process to invoke the valid 
process out of sequence of the intended application, thereby circumventing the well-formed 
transaction.    
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5.2.1.3 Brewer-Nash Model (Chinese Wall) 
Although Clark-Wilson made mandatory access control more palatable, commercial 
mandatory access control gained few footholds in the commercial world except for those 
industries required to comply with government contracts.   ACF2
®4
 and RACF
®5
 both 
implemented mandatory access control using the Clark-Wilson model, but the feature was rarely 
used [ACF99] [RACF03].   
The Brewer-Nash model integrated the concepts of Clark-Wilson by creating another 
variation of a mandatory access control.  The Brewer-Nash model, commonly known as the 
Chinese Wall Security Policy [Bre89], defines a model based upon the concept of ―conflict of 
interest classes.‖  The concept is built upon the theory that as a subject gains access rights in one 
class of data, it restricts the subject‘s access to other data within the same class.   The idea is to 
keep commercial subjects from profiting ―inside knowledge‖ of data accessed in one area or 
from gaining similar knowledge from another entity within the same class.   
The model is best explained using the Brewer-Nash example of 3 companies.   Say that a 
system stores information on Bank-company-A, Oil-company-B, and Oil-company-C.   The 
model has three levels of ―significance‖ (1) objects at the lowest level, (2) groups of all objects 
that belong to an organization or company, the company dataset, and (3) the group of all the 
company datasets whose companies are in competition, the conflict of interest class. [Bre89]  In 
this example, if a user has access to Oil-company-B, the user can be permitted access to Bank-
company-A, but not Oil-company-C.  This is because Oil-company-B and Oil-company-C are in 
the same conflict of interest class, whereas Bank-company-A is not in the same conflict of 
interest class as the two oil companies.   
                                                 
4
 ACF2

 is an access control product designed for MVS by Computer Associates 
5
 RACF

is an access control product designed for MVS by IBM 
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The Chinese Wall Security Policy model is important to consider when analyzing system 
integrity, in that it addresses an important problem in multi-processing computer environments.   
PPT uses Chinese Wall concepts to solve a system integrity problem, in a computing 
environment where it is not valid to run two different process invocation sequences at the same 
time.  For instance, it may be valid to execute Application A, except when Application B is 
executing.   Running both applications simultaneously may create an integrity exposure – as in 
the case of running a maintenance process while production processing is running. 
5.2.2 Other Implementations of a Trusted System Using Invocation Sequences 
The first attempt to define ―trusted‖ system began in December of 1972, at the interim IBM 
SHARE [Schr74-1] (user group) meeting in San Diego.  The SHARE VS/OS Security and Data 
Management Project met in open session to begin its investigation into the lack of system 
integrity and computer security in IBM‘s OS/MVT operating system.  It was one of the first 
known assemblies of computer industry professionals to come together to discuss the topic of 
creating a commercial computer security system.  A diverse group, representing educational 
institutions, service bureaus, the Department of Defense and commercial industry, met to discuss 
the requirements for making computer systems secure.  Barry Schrager, Data Center Director at 
the University of Illinois and SHARE Project Manger, documented the findings and 
requirements of the group in a white paper and presented it to IBM [Schr74-2].   
The SHARE Security and Data Management Project focused on two basic concepts: (1) a 
security system was needed, and (2) as a prerequisite, the operating system had to ensure basic 
system integrity.  SHARE defined system integrity as ―the ability of the system to protect itself 
against unauthorized user access to the extent that the security controls cannot be compromised 
[Sch74-1].‖ The group identified that these two issues, system integrity and data security, were 
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crucial to a computer security system.  The committee‘s white paper highlighted specific 
requirements: 
 The security system should be an integral part of the operating system 
 Identification and validation of users is the first level of security 
 The security system should not be able to be turned off 
 The system should not have to purge all jobs just to run secure jobs 
 The security system should be able to selectively run high-overhead functions on an 
individual basis. 
 A program interface should be the only way to access specific data [Sch74-1].  
The last point defines the need for an access control system where data can only be accessed 
through specified program interfaces (this pre-dates the Clark-Wilson model by 12 years).  This 
requirement was defined by the VS/OS group SHARE requirement #73-86: 
Description: 
There should be a centralized bank of resource control information and an installation replaceable operating 
system provided service for accessing and maintaining it.  The resource control information must relate 
resources (such as datasets, program paths, etc.), conditions under which they can be made available (such as  
levels of validation), and user identifiers must all be installation definable.   
 
All authorization and delegation must flow through the single operating system access and maintenance service, 
and this service must be invokable during normal production operation.  Invocation for the purpose of 
validating access to a resource should return a yes or no answer and optionally a variable length byte string to 
be used in corrective action (e.g. an error message, module name, or a limit on a quantitative resource). 
[Sch74-1] 
 
Further discussion identified the issue of validation of the program path in accessing data.  
Although the technologies have changed since the 1970‘s, the concerns about program structures 
providing increased integrity remain valid today.  This requirement is at the heart of this research 
and was specified in VS/OS group SHARE requirement #73-89: 
Description: 
There should be the capability of associating with any dataset a single interface program capable of accessing 
that dataset.  Where the interface program is a subsystem (e.g. IMS) an interface should be provided to other 
subsystems (e.g. TSO). 
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Incentive: 
The need to be able to limit the path to a dataset to one interface program structures the system so as to 
provide increased integrity, security and backup capabilities.  [Sch74-1] 
 
In the SHARE security white paper, the program pathing requirement expressed not only a 
concern for data security but also for data integrity.  Data accuracy and completeness, as well as 
the protection of the data from unauthorized destruction, modification or disclosure (accidental 
or intentional) were a concern.  The requirement recognized that granting access permissions to 
data was not sufficient for some data, the security system must also identify and validate the 
interface program structure by which the data is accessed.   
In the final IBM white paper, the user group described program pathing as an integral part of 
the security system as follows: 
Its interfaces to the system should be modifiable so that, with simulation, its decision making processes could 
be more easily tested, understood and verified.  With a well planned set of interfaces via the system control 
program, it could be easy to use for application programs.  Since it would be removed from the application 
programs themselves, application programmers need not know the exact decision making process that would be 
used.  Conversely, the decision process could be easily modified without having to modify each of the 
application programs.  And finally, since it would easily be removed from the physical resource control, it could 
easily control conceptual resource such as program paths.   
 
Program paths are transactions, command sequences, and operating processes such as ―OPEN‖.   A program 
path can also be defined to include the flow of control within a module.  This enables an installation to define 
different security levels for different paths within an application program, without having to rewrite different 
application programs due to the differing requirements for security. [Sch74-2] 
 
IBM response to the SHARE white paper was mixed.  They accepted the basic premises, but 
rejected (or ignored) some of its requirements.  The OS integrity requirements were accepted and 
implemented in OS/MVS.  Protection keys and separation of user applications were enforced 
using virtual storage address spaces.  The data security requirements were responded to by IBM 
with the introduction of their access control product RACF

.  However, IBM did not include all 
the security requirements from the white paper in their newly developed security system, RACF

 
and program pathing was one of those features missing in the new security system.   In response 
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to IBM‘s rejection of the security model described in the SHARE white paper, a few members of 
the SHARE group developed a security system using the SHARE white paper as the conceptual 
design.  The result was ACF2
, IBM‘s primary competitor in computer security [Sch74-2]. 
ACF2
®
 (Access Control Facility – Second Generation) implemented a version of program 
pathing.  ACF2
®
 was created by SKK, Inc. (Schrager, Klemens, and Krueger, Inc., 1978-1986) 
in Chicago, Illinois after the founders left the University of Illinois Circle Campus, where the 
first generation of the ACF
 
security system was developed 
The RACF
®
 philosophy of computer security was opposite of that of ACF2
®
.  Whereas 
ACF2
®‘s view of data security was from the resources point of view (rule based), RACF® took 
an end-user‘s point of view (profile based).  ACF2® based its philosophy on the notion that 
resources (information) were corporate assets.  An organizations main goal was to protect those 
assets and therefore would want to look at the computer security from that perspective.  RACF
®
, 
on the other hand, viewed computer security as a means to control user access to assets.  RACF 
took a programmer‘s or user‘s point of view.  One other primary difference between the two 
security systems at the time was that ACF2
®
 enforced security by default – access was denied 
unless explicitly granted.  RACF
®
 would later adopt the same strategy.   
In 1986, ACF2
®
 was purchased by UCCEL and then the following year by Computer 
Associates (CA).  CA struggled with the program pathing feature in ACF2
®
 as the z/OS 
computing environments became more complex.  Finally, in 1999 CA removed the original 
program pathing feature and now verifies only the program accessing the resource, instead of the 
entire program path [ACF99].   
The ACF2
®
 version of program pathing is an early version and inspiration of the Program 
Pathing Trust Model described in this document.   It is the purpose of this research to overcome 
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some of the implementation problems that forced CA to remove the feature from ACF2
®
, and to 
show how, by expanding the model, it can be used to deal with trusted computer environment 
problems.
 
5.2.2.1 ACF2® 
ACF2
®‘s version of program pathing was implemented in 1974, and immediately 
experienced problems with properly mapping process invocation sequences.  In 1999, ACF2
®
 
disabled the program sequence checking feature of program pathing, due to the complexity of 
identifying program paths [ACF99].  The approach of implementing program pathing used by 
ACF2
®
 was to take a core dump of a running process.  The systems programmer would then read 
the core dump, find the Task Control Block (TCB) and follow the Request Block (RB) chain 
which represented the program invocation sequence that was recorded by the operating system 
scheduler.   The program path that was discovered in the operating system‘s TCB/RB chain was 
then manually translated into assembler MACROs (created by ACF2

 developers for that 
purpose) and assembled into the ACF99@RB module (see Appendix C).  ACF99@RB was able 
to define a number of programming environments using the TCB/RB linkage chains.  ACF2

 
program pathing was not able to use source to develop the mappings in ACF99@RB, due to the 
fact that not all vendors supplied the source code to their processes.  
Figure 5-1 is a representation of a program path making up application 1 with a process 
invocation sequence of Program1, Program2, Program3, OSProgram1, OSProgram2, and 
OSProgram3.  Program3 requests OS services to OPEN and READ the file.  OSProgram3 does 
the actual OPEN and READing of the data file.  Under the ACF2
®
 model of program pathing, 
the operating system is considered trusted and the ACF2
®
 path does not extend into the operating 
system program flow.  In the ACF2
®
 model only the program state RB chain would have to be 
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Figure 5-1 MVS Control Block Structure that ACF2 Program Pathing Maps 
defined in ACF99@RB.   Therefore, only the ―Program‖ program flow would be relevant in the 
program path.  ACF2
‘s constructs were not always strictly adhered to from release to release.  
This was due to the changing architecture of OS/MVS as IBM tightened up system integrity.  In 
some releases, selected parts of the OS programs were often identified in the program path as 
well.   Below is how the example in figure 5-1 would have been coded in ACF99@RB [ACF89].   
APPL1    @CMD  , 
@TCB  #APPL1 
#PROGRAM1  @RB  PROGRAM1,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB, 
NEXT=(RB,#PGM##) 
#PGM##    @RB PROGRAM**,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB, 
NEXT=(RB,#PGM##,#OS##) 
#OS##   @RB   PROGRAM**,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),END 
[ACF89] 
Updating ACF99@RB was a tedious task and took intimate knowledge of the task 
scheduling subsystem in the IBM MVS operating system.  With the increasing complexity of the 
MVS operating system (as IBM updated MVS with new architectures, going from MVS, to XA, 
to ESA to z/OS) and fewer and fewer technicians understanding MVS and ACF2 internals, 
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Computer Associates was forced to simplify the program pathing feature in CA-ACF2
®
.  
Currently, ACF2
®
 program pathing involves validating only the program that actually issues the 
OPEN for a dataset (file), in this case, Program3, not the entire program path RB chain 
(programming environment). 
In the current implementation of program pathing, the security administrator only needs to 
specify the name of the program that issues the OPEN of the file on the ACF2 rule as follows: 
MY.DATA    UID(*******userid)   PROGRAM(XYZ)  READ(ALLOW) 
The above ACF2
®
 rule line specifies that the userid can only read the MY.DATA file if the user 
accesses the file using the XYZ program through the paths defined in ACF99@RB.  By dropping 
program pathing from ACF2

, program XYZ can be validated for accessing the resource 
MY.DATA, but the paths in ACF99@RB are no long part of the authorization criteria.   This 
presents a problem if XYZ is a generic read program that any programmer can invoke from any 
program.  It may be necessary to validate that a user is attempting access by a program that is 
authorized to invoke XYZ.   ACF99@RB is no longer used in ACF2

. 
5.2.2.2 RACF® PADS 
RACF
®, IBM‘s z/OS (MVS) security system, implemented program control using Program 
Access to Data Support (PADS) [RACF03].   PADS performs somewhat like ACF2
®
 in its 
current implementation.  Trusted programs are registered in PROGRAM profiles, and only 
authorized users can execute these programs (although PADS does not validate the entire 
program path, it does restrict access to programs).  An example of RACF‘s PADS 
implementation is as follows: 
RDEFINE   PROGRAM    XYZ   ADDMEM(„SYS1.LINKLIB‟) 
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In the above example, the XYZ program in the ―SYS1.LINKLIB‖ file is identified as a trusted 
program. 
PERMIT  XYZ  ID(userid)  ACCESS(EXECUTE)  CLASS(PROGRAM) 
In this example, the userid is given execute access to the XYZ program defined in the previous 
command.   
Data is protected from being accessed by anyone except through a particular program by 
specifying the program in the data profile: 
PERMIT „MY.DATA‟ ID(userid) WHEN(PROGRAM(XYZ))    ACCESS(READ) 
The example above specifies that the userid has read access to the MY.DATA file, but only if 
it is accessed by the XYZ program.  PADS performs the same functionality as the current 
ACF2
®
 implementation.   
5.2.2.3 Top Secret® 
Computer Associates‘ other z/OS security product, CA-Top Secret®, defines computer 
environments with the use of its Facility feature.  CA-Top Secret
®‘s approach is to define the 
initialization program and the program name id.  Under z/OS (MVS), the tradition is that the first 
3 characters of a program product are unique to the program product – CA-Top Secret® takes 
advantage of this to identify a Facility (or programming environment).  CA-Top Secret
®
 creates 
a facility by grouping a set of program names.   Taking advantage of the z/OS programming 
convention that all the program names of a function within an application begin with the same 3 
characters, facilities can be defined by masking the program names, e.g., ISP***** (which 
would define the ISPF programming environment).   CA-Top Secret
®
, however, does not have 
the concept of program pathing as referred to in this research – it merely names the programs in 
the program path, but does not identify their invocation sequences.  Top Secret

 facilities can 
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identify an environment - identify all the programs belonging to an environment, but cannot 
identify their invocation sequence. 
5.2.3 More Recent Background 
5.2.3.1 Trusted Path Execution (TPE) 
Niki Rahimi (IBM) has done work in the area of program path validation in Linux, taking 
advantage of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) hooks.  His work, the "Trusted Path Execution" 
(TPE) [Rahi04] although possibly appearing to be similar to the PPT model, takes a different 
approach.   The trusted path that Rahimi refers to in the TPE is the directory path from which an 
executable resides, not the sequence of program flow path.  Although TPE‘s intent is partially 
the same as that of the PPT model, to prevent the execution of malicious code, it does not 
encompass the whole of PPT‘s strengths.  TPE only verifies that a program was loaded from a 
particular directory. 
Rahimi‘s concept is to validate that the directory paths where a system program resides, and 
verify that only root has authority to write to that directory.  Any program that resides in a 
directory that is writeable by any other userid than root is considered untrusted.  Rahimi‘s TPE is 
based on the premise that a malicious user can overwrite or damage the operating system code if 
the directory has the write privilege granted to anyone else but to the root ID.  [Rahi04]   
Rahimi‘s theory works under the assumption that it is a good thing for root to install all 
software.  However, this does not promote a Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
implementation of security.  Most security professionals would try to limit the use of root to only 
the operating system.  Most IT shops are trying to restrict the use of root.  Root has ―all 
powerful‖ authority – the user using root, cannot be identified when s/he performs activities, 
making individual accountability difficult.  In addition, there is no good way to restrict a user‘s 
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use of root to only those tasks s/he needs to perform.  SUDO [Mann03] (under UNIX and Linux) 
could be used to restrict a user‘s use of root, although SUDO has flaws that enable a 
sophisticated user to get around these restrictions.   
The goal of a true RBAC implemented system is to (1) restrict all users to only those 
functions and data they are required to perform, and (2) to log a user‘s actions on the computer, 
so as to ensure individual accountability.  If all software had to be installed with root then too 
many technicians would have to be granted root authority, because in large shops there are 
multiple technical roles.  TPE provides a good mechanism to ensure that a program is coming 
from a directory in which it was installed, however the theory needs further refinement if it were 
to fit an RBAC implementation of security. 
The PPT model can be used in tandem with Rahimi‘s TPE; they are not incompatible.  PPT 
deals only with the progression of the process invocation sequences, not with validating the 
directory from which the program resides, so this is an aspect of TPE that would enhance a PPT 
implementation (see section 9.3). 
5.2.3.2 Symantec’s Critical Program System (CPS) 
In Symantec Corporation‘s purchase of Platform Logic, it acquired the Host Intrusion 
Prevention product, AppFire
® 
[Appf04]. AppFire
®
, now enhanced and re-branded Critical 
System Protection
® 
(CPS), approaches system integrity using a behavior-based approach.  
Symantec‘s approach is based upon the concept that each software program accesses particular 
resources and accesses them in a particular way.  For example, a program may have to create, 
update or read a log file, or access a particular tablespace in a database.  Behaviors might be 
described as such things as functions of the operating system or application as it accesses files, 
registries, devices, network connections or other system services.    
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Behaviors are defined in Behavior Control Descriptions (BCD).  Each BCD is a set of 
behavior definitions defining a set of resource names, access permissions requested and time or 
frequency of access.  The BCD is in turn associated with a set of processes or a logical group of 
processes invoked a Process Set (PSET).   The PSET associates a set of resources and 
permissions to the set of processes defined in the PSET.  The Process Binding Rules (PBR) 
assigns a process to a process set (PSET).   
BCDs are defined with the product‘s ―profiler tool,‖ which can be set to automatically 
generate a BCD.  The process of automatically creating the BCD is referred to as ―self-learning‖.    
One of the chief advantages of CPS is that the self-learning mode provides a ―crystal box‖ 
approach, where the administrator can audit the behavior controls generated, and the 
administrator can review and modify the generated behavior policy defined in the BCD.    
CPS‘s architecture is not concerned with program pathing (program flow control), however it 
does offer an interesting self-learning concept using the ―crystal box‖ technique.   Unlike many 
―self-learning‖ systems, CPS provides the administrator with the ability to review what the 
system has learned in human-readable format, providing the administrator the opportunity to 
fine-tune and correct the BCD access permissions.  The concept used in CPS more closely 
resembles the Clark-Wilson model implemented by ACF2
‘s program control and RACF‘s 
PADS than it resembles PPT. 
5.2.3.3 SELINUX 
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [NSA01] [Mcca05] [Smal01b] is a National Security 
Agency (NSA) project created to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities in Linux.  
SELinux is a mandatory access control system developed to secure government systems for 
critical applications.  SELinux is based on Flux Advanced Security Kernel (FLASK) [Spen99], a 
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security architecture framework for operating systems.  The FLASK architecture is based upon 
the Flux OS toolkit [Ford97] and was prototyped in the Fluke OS [AFM99]. SELinux is built 
upon a mandatory access control, but it departs from the traditional definition of mandatory 
access control.  Unlike the more traditional versions of mandatory access control (MAC) as 
defined by Bell-LaPadula [Bell76], Biba [Biba77] and the Clark-Wilson  [Clar87] models, the 
FLASK model is a policy-based model.  The basic components of SELinux are a combination of 
type enforcement (TE), role-based access control (RBAC), and multi-level security (MLS).  The 
policy is made up of a reference policy language.  It is compiled and loaded into a reference 
policy in the Linux kernel. 
The reference policy is made up of a policy language that defines computer types.  SELinux 
defines many kinds of types, but a simplistic example is one which defines types of the attributes 
files and processes.  Processes are defined in domains.  Files are defined as resources.  After 
defining domains and resources, the reference policy language defines the domains‘ access to the 
resources, as shown in figure 5-2. 
 
Figure 5-2 SELinux Domain - Resource Concept 
Figure 5-3 is an example of a SELinux policy reference language [Mcca05].  Note that the 
reference policy language defines all the computer entities, both files and processes.  The first 
part of the policy reference language defines the types, then the attributes of 
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Figure 5-3 SELinux Policy Reference Language for daemon.te 
the types are assigned.  In the second part of the policy the domain type is granted access to each 
resource type.  Figure 5-4 illustrates a graphic representation of the security policy in figure 5-3. 
 
Figure 5-4 Conceptual Diagram of Daemon Policy Reference Example 
An interesting feature of SELinux is how it maps process invocation sequences.  It groups 
processes in domains and identifies which processes in the domain can invoke other processes in 
the domain using type enforcement.  SELinux‘s type enforcement (TE) domain transitions are 
based upon the association of programs (or processes) within domains.  A domain is a set of like-
programs (or processes) that work together to create a function (domain).  A domain of programs 
type   daemon.edit; 
type   daemon.d; 
type   daemon.log; 
type   daemon.conf; 
type   port_80; 
domain   daemon : { dirFiles piple }; 
resource   port_80 : { direFiles sockets }; 
domain   daemon.edit : { dirFiles }; 
domain   daemon.d : {dirFiles pipes }; 
resource   daemon.log : { dirFiles };  
resource   daemon.conf  : { dirFiles }; 
access   daemon.d    port_80  read { dirFiles:stat   
sockets:read }; 
access   daemon.d    port_80  write  { dirFiles:none  
sockets: read }; 
 
access   daemon.edit    daemon.conf    read; 
access  daemon.edit    da mon.conf    write; 
a cess   daemon.d    daemon.conf    read; 
access   daemon.d    daemon.log    write {  dirFiles:append  }; 
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is a type.  Each domain is assigned a set of permissions that allow the domain (the set of 
programs) to perform a function.  Domains can invoke other programs within the same domain 
or in other domains using ―transition‖ rules.  SELinux‘s focus, however, is not restricted to the 
invoking sequence of one process invocation to another, but on one domain transitioning to 
another or other types (files, sockets, etc.) – this is determined by type enforcement (TE), which 
is type transition rules.  
The reference policy language illustrated in Figure 5-5 [Macc05] modifies the reference 
policy in Figure 5-3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-5 SELinux Process Control 
In this new domain, the daemon.init process is added to the daemon domain and becomes the 
initialization process that invokes the daemon.edit and daemon.d processes.  The daemon domain 
is modified as shown in Figure 5-6.   
The SELinux reference policy language is not easy to use – and the examples above are very 
simple cases, not using all the capabilities of the language.  Although the language is very 
powerful it requires in-depth knowledge of the processes, files and other resources running on 
the Linux system in order to use it well.  There are literally hundreds of man-years of 
development of the SELinux reference policy.  At this time the kernel reference policy has been 
type daemon-init; 
type  daemon.edit; 
type daemon.d 
domain_type(daemon-init) 
init_daemon_domain(daemon-init,daemon.edit, 
daemon.d) 
 
allow    daemon-init    daemon.edit:process 
transition; 
allow    daemon-init    daemon.d:process 
transition; 
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Figure 5-6 SELinux Process Transitions 
nearly completed.  No application programs have had a reference policy written yet.  To write 
the reference policy for an application would require someone to have both in-depth knowledge 
of the internals of the application and proficiency with the reference policy language. 
5.2.4 Current Literature on Program Pathing 
The current literature on process invocation sequence validation is not in the realm of access 
control, but are approaches intended to solve intrusion detection issues.  The literature focuses 
upon discovering invalid process invocation sequences, and does not deal with the prevention of 
unauthorized processes or processes running out of sequence. Figure 5-7 is a citation map of the 
literature showing the evolution of process invocation sequence mapping (see section 2.2) in 
intrusion detection.  Although the literature does not specifically address all the requirements this 
research is investigating, it does deal with the problem of mapping the process invocation 
sequences (refer to section 4.1) which is central to solving the system integrity problem.  
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Figure 5-7 Literature Mapping 
5.2.4.1 Non-Computational Theory Approaches 
As stated earlier, one of the premises of this research is to use computational theory as a 
basis.  A number of approaches in the literature depart from our approach.  The next four 
approaches are examples of some of these unique approaches. 
5.2.4.1.1 Hofmeyr-Forrest – N-Gram Approach 
Every program produces a set of process invocation sequences.  The sequences are 
determined by the execution order of the processes.  Each process is dealt with as a black box – 
the process invocation sequence does not review the internal workings or role of the process, 
outside its invocation of other processes. Hofmeyr-Forrest [Hof98] defines these sets of 
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sequences as normal behavior and divides the sequences into pattern lengths of 5, 6, or 11 
processes.  Patterns allow for a look-ahead expectation of what processes should follow an 
executed process.  The patterns (n-grams) are stored in a database as normal behavior sequences.  
Any behavior not matching one of the n-gram patterns is determined to be abnormal indicating 
an anomaly.   
The approach is performed in two stages.  The first stage scans traces for normal behavior, 
where patterns are created and stored in a database.  In the second stage new behaviors from 
traces are matched to patterns in the database.  Anomalies, new behaviors that are found to be 
different than those captured in the n-gram patterns, are reported as intrusions.  Process 
invocation is determined whenever a process is created (or invoked) using a fork or vfork.  In 
Hofmeyr-Forrest‘s research, only the fork processes were collected as invoked processes.  The 
vfork is created in the process invocation sequence as a new process ID, and is therefore difficult 
to associate in a trace with the process invocation sequence (which has a different process ID).  
This difficulty is easily overcome by profiling the invocation sequences by intercepting 
processes before they are placed on the dispatch queue. 
Collection of normal behaviors can be accomplished by one of two methods.  First, the 
database can collect learned normal behaviors automatically from traces, through a series of 
tests.  Or normal activity from a running production system can be monitored and the database 
can collect the learned normal behavior.  Secondly, the database can be loaded from manually 
constructed traces.  These are normal variations of possible normal behavior created by the 
researchers.  This latter is the approach taken by Hofmeyr-Forrest to test their approach.  It was 
felt that by using these artificial normal behaviors, more variations in behaviors could be 
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captured and fewer false positives would be detected (i.e. the system would identify fewer false 
intrusion detections). 
 Hofmeyr-Forrest identifies a number of hurdles that must be dealt with before the theory can 
be put into practical use.  The hurdles identified involve both operating system issues and 
problems with the n-gram theory that still must be resolved.  The operating system issue is that 
most such systems do not provide the necessary trace facilities with the required detail to collect 
the process invocation sequences.  Therefore, either a better trace facility would have to be 
provided by the operating systems or one would have to be added to the OS.  The issue with the 
n-gram theory is that there is no ―stopping criteria.‖   That is to say, there is no criterion by mean 
of which it can be determined whether the system learned enough different process environments 
to fully capture the process invocation sequences in a system. 
5.2.4.1.2 Warrender - Forrest – Alternate Data Models 
Warrender- Forrest [Warr99] uses the hidden Markov model (HMM) to create a structure to 
map process invocation sequences.  The hidden Markov model is a Bayesian network where the 
state transitions are probabilities.  The HMM takes much longer to train than the other 
approaches discussed in this paper.  Warrender- Forrest stated that HMM took two months to 
train as opposed to other methods that were trainable in a matter of hours for their largest 
training data.   
Another disadvantage of the HMM method is that the researchers had to predict the number 
of states needed for the number of system invocations.  They used a 40-state HMM in most 
cases.  In this approach, prior knowledge of the process invocation environment is needed.  The 
Warrender-Forrest approach is more complicated than needed for detecting invalid process 
invocations. 
 51 
The HMM is not only more complex than is needed, it also takes more time and effort to 
train and more computing power than other methods.  Therefore, the HMM is not a good 
candidate for our purposes, since predicting probability of new process invocation sequences is 
not necessary in validating them. 
5.2.4.1.3 Ghosh – ANN Approach 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) is an attractive approach because it‘s a relativity simple 
approach to code and calculate.  Ghosh‘s [Gho00] approach uses a combination of three 
algorithms to create an ANN supported by a finite state automaton (FSA).  The ANN algorithm 
used is the Elman recurrent neural network [Elm90].  Unlike traditional forward-feed back 
propagation neural networks, the Elman neural network has a feedback loop from the hidden 
layer to a context layer, which gives the new input another source of input feedback from the 
previous input string.  In effect, this allows a string to be broken up into smaller substrings. 
As an input is fed into the input nodes, they are propagated into the hidden nodes, and the results 
are fed into the output nodes and context nodes.  The next input data is fed to the hidden nodes, 
and the context nodes using the previous input‘s context node results are fed into the hidden 
node.  The FSA accepts all the sequences from the training data.   
The data fed into the Elman ANN is converted into n-gram sequences which are further 
divided up into l-gram sequences (l < n) by the string transducer.   The l-gram sequences are fed 
into the Elman ANN input nodes for training and later for verification.  One or more l-grams can 
make up an n-gram (see section 5.2.4.1.1).  A process invocation sequence can be made up of 
multiple n-grams which are recorded into the FSA by the ―state tester.‖   The ―state tester‖ is 
responsible for automatically creating a FSA to represent valid process invocation sequences.  
The training data is made up only of normal behavior and is used to profile normal behavior.  
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The FSA‘s transitions relate to specific l-gram sequences, which in turn make up one or more n-
grams mapping normal processes.  The n-grams and l-grams are just substrings of the process 
invocation sequence.  The n-grams serve the same function as those in the Hofmeyr-Forrest 
approach.   The l-grams are produced from the n-grams so they can be fed into the ANN. 
One of the objections to ANNs is that it is difficult to determine what the ANN has learned.  
The n-gram and FSA appear to help resolve this issue.  The combination usage of the n-gram and 
Elman ANN solves the problem of determining how many input nodes to use in the ANN.  And 
the use of the Elman ANN creates a good decision making engine.  Like most ANN systems, it is 
difficult to determine accountability.  The ANN can identify what process invocation sequences 
are valid, or invalid, but cannot determine why, because the ANN cannot identify specifically 
what part of the process invocation sequence it found invalid. This is because ANN uses 
stochastic gradient decent to determine whether or not a sequence is valid or invalid [Mitc97].  
The ANN translates the sequence into statistical relationships and the original input is lost.  This 
is the major objection to the ANN approach.   
5.2.4.1.4 Ammons -Larus – Retrieval Tree Approach 
Although Ammons-Larus‘s [Amm98] research is concerned with program execution paths as 
opposed to process invocation sequences, it does illustrate other approaches that can be used to 
represent process invocation sequences.  Mapping program execution paths (internal branches 
within a load module) involves different kinds of processes than mapping process invocation 
sequences; however, they both have a similar intent.  They both map the program paths of an 
application or program.  Program execution pathing maps the internal processes (see section 
2.1.2) whereas process invocation sequences map the external processes (see section 2.1.1) of 
one process to another.  So their research has some relevance to this research.   
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The Ammons-Larus method is an adaptation of the Ball-Larus [Ball96] method.  The Ball-
Larus approach maps execution paths to a direct acyclic graph (DAG).   Program execution paths 
(DAGs) are profiled in a control-flow graph (CFG), where each edge is labeled with the 
frequency over a number of dynamic tests.   As the test data is run, each execution path is 
recorded in the CFG and each edge is updated by one as the program‘s execution path is 
recorded.  Each subsequent program test is captured into a CFG. 
The CFG is converted to use a DAG to model the execution paths.  They heuristically 
identify all explicit paths; the DAG optimizes the spanning tree so that no edges sprouting from a 
node have the same value.  This allows the diagram to identify the optimal path.  DAGs are 
appealing because they are used in system scheduling theory to optimize task scheduling of jobs 
to find the longest and shortest paths. 
Ammons/Larus uses Ball-Larus‘s techniques, where the path profiles count the number of 
times a program executes acyclic paths in a CFG.  Ammon-Larus identify the ―hot‖ paths using 
the frequency values on the edges.  Then using the Aho-Corasick [Aho75] algorithm Ammons-
Larus construct a retrieval tree from the hot paths.  A single retrieval tree can represent a number 
of program flows.  Note that unlike Ball-Larus, Ammons-Larus repeats patterns as it progresses 
through the program path.  Program flows with the same beginning prefixes are organized 
together.  As paths are validated against the retrieval tree, if a path enters a state where there isn‘t 
an edge that matches the path, then a failure function is entered, and the path is reset. 
Ammons-Larus claim that if there are no paths that match the substring, then the failure 
function resets the automaton.  However, Ammons-Larus do not define their automaton.  It may 
be that they are only referring to their structure loosely as an automaton and do not mean it as a 
formal automaton in the theoretical sense.  The retrieval tree structure lacks an accepting state.  
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The retrieval tree also does not take advantage of the Keene closure, although this is not a 
requirement of a deterministic finite state automaton.  They divide their paths into partitions, 
which has advantages if we want to isolate different invocation sequences that may be mutually 
exclusive.  A version of this is accomplished in the PPT model.  Operations that are mutually 
exclusive are defined in separate FSA machines.   
5.2.4.2 Computational Theory Approach 
This research shows that a finite automata approach is the preferred computational model to 
use.  Other researchers have had similar hypotheses, and their work is reviewed in this section.     
5.2.4.2.1 Ko-Fink – Execution Monitoring 
Ko and Fink‘s [Ko94] approach analyzes and maps the behavior of privileged programs as a 
comparison reference with actual program behavior recorded in system audit logs.  Although 
privileged programs can potentially do anything, they tend to perform intended behavior that is 
limited and benign.  Privileged programs can bypass both mandatory and discretionary access 
control mechanisms due to their root privilege.  Ko-Fink‘s research developed a language to 
monitor these privileged program behaviors.  The monitoring language verifies that resources 
can only be accessed through invocation of the proper system invocations.   
Unlike other approaches, the mapping of invocation sequences in Ko-Fink mainly focused 
upon processes executing with privileged access. Unprivileged processes are mapped, but only as 
they relate to the privileged processes.  Any unprivileged process invocations encountered are 
considered part of the privileged process invocation sequence.   
Ko-Fink maps the process invocation sequences using a language based upon predicate logic 
and regular expressions.  It is created manually from system audit logs.  The language is made up 
of three operands described in the example below which define the following:  (1) The name of 
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the process executing and the objects it manipulates, (2) the attributes of the processes, or 
objects, for example the owner or permissions, and (3) the current operations of the program 
execution, for instance what the program can do.  An example of the language follows: 
#define  mailboxdir       “/usr/spool/mail” 
#define  mailport  25 
#define  root_mail_handler “/home/root/mail_handler” 
PROGRAM sendmail(user) 
read(X)  :-  worldreadable(X); 
 write(X)  :-  inside(X, mailboxdir); 
 bind(mailport); 
 exec(“bin/mail”); 
 exec(root_mail_handler)  :-  user.uid = 0; 
END      [Ko94] 
 
The ―#define‖ operand defines the attributes of the objects in the rule.   The ―PROGRAM‖ 
operand defines the beginning of the rule.  The ―exec‖ operand identifies the other processes 
invoked in the sequence.   
Ko-Fink uses a Sendmail example to illustrate how the mapping works.  The Sendmail 
program performs a number of functions: (1) it runs as a daemon process to accept mail from 
mail ports and route the mail to remote systems,  (2) it executes mail handlers on the user‘s 
behalf and  (3) it resends pending mail in the mail queue.  Sendmail has a vulnerability that 
enables a user to make Sendmail execute a user program with root access.  The Ko-Fink 
monitoring language restricts Sendmail to executing only processes in the /bin/mail directory 
(shown in the example monitor language rule above).  The monitoring language is a form of 
process invocation sequence verification – Sendmail can only execute processes from a specific 
directory and not just any program specified by the user. 
The merit of this approach is mentioned by other significant papers that investigate 
alternative approaches to the process invocation sequence problem.  The Ko-Fink approach, 
although not practical from an implementation stand-point, does define some of the issues 
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around why mapping and verifying process invocation sequences is important.  It shows a 
number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited by users to compromise security using some 
simple techniques, underlying the need for controlling process sequence validation.  The problem 
with Ko-Fink‘s approach is that mapping the invocation sequences with the language requires it 
to be done manually by a knowledgeable technician.   
5.2.4.2.2 Kosoresow-Hofmeyr – System Call Traces 
Kosoresow-Hofmeyr‘s [Kos97] research is probably one of the most important approaches in 
the recent literature as far as mapping process invocation sequences is concerned.  In this 
approach, process invocation sequences are mapped from system traces using a regular language 
and are used to construct a deterministic finite state automaton (DFA).  A process invocation 
sequence is mapped in the form of a regular language construct called a macro.  Macros do not 
map an entire process invocation sequence, but are built from repeatable patterns found in the 
system calling traces.  Macros are created from a three-phase process,  (1) a process is executed, 
which may or may not generate a process invocation sequence (invoke other processes).  A trace 
of system invocations is produced, showing the processes invoked from the initial process.  (2) 
The system call trace is analyzed by a script that identifies the invocation sequences for a 
particular execution path; this is done to reduce the size of the invocation sequences and identify 
the common invocation sequence patterns characteristic of the process invocation.  The script 
also identifies only process invocation sequences that are interesting (part of the execution 
sequence being mapped), because there is always a number of system and other overhead 
processes running that are not part of the process invocation sequence, for instance system 
service calls which are not mapped as part of Kowsorsow-Hofmeyr‘s approach.  (3) Finally, a set 
of macros are created heuristically from the analyzed system calling traces.  This is done though 
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a combination of scripts and manual coding of the language.  The macros are then loaded into a 
DFA using another set of scripts.   
Each unique invocation sequence is divided into three parts: a prefix, a main body and a 
suffix.  For each invocation sequence the common prefixes and suffixes are identified.  Then the 
main body sequences are scanned for common reoccurring strings of two to six invocations.  
Each recurring substring of common prefix, shortened main body sequences and suffix become 
macros.  The macros take advantage of Kleene closure [Hopc01] to reduce the size of the process 
invocation sequences captured, for example when process x invokes itself, x
*
 is used where x is 
represented 0 or multiple times.  The macros are then loaded into a DFA.   
By using this method, the researchers found that they could reduce the number of invocation 
string instances they had to capture.  The technique could take advantage of all the different 
reoccurring patterns (macros).  In one case, the researchers found that instead of mapping 75 
strings they could capture the same representation in 36 macros.  The approach drastically 
reduced the size of the process invocation sequence map.  And the researchers found that their 
approach provided ―a reasonably close approximation of normal behavior.‖  Their approach 
admittedly used a combination of scripts and manual methods to create the DFA, and the issue of 
efficiency was an acknowledged issue by the researchers.  They admitted an exact DFA 
representation of a process invocation sequence was likely to be problematic, mainly because to 
do so the DFA would have to map every possible system invocation sequence, which would 
likely cause the DFA to become too large.  Secondly, there would be false negatives, because 
some process invocation sequence variations would probably be missed.  Thirdly, the more 
sequences that were mapped into macros, the longer the calculation time would be to determine 
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the macros.  The program pathing trust model developed in this paper addresses the problems 
encountered by the Kosoresow-Hofmeyr model. 
5.2.4.2.3 Sekar – Finite State Automata Approach 
Sekar [Sek01] also uses a finite state automaton to capture invocation sequences.  Unlike 
previous approaches, the automaton approach is not limited by the length of the invocation 
sequence.  Longer, more complicated invocation sequences do not pose a problem and it is 
computationally efficient.  It easily accommodates program loops and branches. The FSA 
approach also uses the program counter (PC) to capture information about process invocation 
sequences that would not be possible in the static approaches.  The advantages of the FSA 
approach over previous approaches entails: 
 Faster learning – Entire invocation sequences can be learned at once, as opposed to learning 
multiple n-grams.  Experimentation shows that convergence occurs quicker in the FSA 
model than in the n-gram model. 
 Improved detection – Using the PC enables the FSA to detect classes of attacks that were not 
detected in other approaches.  For instance, the n-gram approach can determine that an 
invocation sequence has executed valid n-gram sequences, but it cannot determine that it has 
missed or skipped a sequence.  Also detection takes less computational time and is quicker 
than other approaches.  The FSA has the advantage of being kernel-based, although this is 
also a disadvantage because it entails modifying the kernel. 
 Fewer false positives – The FSA can generalize learned normal behavior, in essence predict 
unlearned behavior, whereas, the previous approaches can only identify those sequences they 
have learned. 
 Simpler and more compact representation – The FSA takes up less memory.  For instance, 
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where the n-gram approach needs to represent 51 system invocations the FSA only needs 13.   
The FSA is trained in real time.  Normal behavior is recorded in the FSA in real time, 
capturing the system invocation name and the point at which the system invocation was made, 
(the value of the PC when the invocation was made).  Each value in the PC represents a different 
state in the FSA.  The system call name (the name of the process being invoked) is represented 
by the transitions.  Sekar represents the automaton by symbolizing the transitions in pairs 
       
  
 
and 
            
       
 where the transition from state Prev PC to PC is labeled by Prev SysCall.  Sekar 
encountered a problem with dynamically linked programs - because these programs may get 
loaded into different locations, they cannot be relied upon to have the same PC location from one 
invocation to another.  Another problem is that system function invocations may invoke other 
processes that cause multiple extensive system invocation sequence branches, which then return 
control back to the original invocation process.  Figure 5-12 represents three invocation 
sequences: 
 
Figure 5-8 Seka's FSAFigure 
The invocation sequences in 5-12 are: 
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As processes are invoked by the operating system, they are placed in frames on the process 
stack.  Each process frame represents an invoked process and contains the return address, 
parameters passed to the process and local variables defined to the process.  This is provided in 
all programming languages.   
The fork and exec system invocations provide a unique problem for Sekar, as they either 
create another copy of the invocation process or create a child process.  The fork and exec are 
basic system invocations that appear quite often in invocation sequences.  For Sekar‘s FSA 
approach, he must decide if processes invoked by a fork or exec should be recorded in the current 
FSA or a new FSA – this suggests that Sekar is building an FSA for each process invoked by a 
command line or deamon. 
This model most resembles the PPT model, and chapter 6 shows how they differ.  The major 
difference between Sekar‘s approach and the Program Pathing Trust Model is that the Sekar 
method maps process invocation sequences within a load module, requiring either the source 
code, the op codes for the invocations or hooks in the exec and fork intercepts to map the 
invocation sequences.  Whereas the Sekar model has problems mapping dynamic invocations, 
the program pathing model focuses upon the mapping of these invocations.   
5.2.4.3 Context Free Grammar or Pushdown Automata 
There are a number of process invocation mapping approaches that are based upon 
theoretical computational models that are not exclusively finite automaton based.  The 
approaches described below are a examples of models that have developed more computationally 
complex models. 
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5.2.4.3.1 Feng - Kolesnikov –Pushdown Automata Approach 
The Feng-Kolesnikov approach uses the system call stack to gather information about valid 
process invocation sequence behavior, and develops a pushdown automaton.  Like Wagner and 
Sekar, Feng [Feng03] uses the system call stack and PC (Program Counter), to gain more 
information about the nature of invocation sequences.  From the PC the current executing 
program‘s next instruction can be determined.   From the call stack, the process invocation 
sequence, its status and the invocation program‘s return address, from which the offset into the 
invocating process where the invoked process was invoked, can be determined.  Feng‘s approach 
is called VtPath, and is unique in that it uses the return addresses recorded in the call stack.  The 
method abstracts two execution points, one from the invoking process and the other from the 
invoked process, and determines if they are valid based upon previously learned normal 
behavior. 
Training is performed by gathering the process return addresses from the call stack and is 
recorded in a hash table called RA (return address) table.  If the return address is the last entry in 
the virtual stack, then the call number is saved with it.  A VP (virtual path) hash table is used to 
save the parent invocation sequences for the process.  During training all valid process 
invocations are added to the hash tables saving their return addresses and virtual paths.   
The VtPath approach is able to handle Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLLs), which the 
Sekar approach had difficulty handling.  VtPath claims that the Sekar‘s FSA approach was an 
―unnecessary simplification.‖  The VtPath uses call stack history, as well as PC information.  By 
doing so, the VtPath traverses function paths that the FSA method only records the system call 
name and the current PC.  The VtPath also records the return addresses from the call stack in the 
VP stack.  The VP stack represents a history of all the unreturned functions.   
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The approach introduces a pushdown automaton, mainly because it is dealing with the 
program counter and system call stack.  The researchers, dealing with a pushdown automaton 
implemented in the OS, emulated the same structure to solve their problem of mapping process 
invocation sequences.  However, the problem of mapping and validating process invocation 
sequences is not the same problem as managing process flows.  Validating process invocation 
sequences does not require the number of times a process is invoked recursively for instance, or 
involve the fact that if process A is invoked 4 times, then process B must be invoked 4 times.  
Therefore, a pushdown automaton has more computational power than is needed.  This is 
analyzed in more detail in section 6.2.1.5. 
5.2.4.3.2 Wagner- Dean – Pushdown Automata Approach 
Wagner-Dean [Wag01] also attempts to solve the problem of detecting system intrusion by 
profiling valid process invocation behavior.  Wagner-Dean‘s assumption is that formal methods 
alone are insufficient to build a system to model valid process invocation behavior.  They base 
this observation on the fact that formal systems have been used for 25 years, and have yet to 
realize this goal.  They agree with the basic premise of these systems, however, that a system‘s 
behavior can be learned by observing its normal behavior.  The assumption is ―a compromised 
application cannot cause much harm unless it interacts with the underlying operating system, 
and those interactions can be readily monitored‖[Wag01].  
The Wagner-Dean approach begins by creating a model of the expected behavior of an 
application from program source code.  Then, they monitor the program and check the system 
call trace for compliance to the model.  Although Wagner-Dean uses practical observation, their 
models do use formal languages, either regular or context-free languages.   
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Wagner-Dean‘s research investigates four approaches to capturing expected process 
invocation behavior.  The four models used are the trivial, the callgraph, the abstract stack and 
the digraph models.   Each model refines the normal behavior represented a little more to prevent 
false positives. The trivial model is a regular language model that is inferred from a parse tree.  It 
identifies the set of system invocation from an alphabet S.  The model of normal behavior is 
defined from a regular language S
*
.  Any invoked process not recognized by the language is an 
invalid process invocation.  The trivial model identifies all the processes that are valid, although 
does not identify the sequence.  The model is fed by analyzing source code to determine what 
process invocations are performed for an application.  Wagner-Dean believe that although the 
trivial phase is ―easy to implement, sound and efficient‖, [Wag01] it does not detect attacks that 
use valid process invocation sequences.  The approach is not granular enough to detect abuses of 
the valid process invocation sequences, such as the open( ) system invocation, which can be used 
to modify any file – including another file that is an executable in the language S*.   
The trivial model just identifies the processes that are allowed to be invoked within an 
invocation sequence, but does not identify the ordering of the invocation sequence.  Ordering of 
the alphabet S is performed by Wagner-Dean using a non-deterministic finite automaton 
(NDFA).  The NDFA (or callgraph) is built by performing a flow-control analysis upon the 
application The NDFA is built assuming that only one invocation can be made from a single 
application location.  In this NDFA, every correct transition state is considered an accepting 
state.  However, this approach has the problem of showing how processes return control to the 
originating process.  Function calls are a particular problem; they are invoked for services and 
are not part of a long invocation sequence.  They appear to be dead-end nodes on a NDFA.  The 
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dead-end nodes (impossible paths) result in a larger than needed NDFA.   To deal with the 
problem of these dead-end nodes, the abstract stack model is introduced. 
The abstract stack model is a non-deterministic pushdown automaton (NDPA) which allows 
for a context free language.  It emulates the program counter and the call stack in the operating 
system.   The dead-end nodes are not a problem, because they are pushed on the NDPA when 
they are invoked, i.e. entry(f), and popped off the NDPA when they return control, i.e. exit(f).  
Again the NDPA is created from an analysis of application source code.  However, the use of the 
NDPA model proves to be a challenge.  In monitoring an application‘s invocation behavior the 
NDPA has to search for all possibilities, this can be theoretically and computational exhausting.   
Another problem that Wagner-Dean discusses is NDPA‘s difficulty in monitoring activity for 
intrusions, because of the need for a top-down analysis.  A top-down analysis may be needed if 
intrusion detection is being done against a system trace log.  However, if intrusion detection is 
being done against real-time processing, the bottom up approach that the NDPA lends itself to 
would be an advantage.  If a process is intercepted in the scheduler before it is executed, the 
system data area representing the process has pointers back to the process that invoked it.  That 
process has a data area with pointers to who invoked it, and so on.  Therefore, a bottom up 
mapping of process invocation sequences would be advantageous. 
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Chapter  6: PPT Theoretical Model 
By analyzing the problem in the light of Chomsky‘s Hierarchy of Formal Languages (see 
figure 6-1), this research identifies an appropriate theoretical model for developing a solution 
model.  By determining requirements and identifying the most restrictive computational theory 
model that sufficiently expresses the problem, the solution avoids being overly complex. The 
computational theory model selected is used as the basis for creating a solution model.  
 
6.1 Criteria for a Computational Model 
Bell and LaPadula claim it is important to ―bridge the gap between general system theory and 
practical problem solving [Bell73].‖ Their research emphasizes the necessity of using 
computational models to guide solutions for IT security issues.  A mathematical model allows 
researchers to represent system requirements and rigorously analyze them.    Existing research on 
Intrusion Detection uses computational theory models associated with regular or context free 
Figure 6-1 Chomsky's Hierarchy of Formal Languages 
66 
 
languages, but does not provide justification with respect to the selection of one theoretical 
model over another, nor does it exploit the theoretical characteristics of the selected model 
[Ko94] [Kos97] [Warr99]. This research explains its choice for a computational theory model, 
and shows how the theoretical characteristics of the model can be used to enforce a policy 
permitting only valid process invocations sequences (VPIS). The intent of analyzing 
computational models to find an appropriate theoretical framework is to preclude potential 
solution-related issues that might not otherwise present themselves prior to implementation of 
the solution. 
6.1.1 . Necessary & Sufficient  
Traditional logic‘s criteria of necessity and sufficiency are used to assist in the selection of an 
appropriate computational model to use in this research. If, when some condition occurs, an 
event associated with that condition also occurs, the condition is said to be sufficient for that 
event.  However, the existence of an event does not imply that a specific sufficient condition has 
occurred since some sufficient conditions may be replaced by other conditions that are also 
sufficient.  On the other hand, if a condition is necessary for the occurrence of an event, the 
occurrence of the event implies that the condition must have occurred.   In other words, the event 
occurs if and only if the necessary condition occurs [Bark80] [Copi78]. 
The computational model selected in this research is sufficient to model the computational 
events investigated here.  Turing Machines (TM) and their computational equivalents are 
sufficient to model any computational event.  But TMs are not necessary to model all 
computational events.  This research finds the computational model with the least computational 
power that still provides the computational power required to model the event. 
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In an argument, the set of necessary conditions contain only the essential conditions that 
support the conclusion.  All conditions that are not necessary to support the conclusion may be 
removed to simplify the solution.  Unnecessary premises can obscure an argument and make it 
difficult to follow [Copi78].  Similarly, in designing engineering solutions, unnecessary 
requirements can cause an engineer to loose focus on solving the problem.  The logical principle 
of Ockham‘s razor suggests that the simpler solution is usually the better one.  Although more 
complex solutions may also solve a problem, a better solution involves only those conditions that 
are necessary to realize the solution.  Ockham‘s razor can be used general guide in the selection 
of the theoretical computational model to avoid unnecessary complexity [Gau03]; this approach 
is taken in this research.     
6.1.2 Choosing a Computational Model 
To identify the simplest computational model necessary to model the problem of validating a 
process invocation sequence instances of invocation sequences are represented in symbolic form. 
After representing the instances in symbolic form, the validation problem is evaluated using 
computational models from the simplest to the most complex, as required, stopping at the 
simplest computational model necessary to model the event.  By evaluating the simplest 
computational models first, and only moving on to more complex models if it is determined that 
a simpler model is inadequate, this research can be certain that it bases its solution on the 
simplest necessary computational model. 
The computational model associated with the theory chosen should have the capacity to 
accept or reject a candidate string representing a process invocation sequence.  The 
computational model must have the ability to recognize the set of strings in a language L in 
which each string represents a finite sequential invocation of processes during execution of an 
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operating system so long as each process is invoked by a process that is authorized to invoke it.  
Any string representing some other process invocation sequence should be rejected as not 
belonging to language L.    
6.1.2.1 Multitasking Requirement 
Within the computational model it is necessary to represent an executing process and the 
sequence of process invocations.  This is complicated by the fact that multiple invocation 
sequences can execute with apparent parallelism.  This research makes the simplifying 
assumption that a system contains a single CPU.  The ability of computers to run multiple 
unrelated process sequences, which appear to execute simultaneously, is called multitasking. A 
user‘s series of processes, although logically executed in a sequential chain, may not actually be 
scheduled in an uninterrupted, temporally contiguous sequence by the operating system‘s 
scheduler.  Rather, the scheduler may find it necessary to interrupt that process invocation 
sequence by starting or resuming one or more other process invocation sequences needing to run 
on the single CPU.  As a result, a number of unrelated process invocation sequences may be 
competing for time on a single CPU processor.  Or, a server may process multiple functions 
within an application on behalf of multiple users, creating multiple process invocation sequences.  
Multitasking presents a challenge requiring a computational model capable of evaluating 
multiple simultaneous process invocations sequences.   
Take two jobs submitted for execution to a server, job a is represented by the process 
invocation sequence abcabc and job x is represented by the process invocation sequence 
xwybzw.  Assume that job a: abcabc and job x: xwybzw each represent valid process invocations 
sequences with each symbol in a string corresponding to the process being invoked.   Also 
assume that a sequence of processes associated with job a is executing on behalf of user 1 and a 
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sequence of processes associated with job x is executing on behalf of user 2.  To the scheduler 
and CPU, however, the execution of the processes associated with the two strings may actually 
occur as shown in figure 6-2:  
 
Figure 6-2: Interleaved Process Execution 
This happens because, when a process invokes another process, an interrupt occurs, allowing 
the scheduler to dispatch another process sequence or system service.  System interrupts cause 
interleaving of process sequences, meaning, effectively, that multiple process invocation 
sequences must be simultaneously evaluated for authorization.   
6.1.2.2 Regular Language 
From the perspective of formal language theory, a Finite State Automata (FSA) is the 
simplest computational machine.  Other researchers have used a FSA in an attempt to map valid 
process invocations sequences in different forms.  In intrusion detection research, which also 
attempts to map valid process invocations sequence, both Kosoresow [Kos97] and Sekar [Sek01] 
entertained the use of the FSA approach. 
Kosoresow identified a Deterministic Finite State Automata (DFA) as an appropriate 
approach to identify patterns with in an invocation sequence [Kos97].  However, Kosoresow also 
identified some issues using a DFA.  For instance, (1) using a DFA to calculate the minimal 
description of a valid process invocation sequence may be time consuming and is potentially NP-
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hard [Kos97].  (2) Creating a DFA from valid process invocations sequence has do be done 
heuristically, using scripts and manually.  Therefore, an exact DFA representation is likely to be 
problematic.  And (3) creating a DFA from traces would require substantial space (memory) 
[Kos97].  A description of Kosoresow‘s approach can be found in section 5.2.4.1.2. 
Sekar, on the other hand, embraced the Finite State Automata (FSA) as an approach to solve 
the problem of verifying valid process invocation sequences.  Sekar‘s approach solved the 
problem of manual learning [Sek01], although it can be argued that Sekar did not address the 
issues of the computational expense and the excessive space needed to implement this model as 
raised by Kosoresow [Kos97].   By way of contrast, the present research uses the concept of  
―one state, one process‖ in its implementation to solve these issues (see chapter 7).   A 
description of Sekar‘s approach can be found in Section 5.2.4.1.3.   
   Other, more complex, conceptual models have also been used, such as Push Down 
Automata (PDA) [Feng03] and the probabilistic Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [Gho00].  For 
more information on other research using a FSM and other theoretical computational methods to 
map valid process invocation sequences, see section 5.2.4.  But recall that a more complex 
solution, although sufficient, may not be logically necessary.   
A FSA recognizes a regular language.    Therefore, this model is appropriate if the set of 
strings representing process invocation sequences form a regular language. Each language 
accepted by some FSA has a corresponding representation in a Regular Expression (RE).  A RE 
is defined [Sips06] [Rich08] as follows: 
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Figure 6-3: Definition of Regular Expression 
A language L is regular if the set of strings in L corresponds to some regular expression 
string as defined by the definitions above.  For example, if strings corresponding to regular 
expression S1 are in some regular language L1 and strings corresponding to regular expression S2 
are in the regular language L2, then a regular expression can be formed corresponding to the 
language consisting of exactly the union of the set of strings corresponding to S1 with the set of 
strings corresponding to S2.  Let one set of strings in the language corresponding to S1 represent 
a set of  valid process invocation sequences and let another set of strings corresponding to S2 
represent another set of valid process invocation sequences.  Both sets are part of a regular 
language described by the union of their respective corresponding regular expressions. Let one 
FSA be constructed to recognize S1, and the other S2.  Then, an FSA can be constructed to 
recognize the sets of strings corresponding to both S1 and S2, using ε transitions from a new start 
state to the original start states of the two FSAs previously used to recognize each set 
individually.  The resulting non-deterministic FSA now recognizes a new set of valid process 
invocations sequences containing all the members of S1 and all the members of S2. 
Regular Expression Definition 
String S is a regular expression over the alphabet , if S is: 
 a for some a in alphabet 
2. ε 
 
4. (S) is a regular expression 
5. Union:  (S1   S2), where S1 and S2 are regular expressions. 
6. Concatenation: (S1   S2), where S1 and S2 are regular expressions. 
7. Kleene Star:  S* 
8. Kleene Plus: S+ 
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Figure 6-4: Representation of the FSA Recognizing the Union of Languages S1 and S2 
Figure 6-4 illustrates the fact that Regular Languages are closed under union.   
6.2 Appropriate Representation of the Problem  
Any two FSAs (whether deterministic or non-deterministic) are said to be equivalent if they 
recognize exactly the same language [Hopc01] [Rich08] [Sips06].  Furthermore, it is known that 
every non-deterministic FSA (NFA) has an equivalent deterministic FSA (DFA).  Every NFA 
can be algorithmically transformed into its equivalent DFA [Brzo62] [Hopc01] [Rich08] 
[Sips06] [Wats95] [Wats00].  The PPT models the process invocation sequence problem using a 
DFA. 
6.2.1  Finite State Automata Representation 
A 5-tuple definition of a FSA (Q, , , P0, F) as shown in figure 6-5 (modified from 
[Sips06]) is the starting point for defining the elements required to represent a process invocation 
sequence.  As detailed below, the DFA is used to accept or reject a process invocations, 
represented as a string over , with the states in Q representing the processes, i.e. Q = 
{processes}. This same representation could be used even if a more computationally powerful 
machine were required.  That is: the processes are represented by the states in Q, and the 
invocation sequences are represented by a sequence of symbols over .  Therefore both Q and  
are associated with processes, where Q = {processes} and  = {process invocations}. 
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Both nondeterministic FSAs (NFA) and deterministic FSAs (DFA) are used throughout this 
chapter to describe the program pathing solution.  Because an algorithm exists to convert an 
arbitrary NFA to an equivalent DFA [Sips06], either one is used as convenient.  The primary 
difference between the deterministic and nondeterministic definition is step 3 in figure 6-5, 
where the transition function  of the deterministic FSA is replaced with the transition relation  
of the nondeterministic FSA, where : Q   (  {})  (Q-{P0}). [Rich08]  
6.2.1.1 States Q 
In the finite set Q, Pi represents process i executing in the system.  More formally, Q = ({P0} 
 {Pi : Pi represents a process Pi that has been dispatched to execute by the scheduler}).  States 
are labeled as P0, P1, P2, … ,Pn, where the symbol Pn represents the name of a real process. |Q| = 
n+1, there n is determined by the number of processes represented in Q.  If there are five 
processes, then there are five states in the DFA, plus one for the start state P0.   All states in Q 
represent processes that are authorized to execute on the computer.  P0 is a start state (described 
in section 6.2.1.4) and is not reachable after transition to another state in Q.   
Figure 6-5: Definition of Deterministic Finite State Automata 
Deterministic Finite State Automata Definition 
(Q, , , P0, F) 
 
Q is a finite set of states. 
 is a finite alphabet. 
 : Q     (Q-{P0}) is the transition function. 
P0  Q is the unique start state. 
F  Q is the set of accepting states. 
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 Alphabet and process invocations
Normal processes are those processes that are allowed to execute on the critical server as 
defined in chapter 2 to fulfill its critical function.   is the alphabet of all the transition inputs of 
normal process invocations corresponding to the set of process represented in Q and are 
represented as lower case p.  Every process, whether normal or not, that can be invoked on a 
system is associated with a corresponding symbol in a finite, though possibly large, alphabet .  
Symbol pi  represents the invocation of process Pi.  These symbols are used to form strings 
representing all possible process invocation sequences in a language L.  The alphabet is a finite 
set of symbols, therefore, over which all possible process invocation sequences both valid and 
invalid are formed.  Thus while Pi Q-{P0} represents a process named Pi executing, pi  
represents the invocation of process Pi.  The language constructed from    is the language 
consisting of the set of all possible strings that can form over the alphabet  , that  is,  = 
               , where  | | = n. 
When process Pi invokes Pk, it causes a transition in the NFA represented as ({Pi},pk).  This 
transition represents that while executing the process Pi, the system encounters the invocation of 
a process Pk as a transition input (or invocation) represented as pk.   Because not all possible 
process invocations are valid process invocations, it is possible that ({Pi},pk) is not defined for 
some pk or for some Pi  Q.   For example, some processes should never be allowed to 
execute on a critical server, because these processes are not essential to the primary function of 
the server.  These invalid process invocations are represented by a subset alphabet  .  The 
set of valid process invocations in  is represented by the subset alphabet , where   , with 
 being partitioned by and .  That is: 
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and 
             
The set of invalid process sequences is of interest.  Any process invocation sequence that 
contains a non-empty substring from the alphabet   by definition is an invalid process 
invocation.  It is invalid because it contains at least one symbol corresponding to the invocation 
of an abnormal process.    Since   is a set of process invocations, there are two possible subsets 
for any sequence in the   set of invalid process invocations sequences.   
 {             
  , where w contains at least one symbol from the alphabet .}, which 
represents the set of invalid process invocations made up of normal and abnormal 
processes.  Any string made up of a symbol not belonging exclusively to the alphabet 
  is considered invalid. 
   
  represents the set of invalid process invocations made up of only abnormal processes. 
Any string made up of a symbol not belonging to the alphabet   is considered invalid.  
  
    w 
                   
  
The set   
  contains all the possible strings that can be created from the alphabet .  Thus, 
  
   contains all possible strings representing valid process invocation sequences over a language 
using  as the alphabet, and more generally, .    
  may also  contain some invalid process 
invocation sequences.  This is because for a process invocation to be valid, it is required that the 
order of its symbols appear in an appropriate sequence and that the sequence be profiled.  It is 
possible that an invalid invocation process sequence could be constructed from the set of valid 
process invocations.  An invalid process invocation sequences over   represents the case in 
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which normal processes are invoked in a sequence that is not appropriate.  The language Lx is 
the language made up of the subset of   
  that makes up the set of invalid process invocation 
sequences.  The set of strings   
  containing the subset of invalid process invocation sequences 
Lx such that: 
       
  
The strings in the language Lx represent process invocation sequences made up of valid 
process invocations from the alphabet   , but there is at least one substring w in each string such 
that | w | ≥ 2 and w represents an invalid process invocation. 
Consider a system process invocation sequence: PqPr Ps Pt.  A normal process can only 
execute if it is invoked by another normal process and if that invocation is valid.  Thus Ps 
executes, because it has been invoked by process Pr.  Similarly, process Pt  executes because it 
was invoked by process Ps.  The ordinal execution of these processes is represented as a 
sequence over   by the following, pr ps pt.  As the OS schedules a finite sequence of processes 
for execution, a corresponding finite-length sequence of symbols w over  is formed.  At any 
invocation index t in the scheduled sequence, the length of w at invocation index t is represented 
as |wt|.  When the next process is scheduled, a new string wt+1 is created such that |wt+1| = (|wt|+1).   
The set of valid process invocations sequences is the language Lv, over the alphabet .  In Lv 
each symbol in a string represents invocation of a normal process that is authorized to invoke the 
subsequent process represented by the subsequent symbol in that string.  The set of valid process 
invocation sequences is a possibly infinite set of such finite-length strings forming the language 
Lv.   Recognition of the language Lv is the focus of this research.  
77 
 
  
  can be divided therefore, into two distinct partitions, Lx and Lv where: 
That is: the set of invalid process invocation sequences       
      , represents the set of 
process invocation sequences that are invoked in an invalid order, although made up of only 
symbols representing valid process invocations, while the set of possible valid process 
invocation sequences       
      , represents the set of valid process invocation sequences. 
Transition Relation 
An invocation of process P2 by process P1 is expressed in the NFA transition relation as 
({P1},p2) = {P2}.  This representation indicates a transition from the NFA set of states 
containing P1 to the set of states containing P2 on the input symbol p2.  The inferred substring w 
is represented as the sequence w = (p1p2) over v.  Let pj represent invocation of process Pj 
immediately subsequent to w. Then a new process invocation sequence is formed by the 
concatenation wpj.   
At invocation index t0 no process has been invoked.  P0 is an accepting state. Therefore the 
initial language is defined as Lt0 = {}. The NFA recognizing Lt0 is called NFAt0 = (Q={P0},, , 
P0, F={P0}) as shown graphically in figure 6-6. 
 
Figure 6-6 Initial Start State – NFAt0 
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Assume for the moment that every process invocation would occur in a valid sequence.   
Then for invocation of process P1 we consider NFAt1 formed by replicating NFAt0 and adding a 
transition on input p1 to a new accepting state P1.  As a result, NFAt1 = (Q={P0,P1},={p1}, P0, , 
F={P0,P1}) as shown in graphically in figure 6-7 recognizes Lt1= {, p1}. 
 
Figure 6-7 NFAt1 
As each invocation progresses and adds another process invocation to the string, a new 
language is created consisting of the previous language and adding a new string.   Assume string 
p1 has resulted in the machine NFAt1 being in the state P1 at invocation index t1.  Then at index t2 
with next process invocation p2, a transition resulting in sting p1p2 is recognized by machine 
NFAt2 = (Q={P0,P1,P2}, ={p1,p2},, P0, F={P0,P1,P2}) which recognizes the language Lt2 = {, 
p1, p1p2}.  
 
Figure 6-8 NFAt2 
Similarly, invocation index t3, where the transition relation ({P2},p3) = {P3},  the transition 
represents the addition of p3 process invocation.  Machine NFAt2 adds the string (p1p2p3), which 
recognizes a new language Lt3 = {, p1, p1p2, p1p2p3} resulting in the machine  NFAt3 = 
(Q={P0,P1,P2,P3}, ={p1,p2,p3},, P0, F={P0,P1,P2,P3})  The sequence of invocation event indices 
occurs until the process sequence terminates and the all process invocation sequences are 
mapped.   
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Figure 6-9 Building the Valid Process Invocation language 
As each new normal process invocation is concatenated to some string present in the current 
set of valid process invocation sequences, a new language is created.  The building of the sets of 
process invocation sequences is symbolized: 
      
   
Initially,  
        
because,                
 ,  
we know that     
                         |  
Figure 6-9 illustrates the building of the new language as it grows in graphic form. 
Note that the series of machines constructed in this manner do not recognize   
 , but only 
increasingly large subsets of that language.  Invocation index based string construction allows 
for validating a process invocation sequence as the sequence is processed by the system‘s 
scheduler.   
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6.2.1.4 Start State P0  
An assumption is that only process invocations that occur subsequent to a machine being in 
state P0  are of interest.  In a computing system this can be any assumed environment.  It can be a 
user pushing a power start button, issuing a command, clicking on a GUI.  Or it can be the state 
after a computer‘s OS has been booted.  In this research the symbol P0 is used to symbolize any 
assumed safe starting condition.  P0 is not an executing process. 
6.2.1.5 FSA Issues 
This research represents a series of process invocations as an FSA.  The standard 5-tuple 
definition of an FSA can be used with the definitions above to model process invocation 
sequences.  Let a machine PPTM (Program Pathing Trust Machine) be an FSA with process 
states Q= {P0,P1,P2,P3,…,Pn}.   P0 is not an executable process and P1 through Pn are executable 
processes.  The alphabet   corresponds to the set of process invocations (see section 6.2.1.2) 
{p1,p1,p3,…pn}.  P0 represents the initial start state of the PPTM.  The set of final or accepting 
states is represented by FQ.  Process invocation transitions are defined as relation.  
: Q  (  (Q – {P0}) 
Mapping process invocation sequences (strings) over an alphabet  is clear enough.  
However, this mapping does not resolve the issue of which computational model is needed to 
solve the problem of determining valid invocation sequences.  Validating the authority of a 
normal process to invoke another normal process is also a requirement and does not just entail a 
strict mapping of each instance of a process invoked by the scheduler.  This is a mistake made by 
some other solutions proposed to solve the problem [Amm98] [Ball96].  However this research 
makes the assumption that once a process is authorized to invoke another process, it is valid for 
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the invocation to be repeated, no matter how many times.  This assumption is explained in this 
section and in section 6.2.2. 
Suppose (p1p2p3p3p4) represents a valid process invocation sequence.  For the program 
pathing problem, the regular expression representing this process invocation sequence is 
(p1p2p3
+
p4).  The regular expression does not count the number of times p3 occurs in the 
sequence, but does indicate that p3 must occur in the sequence, at least once, subsequent to p2 
and prior to p4.  Since the regular expression does not have to insure that a sequence be exact in 
the number of times a process be invoked, the language is regular.  The above regular expression 
specifies that p1 precedes p2, p2 precedes p3, and that p3 can precede itself and precedes p4.  Once 
it is established that P3 may validly invoke P3 then this invocation can occur each time the 
machine is in P2 and can occur any number of times. 
Validating the authority of a process to invoke another process is not dependent upon the 
number of times the process is invoked.  Proving the correctness of execution of some portion of 
the computation may require counting invocations, but that is a different problem.  The program 
pathing problem requires validating that a process has the authority to invoke another process 
and is different from verifying the correctness of the execution.  A process may invoke or fail to 
invoke a normal process that it is authorized to invoke, yet the process is still authorized to 
perform the invocation. Whether or not the process performs the correct invocation may involve 
a program logic error, but is not a question of validating the process‘s authority to perform the 
invocation.  For instance, a teleprocessing program may invoke a process three times to serve 
three different users, but if only two of the processes invoked the ending process and the third 
process ends in error, then the third ending process is never invoked.  This use case would 
constitute a process flow logic error, but not an invalid invocation sequence.  A language 
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containing strings that need to represent how many times a normal process has been invoked 
would not be a regular language and would require a more complex machine to recognize the 
language.  If a more complex language were required, a context free language would have to be 
considered.   
6.2.2 Regular vs. Context Free Language 
Without the need for a language to pump a symbol of the alphabet a specific number of 
times, it is not necessary to use a machine more powerful than an finite state automata.  The 
classic example of a language that does not meet the criteria for the regular language pumping 
lemma is      
   
        .  For L it is necessary to count the number of times a process is 
called, assuming L is a set of strings representing correct process invocation sequences.  
However, the program pathing problem does not involve verifying that the process invocation 
sequence is logically correct, but that the process invocation sequence is authorized.  Anytime a 
symbol occurs consecutively, it can be replaced in the corresponding regular expression by the 
Kleene plus.  This means that a string of the form A
n
B
n
 for n>0 in the context of this problem 
has the equivalent regular expression A
+
B
+
.  As a result the language is no more complex 
than a regular language [Bar61] [Hopc01] [Rich08] [Sips06]. 
6.3  Finite State Automata and the Program Path Trust Model 
Given that an FSA is a reasonable theoretical foundation upon which to build the Program 
Pathing Trust Machine (PPTM) and that it is possible to represent that problem symbolically as 
described earlier, it is necessary to show how the PPTM can be constructed.  Let M be a 
computational model (machine).  Let L(M) be the language recognized by machine M.  
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 Let Lv (M) represent the language recognized by some machine M and containing all the strings 
representing the valid process invocation sequences.  The symbolic representation for this 
machine has been discussed in section 6.2.   
A sequence of process invocations is defined as an ordered series observed prior to some 
fixed event at invocation index t as a computing system schedules consecutive processes.   The 
set of all possible invocation sequences forms the set *.  This language may be viewed as two 
subsets, as described in section 6.2.  One subset Lv (M) contains exactly the set of sequences 
corresponding to the series of acceptable process invocations of the system.  The other subset 
               contains the set of sequences corresponding to the series of invalid process invocations in 
the system that are known to be invalid.  The two subsets are disjoint and partition the set of all 
possible process invocation sequences (see section 6.2.1.1). 
Taking both subsets into account, we can create a corresponding DFA.  The FSA solution 
model proposed in this research initially assumes that the set of valid invocation sequences is 
.  As the solution model identifies and adds new valid process invocations sequences to the 
set, the set of valid invocation sequences grows.  The solution model ensures system integrity by 
identifying valid process invocation sequences.  Techniques for distinguishing these subsets are 
discussed in detail in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3.  Over time, by building the set L   Lv (M), we 
can reduce the occurrences of rejection of valid process invocation sequences, and allow the 
system to identify valid sequences that it may not have explicitly recorded.   However, this 
means there may be some process invocation sequences that are inferred by Mt, but have not 
been encountered.  These process invocations sequences may or may not be valid, but cannot be 
determined, without application of domain knowledge (as discussed in section 6.3.3 and 
following). 
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6.3.1 Why Finite State Automata is a better Computational Model choice. 
One possible concern with the FSA approach is that in a real system many processes are 
invoked and the FSA might quickly become very large and complex, especially if it is to be 
deterministic.  This concern can be addressed to some extent by using minimization algorithms 
for DFAs as described by Hopcroft [Hopc01] and Watson [Wats95], or by the minimization 
algorithm for non-deterministic FSAs described by Brzozowki [Brzo62].  Application of such 
minimization algorithms can yield a simpler equivalent machine with fewer states.   
Another concern with the use of FSA, from the machine learning perspective, is that while 
learning by rote, it may appear that the FSA cannot abstract or generalize from the data that it 
profiles.  However, the process of generating equivalent states through application of the DFA 
minimization algorithm can be viewed as generalization.  This generalization is accomplished in 
two ways.  (1) The looping structures allow for the machine to recognize process invocation 
sequences it has not encountered previously, such as multiple invocations of a process or set of 
processes.  (2) The FSA can encounter multiple prefix invocation subsequences leading to some 
configuration from which machine M transitions to an accepting state, using the remaining 
portion of another input process invocation subsequence to represent a novel process invocation 
sequence. 
6.3.2 Finite State Automaton PPT Representation 
The set of abnormal processes is a finite set of processes that should never be permitted to be 
invoked in the computer.   This set is symbolized as  as the set of abnormal process 
invocations.      
 =   G 
where, G     
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The set  is the set of partially indeterminate processes.  It includes the set of abnormal 
processes from the alphabet .   However, it also includes the set G, which is the set of all 
normal process from the alphabet   whose transitions and states have not yet been represented 
in the DFA.  The set G is important, because it represents those normal processes not considered 
valid to be invoked some time.  Once a normal process from G is considered authorized to be 
invoked, it is removed from the set G, and therefore removed from . 
Valid process invocation sequences (VPIS) are the only process invocation sequences that 
can execute.  The system runs continuously as long as the process invocation sequences are 
valid.  When a valid process invocation is encountered, the DFA transitions to an accepting state. 
When an invalid process invocation is encountered, the DFA enters a trap state from which it 
cannot escape.  Since this state is not an accepting state, the DFA can not recognize any process 
invocation sequence that causes it to enter the trap state, and therefore the sequence is 
determined to be invalid.  The DFAt, recognizes the subset of the language Lv, i.e., it recognizes 
a subset of valid process invocation sequences.      
 
Figure 6-10 DFAt=0 Transition Diagram 
DFAt=0 (figure 6-10) initially accepts the empty string,, and rejects invalid process 
invocation sequences and L(DFAt=0).  In this initial machine no actual process invocation 
sequence is valid.  Any process invocation sequence that is presented to the DFAt=0 is invalid, 
and is not recognized by the DFA.  As processes are encountered, they are validated against the 
DFA‘s states, and are assumed valid as long the input invocation transition causes a transition to 
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an accepting state.  If the input invocation causes a transition to H (the trap state), then the 
process invocation sequence is determined to be invalid. 
6.3.3 PPT Finite-state Automata Learning Mode 
It has been established that a DFA can be used to represent a process invocation sequence.   
However, the challenge is in populating the PPT DFA with valid process invocation sequences.  
The most straight forward approach is to initially train the DFA with valid training data.   The 
process invocations the DFA profiles by rote represent valid process invocation sequences that 
can be audited by a person.   
The method used in this research is to provide a profiling mode.  An administrator can turn 
on profiling while accessing a particular application.  When the profiling mode is turned on, the 
sequence of application process invocations are introduced to the DFA as training data.   New 
strings in the language Lv are recognized by the DFA as they are encountered.  As a result a new 
DFA is created as necessary with appropriate transitions with all other input transitions to the 
new state being set to the default of transitioning to the trap state (see figure 6-11).   Therefore, 
as each normal process is validly invoked, transitions are added to the DFA until the entire valid 
process invocation sequence is recognized.  Consider a newly initialized PPT DFA before it 
encounters any normal process invocations.  Its transition table is shown in figure 6-11; here and 
afterwards, the start state appears in the first row of the transition table and all accepting states 
are shown in boldface and underlined type. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Initial PPT DFA Translation Table 
Consider, a DFAt=1 where the valid process invocation sequence (p1 p1 p3) is encountered.   
 
 
 
P0 H 
H H 
Input
ts 
State
s 
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Remember, 
L(DFAt=0) = { } 
and, L(DFAt=0)  Lv 
As the DFAt=0 encounters p1, symbol p1 representing a previously unseen process is encountered, 
that symbol is removed from  creating the set  - {p1}.  The encounter of the first process 
invocation p1 in the sequence (p1p1p3) causes a new DFA machine to be created: 
L(DFAt=1) = L(DFAt=0)  {p1}  
As the DFAt=1 encounters p1 again, the second process invocation in the sequence (p1p1p3) 
another new DFA machine is created.   
L(DFAt=2) = L(DFAt=1)  {p1p1} 
Recall that the corresponding regular expression for the substring p1p1 is   
 .  As a result, the 
loop back transition is create on the P1 state as shown in figure 6-12.  As the DFAt=2 encounters 
p3, the third process invocation in the sequence (p1p1p3) another new DFA machine is created, as 
shown in figure 6-12. 
L(DFAt=3) = L(DFAt=2)  {p1p1p3} 
 
Figure 6-12 Transition Diagram Representing the DFA Recognizing Language DFAt=3. 
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The DFA transition table for the machine DFAt=3 is shown in figure 6-13. 
.   p1 p3 
P0 H P1 H 
H H H H 
P1 H P1 P3 
P3 H H H 
Figure 6-13 DFAt=3  Transition Table Learning  
As  DFAt=3 is presented a new valid process invocation sequence (p1 p2 p3), and the first 
process invocation p1 is encountered, p1 is already accepted by DFAt=3, so no new DFA machine 
need be created.  As DFAt=3 encounters the second process invocation, p2 in the sequence a new 
DFA machine is created. 
L(DFAt=4) = L(DFAt=3)  {p1p2} 
The result should be recognition of L(DFAt=4) adding the sequence p1 p2  to the language 
L(DFAt=3).  As the DFAt=4 encounters p3, the third process invocation in the sequence {p1p2p3} 
another new DFA machine is created.   
L(DFAt=5) = L(DFAt=4)  {p1p2p3} 
 
Figure 6-14 DFAt=5 Transition Diagram 
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The resulting DFAt=5 recognizes the language L(DFAt=5) and is shown in the transition diagram 
in figure 6-14.  The three strings used as input have been used to create the following fully 
qualified deterministic finite automaton DFAt=5. 
Each state has a transition to the trap state in the instance that an invalid process invocation 
sequence is encountered.   The resulting machine is a fully qualified DFA with transitions 
specified as in figure 6-15.    
  p1 p3 p2 
P0 H P1 H H 
P1 H P1 P3 P2 
P2 H H P3 H 
P3 H H H H 
H H H H H 
Figure 6-15 DFAt=5 Transition Table 
After profiling (p1 p2 p3), DFAt=5 can profile the next valid process invocation sequence.  If 
DFAt=5 encounters a previously unseen process invocation sequence such as (p1 p1 p2 p3), it can 
accept that sequence without the necessity of creating a new machine. 
A new DFA is created after each new process invocation sequence is encountered in 
―profiling‖ mode.  When ―profiling‖ mode is turned off, the DFA has established steady state, no 
new processes are added to the PPT DFA.  If we examine the DFAt=5 transition table created by 
the PPT profiling, we can see that other unseen valid process invocation sequences are accepted 
by the DFA, e.g. p1 p1 p1 p1 p3 and p1 p1 p1 p1 p2 p3.  This does not present a problem, because the 
DFA has established that P1 can invoke P1, P2 and P3, and that P1 can invoke P1 any number of 
times. Whether or not P1 should invoke P1 more than once is a matter of program execution 
correctness, but is not a matter of authorizing P1 to invoke P1.  The validity of the substring p1p1 
has been established.  An algorithm for building a PPT DFA is given in figure 6-16. 
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6.4 Relation Between Lv and L(DFAt) 
Because the DFA is built incrementally, it is not known at any value time t whether L(DFAt) 
= Lv. However, the strings in the set called the white list are in the non-empty intersection 
L(DFAt)  Lv. Because the white list is also built incrementally it cannot be claimed that the set 
of strings called the white list is exactly the set of stings L(DFAt).  Furthermore, it is not known 
whether the set L(DFAt) merely form a non-empty subset of Lv.  L(DFAt)  could contain a set of 
strings that are not a subset of Lv.  That is, it is not known whether there exists another non-
empty subset of strings both in L(DFAt) and outside Lv.  More formally, it is not known whether 
(                 ) = {  }.  This remains an open theoretical question and a topic for future 
research.   The PPT model uses domain knowledge both to build DFAt and to determine whether 
strings known to be in L(DFAt) are also in Lv. In this way the PPT model incrementally builds 
Algorithm for building a PPT DFA 
Set whitelist = { } // set of known valid processes 
Set Q = {P0, H}  // set of DFA states 
Set F = {P0} // set of accepting states 
Set  = { } //initialized alphabet 
Set tempstring w =  
Get input sting 
For (i=1; i  n; i++) 
Set w = wpi 
IF ((w is not in whitelist) and (expert validates w)) 
Add Pi to Q 
Add Pi to F 
Add pi to  
Add DFA transition ((Pi-1,pi)Pi) 
Add w to whitelist 
ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
 
Figure 6-16: Algorithm for Building PPT DFA 
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the non-empty intersection L(DFAt)  Lv called the white list. This open theoretical question is 
further discussed in appendix E. 
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Chapter  7: Implementation of the PPT Model  
In this chapter the PPT DFA theoretical computational model is instantiated into a structure 
that can be implemented on a computer system in the form of a Program Pathing Trust Machine 
(PPTM).  The transition table represented at the end of chapter 6 provides a map for moving the 
theoretical computation model to an implementation of the PPT model into a PPTM.   
The PPTM will operate in two modes.  One mode is the learning mode.  Psuedo code for the 
learning mode was provided in figure 6-16.  Psuedo code for the validation mode is provided in 
figure 7-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Algorithm for PPT DFA in Validation Mode 
The remaining sections of this chapter describe the issues associated with implementation of  
PPTM. 
PPT DFA Validate Mode 
Use DFA built in Learning mode 
Set greylist = { } //holds invocations strings of unknown validity 
Set current DFA state to P0 
Set tempstings w =  
Get input sting of form p1p2……pi….pn for pi   
FOR (i-1;i   n; i++) 
 Set w = wpi  //append pi to w 
 IF (w is not in whitelist) 
  IF(transiton ((Pi-1, pi) is valid) and (pi is in F)) THEN 
   Place w in greylist 
  ELSE 
   Reject w and END 
  ENDIF 
 ENDIF 
ENDFOR 
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7.1 Alternatives for Implementing the Program Pathing Trust DFA 
Implementing the PPTM using a transition table can be done in a number of ways.  The 
application of the DFA dictates what implementation strategy should be used.  Each application 
of the PPT DFA has its own requirements. For instance, in discretionary and mandatory access 
control the number of process invocation sequences mapped for access to a particular resource is 
small and therefore a small and simple mapping structure is sufficient.  For an integrity trusted 
model, which is the focus of this research, all the valid process invocation sequences are mapped.  
Because a much larger number of processes and process invocation sequences are mapped, a 
different structure to implement the PPT DFA model is advisable.  
7.1.1 PPT DFA Bit Map Implementation 
For discretionary and mandatory access control applications, only a small number of process 
invocations need to be mapped.  Take for instance the process invocation sequences where only  
Process P3 is allowed to access resource X, using the invocation sequences p1 p1 p3, p1 p2 p3, and 
p1 p1 p2 p3.  The number of normal processes and valid process invocation sequences in the 
alphabet are very small in number and can be implemented in a very simple structure such as a 
bit map.  
  p1 p2 p3 
P0 0 1 0 0 
H 0 0 0 0 
P1 0 1 1 1 
P2 0 0 0 1 
P3 0 0 0 0 
Figure 7-2 Program Pathing Bit Map 
Consider a small population of process invocations.  For this population, a bit map can be 
used effectively for the mapping structure to represent the PPT DFA.    Consider Figure 6-15, the 
Process Invocations 
P
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DFA transition table in chapter 6.  The table is easily represented by the instantiation of the bit 
map structure in Figure 7-2. 
Initially in the bit map structure all process invocations in the alphabet  are initialized to 
binary 0s - meaning all processes invoked end up in the trap state.  Any transition that is marked 
as binary 0 is defined as a transition to the trap state H.  As the DFA learns new processes and 
new valid invocations, a binary 1 is placed in the cells where the process in the row is authorized 
to invoke the process in the column.  A binary 0 in a cell means move to the trap state, from 
which there is no escape.  A binary 1 means that the process in the row can invoke the process in 
the intersecting column. 
The Program Pathing bit map implementation uses the adjacency-matrix representation used 
in graphic structures [Sedg02].  Using an adjacency-matrix graph of n by n array of Boolean 
values, a Program Pathing bit mapping implementation of an DFA can be built using a small 
amount of storage, given a small number of processes.  The advantage of using a bit map is that 
it allows for mapping every combination of invocations of the processes represented in the 
matrix.  Looking up invocations and adding new invocations to the matrix is relatively simple, 
and computationally inexpensive.  
Adding an invocation or invocation sequence entails adding new processes to the row and 
column and changing the binary 0s to 1s for the cells representing process invocations.   
 
Figure 7-3: Adjacency-matrix 
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Figure 7-3 represents the adjacency-matrix for the bit map represented by figure 7-2 and figure 
6-15. 
Note in figure 7-3 that the first table is an array of process names with pointers to rows in the 
bit map.  This is done so that the process name can be looked up.  The relative offset into the 
process name table is the relative position of the process in the bit map, as indicated by the 
numbers along the rows and columns.      
A disadvantage of using a bit map is that most operating systems are written in the C 
language, which has poor bit manipulation, and therefore coding a bit map in the C language is 
challenging.  Another disadvantage of the adjacency-matrix bit map is that it may result in a 
wasting space.  Mathematically, the adjacency–matrix is still more efficient with storage than the 
retrieval tree approach.  For discretionary and mandatory access control applications the 
adjacency-matrix is sufficient, since these applications are interested in allowing only a few 
process invocation sequences for access to a particular resource.   
Access control identifies the program pathing DFA in the access control list for the resource 
being restricted.  Therefore in an access control system there are multiple program pathing DFAs 
identifying process invocation sequences for each resource needing program pathing controls.  
Although the adjacency-matrix bit map implementation would be sufficient for access control, it 
may not however be sufficient for intrusion detection or ensuring trusted systems where all 
process invocation sequences must be mapped.  Therefore another implementation approach 
must be considered, 
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7.1.2 PPT DFA Adjacency-List Implementation 
The mapping of all valid process invocation sequences is required for intrusion detection or 
to establish a trusted system.  The adjacency-matrix bit mapping approach to program pathing 
would require too much memory to map all process invocations in a system.   In such cases, the 
program pathing DFA mapping structure can be implemented in the form of an adjacency-list 
[Sedg02]. The adjacency-list approach implementation of the program pathing DFA removes the 
empty spaces in the adjacency-matrix by using linked lists.  Although this approach uses more 
memory for smaller process invocation sequences, it ends up taking less space for larger process 
invocation sequences, particularly if the adjacency-matrix is sparsely populated.  The benefit of 
the adjacency-list approach is that it can map a large diverse set of process invocation sequences 
more efficiently if there are a large number of different processes performing the invocations and 
little redundancy.  Figure 7-4 illustrates the adjacency-list approach mapping the same p1 p1 p3, 
p1 p2 p3, and p1 p1 p2 p3 invocation sequences used in Chapter 6, figure 6-15. 
 
Figure 7-4: Adjacency-list  
Although the adjacency-list mapping takes more memory per invocation, as the number of 
processes increases it takes less space when compared to the adjacency matrix.  If p = the 
number of processes invocations in a sequence, then the adjacency-matrix uses p
2
 space to 
implement the mappings whereas, the adjacency-index uses p+L (where L = the count of 
linkages to invoking processes.)   
Using an adjacency-list to implement the program pathing DFA is more efficient than earlier 
approaches because it does not have to map a process invocation multiple times if it appears in 
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different invocation sequences, thereby saving space.  The adjacency-list approach is more 
efficient than the adjacency-matrix in situations were the number of unique processes making 
process invocations is greater than 110 processes or 1.5K of storage.  The adjacency-index 
method can represent 192 process invocation relationships in 1.5K, whereas the adjacency-
matrix can only represent 110 processes but also represent all the possible process invocation 
relationships of those processes.  The adjacency-matrix method is much more efficient in 
representing all the possible process invocation relationships between the processes in the matrix 
– there is no extra cost for representing a process invocation between processes already 
represented in the matrix.  But adding a new process invocation relationship between a process 
already existing in the adjacency-list implementation always has a cost. 
7.2 Measuring Implementation Structures 
Preliminary results showed that the program pathing approach using an adjacency-matrix or 
adjacency-list can provide a more efficient and simpler mapping of process invocation 
sequences.  Figure 7-5 shows a comparison between the adjacency-matrix, the adjacency-list and 
the retrieval tree approaches.  The ―Implementation Approaches‖ columns shows the number of 
processes each approach can represent give the ―Memory‖ allocation. 
 
Figure 7-5: Memory and Process Representation Comparisons 
In 1K of storage, the adjacency-matrix approach can represent close to the same number of 
processes as the other two approaches, however its advantage is that it can represent more 
process invocations between the processes it represents.  Both the retrieval tree and the 
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adjacency-list approaches can only represent the same number of process invocations as there are 
processes represented and adding new process invocations has a cost.  For the retrieval tree 
approach, the cost is higher because each process invocation must identify every process that it 
invokes, even if it has been mapped before.   
The adjacency-matrix approach is also efficient in creating and processing the mapping 
structure which allows for easy addition of processes and process invocations.  Adding a process 
to the matrix can be done by adding a new row and column to the matrix.  Validating if a process 
invocation is authorized is as easy as verifying that the process is represented in the matrix and 
that the cell in the matrix that represents the process  invocation is set to a binary 1.   
For larger mappings of multiple and more complex process invocation sequences the 
adjacency-matrix can become too large.  For some applications, this disadvantage can be 
overcome by breaking up the program pathing DFA into multiple DFAs, like SELINUX does 
with its reference policies [Smal01b].  Each DFA represents a domain of valid process 
invocation sequences.   The relationship between the DFA domains can be mapped in a higher 
level DFA of domain invocations.  The SELINUX approach using domains makes the 
adjacency-matrix approach an optimal solution, where it can be applied.  However, in the case 
where all the process invocation sequences must be mapped in a single DFA, the adjacency-list 
approach is a better implementation of the program pathing model.  The approach allows for the 
most efficient use of storage. 
The program pathing approach, regardless of the method used to implement it (adjacency-
matrix or adjacency-list) provides a good alternative to previously tried methods, i.e. n-gram 
[Hof98] or retrieval trees [Amm98].  Even though both methods‘ DFA can recognize process 
invocation sequences not previously learned, this is not unlike a machine learning algorithm.  If a 
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process invocation has been learned and identified as trusted, then it should be trusted in other 
process invocation sequences that lead to the same process invocation.   
7.3 Coding Structures in PPTM 
Instantiation of a PPT DFA entails creating data areas that support the adjacency-matrix.  
Developing an implementable PPT DFA using an adjacency-matrix is not just a matter of coding 
the structure, the structure has to be designed for maintainability.  The design techniques used 
must be scalable and allow for ease of diagnostics.  The Program Pathing Trust Machine (PPTM) 
was written in C language, the language of choice for most operating systems.  Ideally, the 
PPTM would be integrated as a subsystem in the operating system‘s kernel.  However, the 
PPTM is only a functional prototype to prove that an instantiation of a PPT DFA is possible and 
is capable of solving the problem.  Further testing has to be performed in production ready 
systems to prove that the prototype is sufficient.  The C language also provides the ability to use 
and maintain address pointers, which is useful in designing an implementation of the PPT DFA. 
The PPTM prototype was not implemented into the system‘s kernel, but as a stand-alone 
application that creates the PPT DFA structure, for mapping valid process invocations sequences 
and for validating the authority of process invocation s to determine if they are invalid process 
invocations.  Verification of the prototype was essential before attempting to make any 
modifications to the system‘s kernel.   Complete exploration of issues concerning the 
modification of the system‘s kernel is a topic for future research (see chapter 9).   
7.3.1 PPTM Basic Structure 
This section describes the data areas created to realize a functioning PPTM.  The data areas 
support an implementation of the PPT DFA described in chapter 6. 
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The main data area for the PPTM is the anchor, as shown in figure 7.6.  The anchor data area 
is the communication vector that is an anchor point for all the PPTM‘s basic components.  The 
anchor data area 
 
Figure 7-6: PPTM Anchor Data Area 
is made up of a length field, an eye catcher field and a number of address pointers.   The fields 
are defined as follows: 
len Length of the entire anchor data area.  This field is initialized after the data area is 
allocated and is used to deallocate the data area when the application ends. 
eyecat The eye catcher field is initialized with the ASCII text of ―ANCHOR.‖  The ASCII 
text allows a technician to quickly identify the anchor data area in a core dump of 
memory when diagnosing the application. 
stkptr Address pointer to allocated memory data area called stack, which is a block of singly 
linked list cells each defined by the scell data area.  Scells  define the invoked 
processes. 
sptr Address pointer of the next available unused scell in the scell stack data area. 
snum Number of the next indexed scell available in the scell stack data area. 
autptr Address pointer to the automata data area, where the names of all the encountered 
processes are recorded in an array of data areas called acell. 
aptr Address pointer to the next unused acell available in the acell automata data area. 
anum Number of the next indexed acell available in the acell automata data area. 
The PPT DFA is made up of four sets of data areas: automata, stack, acell and scell. 
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These four data structures work together to instantiate the PPT DFA.  The automata data area is 
the main structure of the PPT DFA; it is an array of the states in the DFA or the normal 
processes.  The elements in the automata data area are acells; each acell represents a state or 
normal process with reference to the DFA 5-tuple characteristics of the PPT DFA.  Q = 
automata data area or Q = (acell[1], acell[2],…acell[n]).  The alphabet  is represented by the 
elements in the stack data area called scells.  They represent transitions or valid process 
invocations.   = stack data area or  = (scell[1], scell[2],…scell[n]).   
 
Figure 7-7: Automata Data Structures 
7.3.2 How the  PPTM works 
The prototype is initialized by allocating the anchor, stack and automata data areas.  These 
blocks of memory all have a length (len) and eye catcher (eyecat) initialized so that the end of 
each data area can be determined and so that the data area can be easily found in a memory core 
dump.  The size of the data area blocks in the prototype is arbitrarily determined by an internally 
defined variable, however in a production-quality implementation the data areas can be allocated 
dynamically depending upon the size of the stored DFA recorded (for instance the number of 
acells allocated in the automata data area are exactly the number of processes recorded). The 
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size of the data area is important for the purposes of de-allocating the memory at a later time, and 
for reading a memory core dump if necessary. 
Once the main data areas are allocated and initialized the PPTM reads the valid process 
invocation sequences needed to populate the automata data area.  Populating processes into the 
cells is a matter of recording processes as they are encountered when the PPTM is in recording 
mode – in the case of the prototype, this means reading the ―train‖ file.  In recording mode, all 
process invocation sequences are assumed to be valid process invocation sequences and are 
recorded in the automata.   
After all the recorded processes are loaded into the automata data area, the PPTM prints out 
the automata structure into an ―autotrace‖ file. This is to allow auditing of the automata data area 
created by the PPTM application.  Using the example of the valid process invocation sequences  
 
Figure 7-8: “automata” Data Area Containing the Process Invocation Sequences 
p1p1p3, p1p2p3, and p1p1p2p3, (described in chapter 6), the automata data area would look as 
illustrated in figure 7-8. 
  The PPTM automata data area is interpreted from the in core memory version and translated 
into a text file.  The resulting ―automtrace‖ file is a representation of the automata data area in 
grammatical form, indicating that the process on the left can call either the processes P1, P2 or 
P3.   
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Automata Trace 
Caller Process -> Called Process | Called Process  
S -> ProcessP1  
ProcessP1 -> ProcessP1 | ProcessP2 | ProcessP3 
ProcessP2 -> ProcessP3 
ProcessP3  
Figure 7-9: Format of the “automtrace” file 
The PPTM then validates any process invocation sequences it encounters against the valid 
process invocation sequences it has recorded in the automata data area.  The PPTM is now in 
validate mode.  Any process or process invocation that is encountered but not authorized is 
recorded as an error.  For the sake of the prototype, all unauthorized processes or process 
invocations that are not valid are recorded in the ―auditfile‖ file.  In validate mode, if the PPTM 
encounters a process that has not been recorded in the automata data area, the PPTM writes an 
error message to the ―auditfile‖ file:   
Called process [ID2] - [process name] invalid. 
If on the other hand the PPTM encounters a process invoking a process that is a normal process, 
but is not authorized to invoke, then the PPTM writes another error message to the ―auditfile‖ 
file: 
 It is invalid for PID [ID3] - process [process name 1]6 to call 
process [process name 2]
7
. 
As a process is validated, the PPTM writes out the process invocation process so that it can be 
audited later.  If the audited process invocation sequence was validated incorrectly, a technician 
can correct the PPTM by submitting the audited process invocation sequence to be recorded in 
the automata data area.
                                                 
6
 [Process name 1] refers to the process attempting to invoke process 2  
7
 [Process name 2] refers to the process being invoked by process 1 
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Chapter  8: Development and Test Results 
Development and testing of the PPTM prototype was done on a Dell Latitude C640 with an 
Intel Pentium 4, 1.80 GHz, 500 MB RAM and 30GB hard drive hardware, running Linux Red 
Hat Fedora Core 6.  It was also tested on a Dell Latitude D600 with an Intel Pentium M, with 1.6 
GHz, 2 GB RAM and 60 GB hard drive hardware.  This system ran Windows XP with service 
pack 3.  The code was additionally tested on a MacBook 5.2 with an Intel Core 2 Duo, 1.23 GHz, 
4GB RAM and 160GB hard drive, running OS X 10.6.5.  The code was recompiled on each of 
these systems and ran without any problems. 
8.1 Development 
Implementing the PPTM involved making some decisions concerning the operating system 
and the programming language to be used.  Given that the PPTM would eventually reside in the 
OS kernel, it was decided to use C language and given that the PPTM has to be used in multiple 
OS environments, this research chose GNU‘s gcc compiler, since it supports multiple OS 
environments.   The source code was transferred to two other computers running different OS 
`systems for testing.   
The source code was placed in a development directory.  The system path was positioned to 
the source code in the development directory using the PATH=$PATH:. command.  The gcc 
PPTM.c –o PPTM command was used to create an executable program called PPTM. A copy 
of the PPTM source code can be found in Appendix A. 
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8.2 Unit Testing and Debugging 
Testing the PPTM was a challenge because it proved difficult to acquire test data from 
production or quality assurance (QA) critical servers that ran processes that needed to be 
protected.  In order to secure sufficient test data from critical servers, this research would have to 
demonstrate that the algorithms perform and function as designed.  Initially it was important to 
verify that the code performed the functions it was designed to perform properly.  A series of 
unit tests were conducted to verify each function.   
8.2.1 Test Reading Training Data and Building the Automata Structure 
Mock training data was used to test the PPTM program‘s ability to read in the data and store 
it in the automata.  The training data was sparse to make it easy to debug and was crafted to test 
the different features of the automata structure.  The implemented automaton is made up of acells 
and scells.  An acell is a data area that represents a process, or in computational theory 
vernacular, a state.  The scell data area represents a transition to a state.  The test training data 
verified that both acells and scells were created properly.  If an acell for a process already 
existed, another acell would not need to be created and the acell for the process would be re-
used.   
As a process invokes other processes, scells representing the invoked processes are linked to 
the invoking process‘s acell.   The scell also links to the invoked process‘s acell, if it exists, 
otherwise an acell is created for the invoked process and the linked scell in the invoking process 
acell linklist points to the invoked process‘s scell.  If a process‘s scell is already linked to an 
invoking processes acell, then a duplicate scell does not need to be linked to the acell.   The scell 
would be re-used.    
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After all the crafted mock training data was read and modeled in the PPTM automaton, the 
PPTM code printed out the automaton representation to an ―automtrace‖ file.  The ―automtrace‖ 
file was used to verify that the training data was represented properly in the automaton and could 
be used for debugging later. 
8.2.2 Verify Data Against the Profiled Training Data in the Automata 
Once the automata machine was loaded with the mock test data, and the ―automtrace‖ file 
verified that the automata structure was successfully built, the PPTM prototype was then tested 
to see if it could be used to verify process invocations.  The validation testing determined if the 
automata could identify the process invocation sequences that the PPTM loaded into the 
automata and determined if it was able to identify invalid process invocation sequences.  The 
testing was intended to verify that the automaton could identify the following invalid process 
invocations: 
1. An abnormal process tries to invoke a process. 
2. A normal process tries to invoke an abnormal process. 
3. A normal process tries to invoke a normal process that it is not authorized to invoke. 
8.3 System Testing 
In absence of available test data, mock test data was created programmatically.   The Tstdata 
program was created to generate test data to test the PPTM program.  See Appendix A for the 
Tstdata souce code.  The Tstdata program randomly generates system test data to test the PPTM 
program and to find any problems that the simulated hand crafted test data in the functional 
testing did not reveal.   
107 
 
8.3.1 Tstdata – Random Test Data Generator 
The Tstdata program randomly generates process names and process invocation sequences.  
The Tstdata has three defined constants in the Test.h file which control the volume and 
characteristics of the test data. 
1. NoProcess    – Defines the number of processes the Tstdata can choose from. 
2. NoIDs           – Defines the number of process invocation sequences to generate. 
3. NoProString – Defines the maximum number of processes that can be in a process                                     
invocation string. 
The Tstdata program generates NoIDs number of process invocation sequences, choosing 1 
to NoProString number of processes in a sequence.  The number of processes in a sequence is 
randomly generated for each sequence, so each may have a different number of processes.  Each 
process invocation sequence is assigned a UID number 1 through NoIDs, e.g., {UID1, UID2, 
…,UIDn}.  Each process added to a process invocation sequence is randomly chosen from a 
number 1 to NoProcess.  The processes are assigned a name based upon the random number 
generated with an M preceding it, e.g., {M1, M2, M3, …, Mn}. 
The test data generated is in the following format: 
UID1   S   M291 
UID1   M291  M876 
UID1  M876  M97 
UID2  S   M79 
UID2  M79 … 
Note that every process invocation sequence starts with the start state S, which is equivalent to 
the P0 start state described in the theoretical model in chapter 6. 
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Each line in the test data represents a process invocation, identifying the process sequence it 
belongs to (indicated by the UIDn), the invoking process, immediately after the process sequence 
number and the invoked process, right after the invoking process name.   
The variables in the Test.h file can be changed to simulate various process invocation 
sequence scenarios.   The Tstdata.c program must then be re-complied using the GNU gcc 
compiler to accept the changes made in the Test.h file.  The Tstdata program is then executed to 
generate test data that is written to the Train file, so it can be used as training input to the PPTM 
program.   
8.3.2 Performance Testing the PPTM prototype 
System testing focused upon establishing the performance baselines for building the 
automata and validating process invocation sequences against training data loaded into the 
automata.  Unlike the functional tests, this data was larger in volume and more complex.  The 
test data was generated automatically using the Tstdata program.  The table in figure 8-1 shows 
the system testing and the parameters used to test the PPTM prototype.  
Figure 8-1 is the results from the system test.  The table scells and acells represent the 
memory allocation of the PPTM data structures to so that the amount of memory necessary to 
represent the process invocation sequences using either the adjacency-matrix or the adjacency –
list can be determined.  The test provides statistics to verify the amount of memory that PPTM 
needs for each approach.  It is important to know the memory requirements of PPTM when it 
runs on critical servers so as to prevent system resources from being over utilized by PPTM.  
Since PPTM is to be implemented into the kernel to intercept processes being scheduled for 
dispatching to the CPU, the PPTM structures should not use up too much RAM.   
109 
 
 
The result of system testing uncovered some problems not discovered in the functional 
testing, such as buffer overflows (which happened when a large volume of test data was 
presented to the PPTM).   Further, the system test identified the fact that an automaton becomes 
denser as the invocation sequences invoke more processes.    
System testing demonstrated that the PPTM could handle a large number of processes and 
sequences.  The tests performed as expected, the PPTM profiled all the test data and identified 
the process invocations it should have indentified as invalid.  No anomalies were found during 
testing of the validation phase of the PPTM 
# of 
sequences 
# of 
processes 
Max # of 
processes 
per 
sequence 
acells scells 
Max number of 
possible 
invocation 
combinations 
Memory 
allocation for 
matrix in MB 
Memory 
allocation 
for link-list 
in MB 
percentage 
density 
10 10 10 10 40 121 0.000320 0.0009 33.06% 
10 100 50 93 253 10,201 0.004054 0.0067 2.48% 
10 1,000 100 434 567 1,002,001 0.132692 0.0219 0.06% 
100 10 10 10 116 121 0.000320 0.0021 95.87% 
100 100 100 100 3,979 10,201 0.004268 0.0638 39.01% 
100 1,000 100 997 5,460 1,002,001 0.149874 0.1137 0.54% 
1,000 10 10 10 118 121 0.000320 0.0021 97.52% 
1000 100 100 100 10,074 10,201 0.004268 0.1568 98.76% 
1000 1,000 100 1,000 48,438 1,002,001 0.149965 0.7696 4.83% 
1000 10,000 100 9,943 49,569 100,020,001 12.226750 1.0598 0.05% 
10,000 10 10 10 116 121 0.000320 0.0021 95.87% 
10,000 100 100 100 10,170 10,201 0.004268 0.1582 99.70% 
10,000 1,000 100 1,000 392,882 1,002,001 0.149965 6.0254 39.21% 
10,000 10,000 100 10,000 494,121 100,020,001 12.228489 7.8449 0.49% 
100,000 10 10 10 117 121 0.000320 0.0021 96.69% 
100,000 100 100 100 10,164 10,201 0.004268 0.1581 99.64% 
100,000 1,000 100 1,000 994,279 1,002,001 0.149965 15.2020 99.23% 
100,000 10,000 100 10,000 2,430,739 100,020,001 12.228489 37.3953 2.43% 
100,000 100,000 100 100,000 5,025,487 10,000,200,001 1,195.168495 79.7346 0.05% 
Figure 8-1 System Test Results 
The high mark testing was 100,000 processes in 100,000 process invocation sequences 
averaging 50 processes in each sequence.  All 100,000 processes were used in the invocation 
test, and over 5 million process invocations were profiled.  Memory utilization for the PPTM 
using the adjacency-list and the adjacency matrix were calculated.  The amount of allocated 
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RAM needed to represent the PPTM adjacency-list structure was about 80MB versus over 1 GB 
using the adjacency-matrix.  The density of the invocations was measured to determine the point 
at which the adjacency-matrix began out performing the adjacency-list structure.   
For tests where the number of processes were between 10 and 1000, there was no significant 
difference between the two structures.  As the number of processes increased, the adjacency-list 
began allocating less memory than the adjacency-matrix.  This trend continues until the number 
of process invocations grows and begins filling the adjacency-list.  When the adjacency-list 
structure starts to converge to around 40% of the maximum number of possible invocation 
combinations, the adjacency-matrix starts to become the more optimal structure for conserving 
memory.  It is, however, unlikely that process invocations would reach a 40% density.  It would 
mean that if there were 10,000 processes, there would be 100 million process invocation 
possibilities and that the system would have to make 40 million of process invocations for the 
adjacency-list to be suboptimal.  The tests suggest that the adjacency-list is the preferred 
structure to use of system integrity process invocation authorization.  
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Chapter  9: Future Research 
9.1 Implement PPTM into the Operating System’s Kernel 
Implementation of PPTM requires that it be installed in the OS kernel so that it can validate 
program path sequence of process invocations.   Of course, if the PPT model were to be adopted 
as part of an existing access control system, the OS intercept problem would be partially solved, 
as most access control systems already have intercepts in the OS.   
Once the PPTM system is implanted into the kernel, it can monitor every process that is 
loaded for execution in real time.  The PPTM system is able to verify all process invocation 
sequences.  A fully functional PPTM subsystem must be developed with all the user interfaces 
and options to enable the PPTM prototype to function in a production environment. 
9.2 Testing 
The PPTM has been tested with mock data.  However additional testing with real data is 
necessary once the PPTM has been implemented in a system as described above.   All the 
features in the PPTM implemented in the kernel described in section 9.1 must be tested and with 
a number of application scenarios.  A number of known applications have to be tested in 
combination and separately to determine if the system can identify and distinguish between valid 
and invalid process sequences.  To understand how exactly the PPTM system works, the system 
must be tested for performance as well as accuracy.   Comparing the results of PPTM to other 
process invocation sequence models is difficult, due to lack of a standard test bed, but 
comparative evaluations should be made so far as possible.   A useful extension of this research 
may be the development and proposal of a standard test bed made available to other researchers 
to facilitate comparisons of approaches. 
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9.3 Process Authentication 
Process authentication is important for determining that a process is the process it purports to 
be.  Future research will determine whether the PPT model can en extended to include 
authentication.  Further discussion on this issue is presented in appendix D.   
9.4 The Validity of Inferred Process Invocation Sequences 
One may make the assumption that by authorizing individual process invocations the PPT 
model can infer valid process invocation sequences it has not yet encountered. This assumption 
may allow the PPT DFA to accept sequences that are invalid. Further research should aim at 
determining whether some members of L(DFAt) are not in Lv.  Further discussion on this issue is 
presented in appendix E. 
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Chapter  10:  Conclusion 
This research has identified a model to validate process invocations in order to prevent the 
execution of unnecessary processes that steal CPU cycles or otherwise interfere with production 
processing.  Unlike intrusion prevention, the significance of program pathing is to keep normal 
processes from being invoked at inappropriate times, as well as to keep malware from running.  
The goals of the program pathing model are to be scalable to a production environment, and to 
take relatively little time and knowledge to implement and maintain. 
The first principle of engineering is to analyze and understand the problem to be solved.  
Rigorous analysis of a problem often yields a good solution, and one that is not overly complex.  
A simpler solution is easier to manage, thus better positioned to perform optimally.  This 
research has analyzed the problem of validating process invocation sequences using a 
computational theory approach. 
10.1 Computational Theory Approach to Validating Process Invocation 
Sequences  
Bell and LaPadula stated that it was important to ―bridge the gap between general theory and 
practical problem solving‖ [Bell73].  And it is important to engage theoretical modeling in the 
problem solving process.  This research has used computational theory to define and analyze the 
problem.  Representing the process invocation sequence problem symbolically and examining it 
in the context of computational theory has enabled a more precise definition of the problem.  
Computational theory has focused the problem, allowing the solution to emerge from problem 
analysis. 
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10.1.1 Required Computational Power 
 It was determined that a finite state automaton (FSA) has sufficient computational power to 
solve the problem of mapping process invocation sequences.  In the DFA model chosen valid 
process invocations are mapped to verify the authority of each process to invoke or be invoked 
by another process.  This technique assumes that all process invocations are invalid unless 
registered in the DFA. 
To take into account abnormal processes from the alphabet  the automata had to define a 
new variable symbol .  The symbol  deviates from traditional automata theory.  Traditional 
automata theory does not use variables in the alphabet. There is literature to suggest that a 
variable of indeterminate or unknown inputs in a transition might be acceptable [Buch60a] 
[Buch60b] [Elie74].  However, the present research did not further pursue these more 
computationally complex approaches because the DFA used here has sufficient computational 
power.  
10.1.2 Translating Theory into Solutions 
When dealing with even simple computational theory it is difficult to translate theory into 
implementation.   There are some tools that allow researchers to convert regular expressions into 
implementation, such as lex and yacc [Levi95], but these are scripting languages and not 
applicable to the PPTM.  The PPTM must be implemented into the kernel.  This research has 
identified two possible data structures to implement an DFA – adjacency-matrix and adjacency-
list [Sedg02].  Adjacency algorithms are graph algorithms, and the DFA is represented as a 
graph. 
The adjacency-matrix (or bit map) fulfills all the requirements necessary to implement an 
DFA state transition table.  The adjacency-matrix algorithm performs well if there are a large 
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number of input transitions.  For state transition tables that have fewer input transactions, an 
adjacency-list (or link-list) is more memory efficient.  The optimal implementation of the DFA 
depends upon the constraints dictated by the problem and the calculated memory requirements 
required to represent the DFA in implementing each of the adjacency algorithms.  
10.2 Impact upon the Program Pathing Problem 
This research‘s approach to the program pathing problem (process invocation sequence 
problem) has been to look for a simple solution.  Instead of concentrating on mapping entire 
process strings or patterns, focus has been upon a process‘s authority to invoke another process.  
This simpler solution enables a DFA to profile invocation sequences more easily, as the 
invocation sequences are built from individual mappings of authorized process invocations.  
Other solutions have tried to map either the whole invocation sequence or substrings of that 
sequence.  
Although the program pathing model prototyped has been functionally tested and system 
tested, it still needs to be embedded, implemented, and tested in an actual operating system.   As 
stated in chapter 9, the real test for the model is for PPTM to be implemented without a lot of 
effort and to run effectively on a production system.  This has to wait for future research and an 
institutional partner willing to spend the time testing.   
10.2.1 Mapping Process Authority to Invoke Processes 
The PPTM maps running process invocations as they are encountered to build the invocation 
sequences to be authorized.  Instantiating the DFA into a series of linked lists of process 
invocations simplifies the mapping of sequences.  A process cannot invoke another process 
unless the process that invoked it in turn was authorized to be invoked by another invoking 
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process.  The valid invocation sequences are implied to be authorized, because only valid 
process invocations are allowed to be executed.   
An advantage of the program pathing model is that it can populate the DFA linked list as 
process invocations are encountered and profiled from a running system.   There is no need to 
edit or write a policy language to map process invocation sequences.  If a process invocation 
sequence is encountered that has not been profiled by the program pathing DFA, the audit record 
identifying the encountered process invocation can be used to update the DFA, and capture that 
invocation as valid. 
False negatives (i.e., prevention a process from being invoked when it should) can be 
prevented by placing the PPTM into Warn mode.  Warn mode allows processes that may be 
critical to the operation to continue to be invoked, but alerts administrators that there is a 
potential false negative and something must be checked.   
10.2.2 Mode Characteristics of Some Process Invocations 
One characteristic of program pathing is that some process invocation sequences may be 
valid at one time but not another.  For instance, it is not valid to run maintenance processes 
during production times.  There may be processes that should run at scheduled times, and only at 
those times.  The program pathing model must be able to handle cases where a sequence is valid 
at one point in time and invalid at another. The program pathing DFA can deal with these cases 
by (1) turning off the PPTM to allow the usually invalid processes to be invoked, or (2) 
switching the program pathing DFA to another DFA to allow the processes to run PPTM, or (3) 
including a time window as part of each process invocation symbol in . 
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10.3 Potential Use of the Program Pathing Trust Model 
The Program Pathing Trust Model is not intended to be a stand-alone function.  It is intended 
to be a component of a larger security system as are the original program pathing in ACF2

 
[ACF99] and the program controls in SELinux [Mcca05].  That is to say, it is not intended to be 
used as a stand-alone function such as an intrusion prevention system (like Symantec‘s Critical 
System Protection [Suma05]).  
10.3.1 Program Pathing in an Access Control System 
The original use of program pathing was in a discretionary access control system (ACF2 
[ACF99].)   Its purpose was to verify that a user‘s access to a resource was granted but only 
through particular process invocation sequences.  Any access to the resource outside the valid 
process invocation sequence was considered inappropriate and was denied.   User authentication 
and user authorization to the resources is handled by the access control system, and the process 
invocation sequence validation could be handled by the Program Pathing Trust Model working 
as a component of the access control system.   
Using the Program Pathing Trust Model to validate process invocation sequences would 
prevent a user from accessing data through any means but an authorized process, thereby adding 
a more secure dimension to access control.  Restriction of user access to data in this way could 
help prevent unauthorized copying or leaking of data.    
10.3.2 Program Pathing in a System Integrity System 
A form of program pathing has been used in SELinux [Mcca05], and falls into some of the 
same pitfalls as the ACF2
‘s implementation.  It identifies the process invocation sequences 
allowed within a domain, and writes these relationships into a security policy using the SELinux 
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policy language.  SELinux also validates access to other domains, resources, security labels and 
levels, etc.  SELinux is a mandatory access control and system integrity system that could use the 
Program Pathing Trust Model in the same manner as discretionary access control.  In the case of 
mandatory access control, a user with a security label could access a resource with the same 
security label but would only be allowed access it using specific process invocation sequences.  
SELinux has redefined mandatory access control to include system integrity [Mcca05].   
The Program Pathing Trust Model can be used in the SELinux subsystem to define the 
processes within a domain.  The Program Pathing Trust Model would remove the need to define 
each process manually in a security policy – thereby simplifying SELinux‘s implementation.   
 119 
 
References 
[ACF99] CA-ACF2 Systems Programmer Guide CA-ACF2 Release 6.3, September 1999 
 
[ACF89] ACF99@RB module from CA-ACF2

 Release 6.2, Computer Associates, 
International, 1989 
 
[AFM99] Assurance in the Fluke Microkernel: Final Report, Secure Computing Corporation, 
Contract no. MDA904-97-C-3047, April 1999. 
 
[Aho75] Alfred Aho, Margaret Corasick, ―Efficient string matching: An aid to bibliographic 
search‖, Communications of ACM, Volume 18, Issue 6, pages 333-340, 1975. 
 
[Aho97] Alfred Aho, ―Algorithms for finding patterns in strings‖.  In J. van Leeuwen, editor, 
Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, volume A, chapter 5, pages 255-300.  MIT Press, 
1994. 
 
[Aho00] Alfred Aho,  Jeffery Ullman, Foundations of Computer Science C Edition, Computer 
Science Press, NY, 2000. 
 
[Amm98] Glenn Ammons, James Larus, ―Improved data-flow analysis with path profiles,‖ ACM 
SIGPLAN Notices, Volume 33, Issues 5 (May 1998), pp. 72-84. 
 
[Appf04] The AppFire Suite for Host Intrusion Prevention: Technical White Paper, 
PlatformLogic, www.platformlogic.com (website no longer available see citation below) 
 
[Ball92]  Thomas Ball, James Larus, ―Optimally Profiling and Tracing Programs,‖ Proceedings 
of the 19th annual ACM symposium on Prinicples of Programming Languages, p.59-70, 
Albuquerque, NM, Jan. 19-22, 1992.. 
 
[Ball96]  Thomas Ball, James Larus, ―Efficient path profiling,‖ Proceedings of the 29th annual 
ACM/IEEE international symposium on Microarchitecture, p.46-57, December 2-4, 1996, Paris, 
France. 
 
[Bar61] Y. Bar-Hillel, M. Perles, and E. Shamir, "On formal properties of simple phrase-
structure grammars". Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft, und 
Kommunikationsforschung 14: 143–177, 1961. 
 
[Bark80] Stephen Barker, The Elements of Logic, Third Editon, McGrall-Hill, NY, 1980. 
 
[Beak69] George C. Beakley, Donovan L. Evans, Deloss H. Bowers, Careers in Engineering and 
Technology, Macmillan Company, 866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022, Page 448, 
1969. 
 
 120 
 
[Bell73a]  Bell, D E, LaPadula, L J. "Secure Computer Systems‘ Mathematical Foundations," 
ESD-TR-73-278, vol. 1, ESD/AFSC, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, Mass., Nov. 1973 (MTR-2547, 
vol. 1, MITRE Corp., Bedford, Mass.) 
 
[Bell73b] Bell, D. E., LaPadula, L. J "A Secure Computer Systems' A Mathematical Model," 
ESD-TR-73-278, vol. 2, ESD/AFSC, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, Mass., Nov. 1973 (MTR-2547, 
vol 2, MITRE Corp., Bedford, Mass.}  
 
[Bell74a] Bell, D. E. "Secure computer systems: A Refinement of the Mathematical Model," 
ESD-TR-73-278, vol. 3, ESD/ AFSC, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, Mass, April 1974 (MTR 2547, 
vol. 3, MITRE Corp., Bedford, Mass.}. 
 
[Bell74b] Bell, D. E, LaPadula, L. J. "Secure Computer Systems. Mathematical Foundations and 
Model," M74-244, MITRE Corp, Bedford, Mass., Oct, 1974. 
 
[Bell76] D. E. Bell, L. J. LaPadula, ―Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and Multics 
Interpretation,‖ ESD-TR-75-306, Project 522B, MITRE Corporation, Deputy for Command and 
Management Systems, USAF, Contract No. F19628-76-C-0001, March 1976. 
 
[Biba77] K. J. Biba, ―Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems,‖ ESD-TR-76-372, 
Project 522B, MITRE Corporation, Deputy for Command and Management Systems, USAF, 
Contract No. F19628-76-C-0001, April 1977. 
 
[Bish03] Matt Bishop, "What Is Computer Security?," IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 1, no. 1, 
pp. 67-69, Jan. 2003, doi:10.1109/MSECP.2003.1176998. 
 
[Bove02] Daniel Bovet and Marco Cesati, Understanding the Linux Kernel, Second Edition, 
O‘Reilly & Associates, 20  
 
[Bran88] Branstad, M.; Tajalli, H.; Mayer, F. Aerospace Computer Security Applications 
Conference, 1988., Fourth Volume , Issue , 12-16 Dec 1988 Page(s):362 – 367 
 
[Bre89]  David Brewer and Michael Nash, ―The Chinese Wall Security Policy,‖ p. 206, 1989 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,  1989 
 
[Brzo62] J.A. Brzozowski. ―Canonical Regular Expressions and Minimal State Graphs for 
Definite Events,‖  Mathematical Theory of Automata, Vol. 12, MRI Symposia Series, pp. 529-
561, Polytechnic Press, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, NY, 1962. 
 
[CC04]  Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security 
functional requirements, January 2004, Version 2.2 CCIMB-2004-01-002 
 
[CCA08]  CA Access Control, Protecting Server Resources with CA Access Control, Technical 
Brief: CA Access Control, 2008 
 
 121 
 
[Chri08] Christian Christiansen, IDC White Paper - Server Resource Protection: A Critical 
Element of IT Security, Interactive Data Corporation, July 2008 
 
[Clar87] D. D. Clark, and D. R. Wilson, "A Comparison of Commercial and Military Computer 
Security Policies," IEEE Security and Privacy Symposium, p. 184-194, April 1987. 
 
[Copi78] Irving Copi, Introduction to Logic, Fifth Edition, MacMillian Publishing, NY, 1978. 
 
[CSI03] Computer Security Institute, ‖2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey,― 
(2003). 
 
[CST72] Computer Security Technology Planning Study, Deputy for Command and 
Management Systems, HQ Electronic Systems Division, ESD-TR-73-51, Vol. II, October 1972. 
 
[CIP05]  Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security Faces Challenges 
in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, United States Government Accountability Office, 
Report to Congressional Requesters,GAO-05-434, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
434, May 2005. 
 
[Dahl94]
 
  Robert Dahlberg, Personal Experience as a Software Developer on CA-ACF2 working 
on various aspects of the product including program pathing, SKK/UCCEL/Computer 
Associates, Chicago, IL, 1984 – 1994 
 
[Denn87] Denning, D.E. ―An Intrusion-Detection Model, Software Engineering,‖ IEEE 
Transactions on Volume SE-13, Issue 2, Feb. 1987 Page(s): 222 - 232 
 
[Dij59] E. W. Dijkstra. A note on two problems in connection with graphs. Nuerische 
Mathematik, 1:269-271, 1959. 
 
[DoD85]  Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, DoD 5200.28-
STD, Library no. S225,711 December 1985 
 
[Eete08] Michael van Eeten, Johannes Bauer, Economics of Malware: Security Decisions, 
Incentives and Externalities, Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Directorate for Science, Technology, and Industry, Paris, France, 2008.  
 
[Elm90] J. L. Elman, ―Finding Structure in Time‖, Cognitive Science, 14:179-211, 1990. 
 
[Fedo06] Fedora (2006). Retrieved 05/15/2006: http://www.fedora.info/  
 
[Feng03] Henry Hanping Feng , Oleg M. Kolesnikov , Prahlad Fogla , Wenke Lee , Weibo 
Gong, ―Anomaly Detection Using Call Stack Information,‖ Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, p.62, May 11-14, 2003  
 
[Fire03] Donald Firesmith, Engineering Security Requirements, Journal of Object Technology, 
vol. 2, no. 1, January-February 2003, pages 53-68. 
 122 
 
 
[FISM02]  ‗‗Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002‖, H. R. 2458—48,  
 
[FISM08]  ―Federal Information Security Management Act of 2008‖, S.3474 .  
 
[Ford97] Bryan Ford, Kevin Van Maren, Jay Lepreau, Stephen Clawson, Bart Robinson, Jeff 
Turner, ―The Flux OS Toolkit: Reusable Components for OS Implementation,‖ The Sixth 
Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems, Cape Cod, MA, USA, page(s): 14-19, May 5-6 
1997 
 
[Forr96] Stephanie Forrest, Steven A. Hofmeyr, Anil Somayaji, Thomas A. Longstaff, "A Sense 
of Self for Unix Processes," sp, pp.0120, 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1996. 
 
[Gass88] Morrie Gasser, Building a Secure Computer System, New Your: Nostrand Reinhold, 
1988.  
 
[Gau03] Hugh G. Gauch, Scientific Method in Practice, Cambridge University Press, 2003 
 
[Gho00] Anup K. Ghosh , Christopher Michael , Michael Schatz, ―A Real-Time Intrusion 
Detection System Based on Learning Program Behavior,‖ Proceedings of the Third International 
Workshop on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, p.93-109, October 02-04, 2000  
 
[Gogu82] J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer, ―Security Policies and Security Models,‖ IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1982 
 
[Grah72] G.S. Graham and P. J. Denning,―Protection – Principles and Practice,‖ AFIPS 
Conference Proceedings, Vol. 40, Spring Joint Computer Conference, Montvale, New Jersey, 
1972. 
 
[Harr03] Shon Harris,―CISSP Certification Exam Guide‖, 2nd Edition, McGraw-Hill, 2003. 
 
[Hart05] Hart, James L. M., Captain, USAF, ―An Historical Analysis of Factors Contributing to 
the Emergence of the Intrusion Detection Discipline and its Role in Information Assurance‖, 
Thesis, AFIT/GIR/ENV/05M-06, Department of the Air Force Air University, Air Force Institute 
of Technology, 2005. 
 
[Hick07] Boniface Patrick Hicks, ―Secure System Development Using Security-Typed 
Languages,‖ PhD Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Computer Science 
and Engineering, December 2007. 
 
[Hof98] Steven A. Hofmeyr, Stephanie Forrest, Anil Somayaji, ―Intrusion Detection Using 
Sequences of System Calls,‖ Journal of Computer Security, Volume 6, Number 3 / pp.151 – 180,  
1998. 
 
[Hogl05] Greg Hoglund, James Butler ―Rootkits: Subverting the Windows Kernel,‖ Addison-
Wesley, 2005. 
 123 
 
 
[Hopc01] John Hopcroft, Raheev Motwani, Jeffery Ullman, ―Introduction to Automata Theory, 
Languages, and Computation,‖ 2nd Edition, Addison-Wesley, 2001. 
 
[IBM08] SMP/E V3R1.0 for z/OS and OS/390 Reference, SA22-7772-01, Online Library, 
available on the IBM Online Library Omnibus Edition: MVS Collection CD-ROM, SK2T-0710, 
2008. 
 
[IBM09] z/OS TSO/E Bookshelf,  GA22-7489-12 Online Library available on the IBM Online 
Library Omnibus Edition:  z/OS DVD Collection (SK3T-4271), 2009  
 
[Ietf] Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF), RFCs 2903 2904, 2905, 2906, www.ietf.org 
 
[ISO96] Security Frameworks for Open Systems: Access Control Framework, Technical Report 
ISO/IEC 10181-3, ISO, 1996 
 
[Jaeg04] Trent Jaeger, Anthony Edwards, Xiaolan Zhang, ―Consistency Analysis of 
Authorization Hook Placement in the Linux Security Modules Framework,‖ ACM Transactions 
on Information and System Security (TISSEC),Volume 7 ,  Issue 2  (May 2004), Pages: 175 - 
205    
 
[Jaeg05] Trent Jaeger, “Clark-Wilson Integrity as a Security Goal for SELinux Policies,‖ IBM 
TJ Watson Research Center, USA, SELinux Symposium, 2005 
 http://www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session5/5-2-jaeger.pdf  
 
[Ju07] Hu Jun, Shen Changxiang, ―An Information Flow Security Model to Trusted Computing 
Sytem,‖ The First International Symposium on Data, Privacy, and E-Commerce, page(s): 310-
315, November 1-3, 2007. 
 
[Keen05] Keeney, M., et al.: Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical 
Infrastructure Sector. Technical report, US Secret Service and CERT Program,SEI, CMU, 
Pittsburgh, PA (May 2005) 
 
[Ko94]  Calvin Ko, George Fink and Karl Levitt, ―Automated Detection of Vulnerabilites in 
Privileged Programs by Execution Monitoring,‖ 10th Annual Computer Security Applications 
Conference Proceedings, page(s): 134-144, Orlando, FL, December 5-9, 1994. 
 
[Kole05] Oleg Kolesnikov and Wenke Lee. ―Advanced Polymorphic Worms: Evading IDS by 
Blending in with Normal Traffic.‖ Technical Report GIT-CC-05-09, Georgia Institute of 
Technology, 2005. 
 
[Kos97] Andrew P. Kosoresow, Steven A. Hofmeyr, ―Intrusion Detection via System Call 
Traces,‖ IEEE Software, v.14 n.5, p.35-42, September 1997. 
 
[Lar99] James Larus, ‗Whole Program Paths‖, Proceedings of the SIGPLAN 1999 Conference 
on Programming Languages Design and Implementation, Atlanta, GA. May 1999. 
 124 
 
[Levi95] John Levine, Tony Mason, Doug Brown, ―lex & yacc‖, O‘Reilly & Associates, Inc., 
1995.  
 
[Lipt77] R. J. Lipton and L. Snyder, ―A Linear Time Algorithm for Deciding Subject Security‖, 
Journal of Association for Computer Machinery, Vol. 24, No 3, July 1977, pp. 455-464 
 
[Losc05] Peter Loscocco, Stephen Smalley, ―Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies 
into the Linux Operating System,‖ SELinux Symposium, 2005 
 
[Mann03] Scott Mann, Ellen Mitchell, Mitchell Krell, ―Linux System Security: An 
Administrator‘s Guide to Open Source Security Tools‖, Prentice Hall, 2003. 
 
[Mcca05] Bill McCarty, SELINUX NSA‘s Open Source Security Enhanced Linux, O‘Reilly & 
Associates, 2005 
 
[Mins67] Marvin Minsky, Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967 
 
[Mitc97] Tom Mitchell, Machine Learning, WCB/McGraw-Hill, 1997 
 
[NIST1]
 
  http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/cc_docs/index.html, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 
 
[NSA01]
 
 http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/index.cfm, National Security Agency, Central Security 
Service, Fort George G. Meade, MA, NSA Press Release, January 2001. 
 
[Park03] Jaehong Park, Usage Control: A Unified Framework for Next Generation Access 
Control, PhD dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax VA., Summer 2003 
 
[RACF03]
 
 z/OSV1R6.0 Security Server RACF Security Administrator‘s Guide, IBM 
Corporation, SA22-7683-05, August 8, 2003 
 
[Rahi04] Niki Rahimi (IBM), ―Trusted Path Execution for the Linux 2.6 Kernel as a Linux 
Security Module,‖ 14th USENIX Security Symposium, pages 73–80 of the Proceedings, June 
2004. 
 
[Ravi04] S. Ravi, A. Raghunathan, P. Kocher, and S. Hattangady. ―Security in Embedded 
Systems: Design Challenges.‖ ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, 3(3), 
August 2004. 
 
[Rich08] Elaine Rich, ―Automata, Computability, and Complexity,‖ Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle 
River, NJ, 2008. 
 
[Rose99] Kenneth Rosen, ―Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications,‖ 4th Edition, 
WCB/McGraw-Hill, 1999 
 
 125 
 
[SCC70] Security Controls for Computer Systems: Report of Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Computer Security, Rand Corporation, Office of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, Washington D.C., February, 1970. 
 
[Schr74-1]  Barry Schrager, SHARE VS/OS Security and Data Management Project Goals for 
Data Security, SHARE Conference, March 4, 1974. 
 
[Schr74-2]  Barry Schrager, Centralized Resource Control Information Facility, IBM Data 
Security Forum, Denver, Co., September 1974. 
 
[Sedg02] Robert Sedgewick, Algorithms in C: Part 5 - Graph Algorithms, 3
rd 
 Edition, Addison-
Wesley, 2002. 
 
[Sek01] R. Sekar, M. Bendre, D. Dhurjati, P. Bollineni, ―A fast automaton-based method for 
detecting anomalous program behaviors‖, Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security 
and Privacy, Page(s): 144-155, 2001. 
 
[SHA99]  1955: IBM Customers form the First Computer User Group.  Computer World, May 
5
th
  1999; SHARE is IBM user group organization established in 1955 (the first such 
organization).  It met for the first time at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, CA on August 15
th
, 
1955.  SHARE works with IBM to evaluate and develop requirements and enhancements to IBM 
products and to the computer industry at large. 
 
[Silb05] Abraham Silberschatz, Peter Galvin, Greg Gagne, ―Operating System Concepts,‖ 7th 
Edition, Addison-Wesley, 2005. 
 
[Sips06] Michael Sipser , ―Introduction to the Theory of Computation.‖ 2nd edition, Thomson 
Course Technology, Section 1.4: Nonregular Languages, pp. 77–83. Section 2.3: Non-context-
free Languages, pp. 123–129, 2006. 
 
[Ski90] S. Skiena, "Minimum Spanning Tree." §6.2 in Implementing Discrete Mathematics: 
Combinatorics and Graph Theory with Mathematica. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 232-
236, 1990.  
 
[Smal01a] Stephen Smalley, Timothy Fraser, and Chris Vance, ―Linux Security Modules: 
General Security Hooks for Linux‖, http://lsm.immunix.org/ September, 2001 
 
[Smal01b] Stephen Smalley, Timothy Fraser, ―A Security Policy Configuration for the Security-
Enhanced Linux‖, http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/papers/policy/policy.html, February 2001 
 
[Smal04] Stephen Smalley, Chris Vance, Wayne Salamon, ―Implementing SELinux as a Linux 
Security Module,‖ Contract MDA904-01-C-0926, March 2004 
 
[Spen99] Ray Spencer, Stephen Smalley, Peter Loscocco, Mike Hibler, David Anderson, Jay 
Lepreau, ―The Flask Security Architecture: System Support for Diverse Security Policies,‖ 
Proceedings of The Eighth USENIX Security Symposium, August 1999, pages 123-139. 
 126 
 
 
[Syma05] Symantec Critical System Protection A Technical White Paper given to me by 
Symantec representative, Summer 2005 (after PlatformLogic acquisition) 
 
[Syma10] Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for 2009 A Technical White 
Paper, Volume XV, April 2010. 
 
[Stall92] William Stallings, ―Operating Systems‖, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992. 
 
[Tayl98] R. Gregory Taylor, Models of Computation and Formal Languages, Oxford University 
Press, 1998 
 
[Wag01] D. Wagner and R. Dean, ―Intrusion detection via static analysis‖, Proceedings of the 
2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Page(s): 156-168, 2001. 
 
[War99] C. Warrender, S. Forrest, B. Pearlmutter, ―Detecting intrusions using system calls: 
alternative data models‖, Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
Page(s):133 – 145, 1999. 
 
[Wats95]  Bruce W. Watson, A Taxonomy of Finite Automata Minimization Algorithms, 
Computer Science report 93/44, Eindhoven University of Technology, Netherlands, January 24, 
1995. 
 
[Wats00] Bruce W. Watson, Directly Constructing Minimal DFAs : Combining Two Algorithms 
by Brzozowski, in S. Yu and A. Paun, eds, CIAA 2000, London, Ontario, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, 2088(2001), 311–317, Springer, 2000. 
 
[Webb08] Charles F. Webb, IBM,  z10: The Next-Generation Mainframe Microprocessor, IEEE 
Micro, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 19-29, March/April, 2008. 
 
[Wrig02a] Chris Wright, Crispin Cowan, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, and Greg Kroah-
Hartman, ―Linux Security Module Framework,‖ 11th USENIX Security Symposium, August 
2002 
 
[Wrig02b] Chris Wright, Crispin Cowan, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, and Greg Kroah-
Hartman, ―Linux Security Modules: General Security Support for the Linux Kernel,‖ 11th 
USENIX Security Symposium, August 2002.
 127 
 
Appendix A: Prototype Source Code 
A.1 PPTM Source Code 
/*********************************************************************************** 
/*  PPTM - Program Pathing Trust Model 
/*********************************************************************************** 
/*   
/*  Purpose of this program is to simulate an automata for the purposes of mapping  
/*  a sequence of process invocation calls.   The program will then validate those 
/*  calls using the built automata.  
/* 
/*  Developer: Robert Dahlberg - PhD candidate 
/*             Virginia Commonwealth University 
/*             Computer Science Department 
/*             School of Engineering 
/*             Prototype as partial fulfillment of PhD dissertation 
/* 
/*  Created:     Febuarary 7th, 2010 
/*  Updated:     January 23rd, 2011 
/*********************************************************************************/ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include "Automata.h" 
#include "print.h" 
/*************************************************** 
/*             define global variables 
/***************************************************/ 
acell * scnatm(anchor * ack, char * pgm); 
void traceaut(anchor * ank); 
const char blank[] = " "; 
char * bid = NULL; 
char * bcaller = NULL; 
char * bcalled = NULL; 
char * vid = NULL; 
char * vcaller = NULL; 
char * vcalled = NULL; 
char * last = NULL; 
anchor   * achr; 
stack    * stk; 
automata * autom; 
char TFile[200] = "train"; 
char tbuffer[80] = " "; 
char VFile[200] = "validate"; 
char vbuffer[80] = " "; 
char AFile[200] = "auditfile"; 
char abuffer[80] = " "; 
 
 
main() { 
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/*********************************************/ 
/*  allocate storage for anchor data area    */ 
/*********************************************/ 
achr = (anchor *) malloc(sizeof(anchor)); 
achr->len = sizeof(anchor); 
strcpy (achr->eyecat,"*ANCHOR*"); 
achr->stkptr = 0; 
achr->sptr = 0; 
achr->snum = 0; 
achr->autptr = 0; 
achr->aptr = 0; 
achr->anum = 0; 
printf ("  anchor pointer = %p \n",achr); 
 
/*********************************************/ 
/*   allocate storage for Stack data area    */ 
/*********************************************/ 
stk = (stack *) malloc(sizeof(stack)); 
memset(stk,'\0',sizeof(stack)); 
stk->len = sizeof(stack); 
strcpy (stk->eyecat, "**STACK*"); 
stk->nxtstk = 0; 
achr->stkptr = stk; 
achr->sptr = & stk->cellstk[0]; 
achr->snum = 0; 
printf ("   stack pointer = %p\n", stk); 
 
/***********************************************/ 
/*  allocate storage for Automata data area    */ 
/***********************************************/ 
autom = (automata *) malloc(sizeof(automata)); 
memset(autom,'\0',sizeof(automata)); 
autom->len = sizeof(automata); 
strcpy (autom->eyecat, "AUTOMATA"); 
achr->autptr= autom; 
achr->aptr = & autom->autcell[0]; 
achr->anum = 0; 
printf ("automata pointer = %p\n", autom); 
 
/************************************************/ 
/*    Build Automata from recorded system       */ 
/************************************************/ 
/************************************************/ 
/*              Open Training file              */ 
/************************************************/ 
acell * aelement = NULL; 
acell * a3element = NULL; 
scell * aselement = NULL; 
acell * a2element = NULL; 
scell * lselement = NULL; 
scell * selement = NULL; 
 
FILE *tfp; 
  if((tfp = fopen(TFile,"r")) == NULL)  
  { 
     printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "train" RESET " file \n"); 
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     exit(1);   
  } 
 
  /******************************************* 
  /*           read training record          */ 
  /*******************************************/ 
while(fgets(tbuffer,sizeof(tbuffer),tfp)!= NULL) 
{ 
  bid = strtok(tbuffer,blank); 
  printf("ID = %s \n",bid); 
  bcaller = strtok(NULL,blank); 
  printf("Caller = [%s] \n",bcaller); 
  bcalled = strtok(NULL,blank); 
  printf("Called = [%s] \n",bcalled); 
 
/************************************************/ 
/*       Find caller process in automata        */ 
/************************************************/ 
  aelement = scnatm(achr,bcaller);       /* find caller's acell in automata      */ 
/***********************************************/ 
/***********************************************/ 
/*       "caller" not found in automata        */ 
/***********************************************/ 
/***********************************************/ 
  if (aelement == NULL)                  /* caller's acell not found             */ 
    { 
   
     /*********************************************** 
     /*           Add "caller" to Automata          */ 
     /***********************************************/ 
    
     aelement = achr->aptr;               /* get new acell                        */ 
     strcpy(aelement->pgm,bcaller);       /* copy caller process into new acell   */ 
     achr->anum = achr->anum + 1;         /* update acell number by one           */ 
     achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* ptr to next available  acell    */ 
  
     selement = achr->sptr;               /* get next available unused scell      */ 
     stk = achr->stkptr;                  /* get pointer to stack                 */ 
     achr->snum = achr->snum + 1;         /* update scell number by one           */ 
     achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* get next available unused scell   */ 
     aelement->lnkcell = selement;        /* store 1st available scell in new acell*/ 
  /*********************************************************/ 
  /* printf("Caller = [%s] not found\n",bcaller); 
  /*********************************************************/ 
     a2element = scnatm(achr,bcalled);    /* find calling process acell in automata*/ 
     /**********************************************/ 
     /*     "called" process not in automata       */ 
     /**********************************************/ 
     if (a2element == NULL)                /* if caller process not found         */ 
        {  
      a2element = achr->aptr;             /* get an acell for calling process    */ 
         strcpy(a2element->pgm,bcalled);     /* move calling process into acell     */ 
         a2element->lnkcell = NULL;          /* clear acell's link to scell         */ 
         achr->anum = achr->anum + 1;        /* update scell number by one          */ 
         achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum];  /* point to next free acell     */ 
        }   
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     selement->pgmcell = a2element;        /* move called acell to scell of caller */ 
     selement->lnkcell = NULL;             /* clear scell's next scell pointer    */ 
    } 
    else  
    { 
     /***********************************************/   
     /***********************************************/ 
     /*            "Caller" process found           */ 
     /***********************************************/ 
     /***********************************************/ 
  a2element = NULL;                     /* clear a2element             */ 
     a2element = scnatm(achr,bcalled);     /* find if an acell for called */ 
     /***************************************************************/ 
     /*  called process NOT found - make sure called acell in scell */ 
     /***************************************************************/ 
     if (a2element == NULL) 
        {    
         selement = aelement->lnkcell;     /* get 1st scell out of acell    */ 
         if (selement == NULL) 
            { 
             stk = achr->stkptr;             /* get stack */ 
             aelement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */ 
             selement = achr->sptr;          /* get next free scell  */ 
   
             achr->snum = achr->snum + 1;    /* increment scell number by one */ 
             achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance next free scell ptr*/ 
 
             a2element = achr->aptr;         /* get next free acell ptr  */ 
             achr->anum = achr->anum + 1;    /* increment acell number by one  */ 
             achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* advance to next acell ptr*/ 
 
             strcpy(a2element->pgm,bcalled); /* copy called process name to new acell */ 
 
             selement->pgmcell = a2element;  /* point to new acell from new scell */ 
             selement->lnkcell = NULL;       /* init new scell pointer to next scell*/ 
            } 
  
          else 
            { 
             a3element = selement->pgmcell;  /* get acell out of 1st scell    */ 
             lselement = selement; 
             /**********************************************************************/ 
             /*  search scells in found "called" acell for "caller" process acell  */ 
             /**********************************************************************/ 
             while ((a3element != a2element) && (selement != NULL)) 
                {   
                 lselement = selement;         /* save this scell as last scell */ 
                 selement = lselement->lnkcell;      
                 if (selement != NULL) 
                    {  
                     a3element = selement->pgmcell; /* get acell out of next scell  */ 
                    } 
                }   
              /************************************ 
     /*         was NO scell found?  
     /************************************/ 
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     if (selement == NULL)  
    {   
                  if (a3element != a2element) 
                    { 
                     stk = achr->stkptr;              /* get stack */ 
                     lselement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */ 
                     selement = achr->sptr;           /* get next free scell  */ 
   
                     achr->snum = achr->snum + 1;     /* increment scell number by one */ 
                     achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance next scell ptr*/ 
                     a2element = achr->aptr;         /* get next free acell ptr  */ 
                     strcpy(a2element->pgm,bcalled); /* copy called process name to acell */ 
 
                     selement->pgmcell = a2element;  /* point to new acell from new scell */ 
                     selement->lnkcell = NULL;       /* init new scell ptr to next scell*/ 
                     achr->anum = achr->anum + 1;    /* increment acell number by one  */ 
                     achr->aptr = &autom->autcell[achr->anum]; /* advance to next acell*/ 
                    } 
                } 
      } 
        } 
            else 
        { 
         /***************************************************************/ 
         /*  called process FOUND     - make sure called acell in scell */ 
         /***************************************************************/ 
         selement = aelement->lnkcell; 
      if (selement == NULL) 
            { 
             stk = achr->stkptr;             /* get stack */ 
             aelement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */ 
             selement = achr->sptr;          /* get next free scell  */ 
   
             achr->snum = achr->snum + 1;    /* increment scell number by one */ 
             achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance next free scell ptr*/ 
 
             selement->pgmcell = a2element;  /* point to new acell from new scell */ 
             selement->lnkcell = NULL;       /* init new scell pointer to next scell*/ 
            } 
         else 
      { 
             while ((a3element != a2element) && (selement != NULL)) 
                {   
                 lselement = selement;             /* save this scell as last scell */ 
                 selement = lselement->lnkcell;      
                 if (selement != NULL) 
                    { 
                      a3element = selement->pgmcell;  /* get acell out of next scell  */ 
                    }    
                }  
             if (a3element != a2element) 
                { 
                 stk = achr->stkptr;              /* get stack */ 
                 lselement->lnkcell = achr->sptr; /* point last scell to new scell */ 
                 selement = achr->sptr;           /* get next free scell  */ 
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                 achr->snum = achr->snum + 1;     /* increment scell number by one */ 
                 achr->sptr = &stk->cellstk[achr->snum]; /* advance to next scell ptr*/ 
              
                 selement->pgmcell = a2element;  /* point to new acell from new scell */ 
                 selement->lnkcell = NULL;       /* init new scell ptr to next scell*/ 
                }  
            } 
        } 
    } 
memset(tbuffer,'\0',sizeof(tbuffer)); 
}  
 fclose(tfp); 
 traceaut(achr); 
/************************************************/ 
/*              Open Validate file              */ 
/************************************************/ 
printf("\nProcessing Validate file \n\n"); 
FILE *vfp; 
if((vfp = fopen(VFile,"r")) == NULL) { 
  printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "validate" RESET " file \n"); 
  exit(1);  }    
 
/************************************************/ 
/*              Open auditfille file              */ 
/************************************************/ 
printf("\nProcessing auditfile file \n\n"); 
FILE *afp; 
if((afp = fopen(AFile,"w")) == NULL)  
 { 
     printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "auditfile" RESET " file \n"); 
    exit(1);   
 }    
 
/************************************************/ 
/*          Validate a Process                  */ 
/************************************************/ 
while(fgets(vbuffer,sizeof(vbuffer),vfp)!= NULL) 
{ 
  vid = strtok(vbuffer,blank); 
  printf("ID = [%s] \n",vid); 
  vcaller = strtok(NULL,blank); 
  printf("Caller = [%s] \n",vcaller); 
  vcalled = strtok(NULL,blank); 
  printf("Called = [%s] \n",vcalled); 
  /************************************************** 
  /*      Validate Process invocation calls 
  /*************************************************/ 
  memset(abuffer,'\0',sizeof(abuffer)); 
  aelement = scnatm(achr,vcaller);       /* find caller acell in automata      */ 
   if (aelement == NULL) 
    { 
       strcpy(abuffer,"Caller process ["); 
       strcat(abuffer,vid); 
       strcat(abuffer,"] - ["); 
       strcat(abuffer,vcaller); 
       strcat(abuffer,"] invalid \n"); 
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       fputs(abuffer,afp); 
       printf("Caller process %s - [%s] invalid \n",vid,vcaller); 
    } 
  else 
    { 
       a2element = scnatm(achr,vcalled);      /* find called acell in automata  */ 
       if (a2element == NULL) 
       { 
         strcpy(abuffer,"Called process ["); 
         strcat(abuffer,vid); 
         strcat(abuffer,"] - ["); 
         strcat(abuffer,vcalled); 
         strcat(abuffer,"] invalid \n"); 
         fputs(abuffer,afp); 
         printf("Called process %s - [%s] invalid \n",vid,vcalled); 
       } 
       else 
        { 
         selement = aelement->lnkcell; 
    if (selement != NULL) 
      { 
             a3element = selement->pgmcell; 
       while ((a3element != a2element) && (selement != NULL)) 
                {   
                 lselement = selement;             /* save this scell as last scell */ 
                 selement = lselement->lnkcell;      
                 if (selement != NULL) 
                    { 
                     a3element = selement->pgmcell;  /* get acell out of next scell  */ 
                    } 
                }  
             if (a3element != a2element) 
                { 
                 strcpy(abuffer,"It is invalid for PID ["); 
                 strcat(abuffer,vid); 
                 strcat(abuffer,"] - process ["); 
                 strcat(abuffer,vcaller); 
                 strcat(abuffer,"] to call process ["); 
                 strcat(abuffer,vcalled); 
                 strcat(abuffer,"] \n"); 
                 fputs(abuffer,afp);    
                 printf("It is invalid for process %s - [%s] to call process [%s] \n",vid,vcaller,vcalled); 
                } 
            } 
    else 
      { 
    strcpy(abuffer,"It is invalid for PID ["); 
             strcat(abuffer,vid); 
             strcat(abuffer,"] - process ["); 
             strcat(abuffer,vcaller); 
             strcat(abuffer,"] to call process ["); 
             strcat(abuffer,vcalled); 
             strcat(abuffer,"] \n"); 
             fputs(abuffer,afp);    
             printf("It is invalid for process %s - [%s] to call process [%s] \n",vid,vcaller,vcalled); 
   }  
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        }    
 } 
memset(abuffer,'\0',sizeof(abuffer)); 
}  
fclose(vfp); 
fclose(afp); 
 
printf(BOLDBLACK"Exit Program" RESET "\n"); 
 
return 0; 
} 
 
/******************************************************/ 
/*****************************************************/ 
/* Subroutine:  scnatm                               */ 
/*---------------------------------------------------*/ 
/*        search automata for a program name         */ 
/*****************************************************/ 
/*****************************************************/ 
acell * scnatm(anchor * ack, char * pgm)     
{  
 automata * atm = ack->autptr;  
 int xno = ack->anum; 
 int i = 0; 
 int finda = 0; 
 acell * xelement = NULL; 
 
 xelement = &atm->autcell[i]; 
 /************************************************************************/ 
 /* Scan Automata until end of automata sting or found the process name  */ 
 /************************************************************************/ 
 while ((xno != i) && (finda == 0)) 
    { 
     /*******************************************/ 
     /**   Matching program found in automata  **/ 
     /*******************************************/ 
     if (strcmp(xelement->pgm,pgm) == 0)     /* compare acell processes */ 
        {  
         finda = 1;                            /* found it - mark flag    */ 
        } 
     /*******************************************/ 
     /**   Get next process name in automata   **/ 
     /*******************************************/ 
     else 
        { 
         i++;                                   /* advance to next acell in automata */ 
         xelement = &atm->autcell[i];           /* get @ of next acell in automata */ 
        } 
    } 
 /********************************************/ 
 /*      Was process name not found?         */ 
 /********************************************/ 
     if (finda == 0)                        /* no match found - mark return element */ 
    {  
     xelement = NULL;                       /* mark return element to NULL      */ 
    } 
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 return xelement; 
} 
 
/********************************************************/ 
/********************************************************/ 
/* Subroutine:  traceaut                                */ 
/*------------------------------------------------------*/ 
/*    Trace automata and print out programs             */ 
/********************************************************/ 
/********************************************************/ 
void traceaut(anchor * ank)     
{  
 char TraceFile[200] = "automtrace"; 
 char Tracebuffer[200] = " "; 
 scell * scelement = NULL; 
 acell * aaelement = NULL; 
 acell * abelement = NULL; 
 automata * ama = ank->autptr; 
 int ano = ank->snum; 
 int sno = ank->anum; 
 int j = 0; 
 int x =0; 
 char cella[24]; 
 char cells[24]; 
 
FILE *tracefp; 
if((tracefp = fopen(TraceFile,"w")) == NULL)  
    { 
     printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "autotrace" RESET " file \n"); 
     exit(1);   
 } 
 
 printf("\n Trace Automata \n"); 
 printf("number of acells: [%d] \n",sno); 
  
 strcpy(Tracebuffer,"                 Automata Trace \n"); 
 fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
 strcpy(Tracebuffer,"----------------------------------------------------------\n"); 
 fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
 memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer)); 
 strcpy(Tracebuffer,"Caller Process -> Called Process |Called Process \n"); 
 fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
 strcpy(Tracebuffer,"----------------------------------------------------------\n"); 
 fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
 memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer)); 
 aaelement = &ama->autcell[j]; 
 /************************************************************************/ 
 /* Scan Automata until end of automata sting or found the process name  */ 
 /************************************************************************/ 
 while (j < sno) 
     { 
     /*******************************************/ 
     /**   Matching program found in automata  **/ 
     /*******************************************/ 
     printf("Calling = [%s]",aaelement->pgm); 
     strcpy(Tracebuffer,aaelement->pgm); 
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     scelement = aaelement->lnkcell; 
   
     /*******************************************/ 
     /**   Get next process name in automata   **/ 
     /*******************************************/ 
     while ((scelement != NULL)) 
        {  
         abelement = scelement->pgmcell;                                                
   if (x == 0) 
      { 
     printf("->[%s]",abelement->pgm); 
     strcat(Tracebuffer,"->");  
     x ++; 
   } 
  else 
   { 
    printf("|[%s]",abelement->pgm); 
    strcat(Tracebuffer,"|"); 
    if (strlen(Tracebuffer) >= (200-9)) 
    { 
     printf("\n"); 
     strcat(Tracebuffer,"\n"); 
     fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
                 memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer)); 
    } 
   } 
         strcat(Tracebuffer,abelement->pgm); 
         scelement = scelement->lnkcell; 
        } 
 if (strlen(Tracebuffer) >= 2) 
     { 
         printf("\n"); 
         strcat(Tracebuffer,"\n"); 
         fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
   memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer)); 
  } 
     j++; 
  x = 0; 
     aaelement = &autom->autcell[j]; 
    } 
 printf("close auditfile \n");  
 snprintf(cella, sizeof(cella), "%d", ank->anum - 1); 
 strcpy(Tracebuffer,"Number of acells ="); 
 strcat(Tracebuffer,cella); 
 strcat(Tracebuffer,"\n"); 
 fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
 memset(Tracebuffer,'\0',sizeof(Tracebuffer)); 
 snprintf(cells, sizeof(cells), "%d", ank->snum - 1); 
 strcpy(Tracebuffer,"Number of scells ="); 
 strcat(Tracebuffer,cells); 
 fputs(Tracebuffer,tracefp); 
 fclose(tracefp); 
 return; 
} 
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A.2 PPTM Automata Header files 
#define n 1000000 
#define m 100000 
 
/***************************************/ 
/*  link list scells                    
/***************************************/ 
struct scell  
 { 
  struct acell * pgmcell; 
  struct scell * lnkcell; 
 }; 
/**************************************** 
/*  Stack of link list scells          */ 
/***************************************/ 
struct  stack 
 { 
  int       len; 
  char       eyecat[8]; 
  struct stack  *   nxtstk; 
  struct scell     cellstk[n]; 
 }; 
/****************************************** 
/*  Automata acell                       */ 
/*****************************************/ 
struct  acell 
 { 
  char    pgm[24]; 
  void * lnkcell; 
 }; 
/****************************************** 
/*  Audit pcell                          */ 
/*****************************************/ 
struct pcell 
 {   
       struct acell  *  aptr; 
       short int        acount; 
       short int        status;    
       struct pcell  *  dauptr; 
       struct pcell  *  sibprt; 
    };  
/*****************************************/ 
/*     Automata structure 
/*****************************************/ 
struct  automata 
 { 
  int   len; 
  char   eyecat[8]; 
  struct acell autcell[m]; 
 }; 
/****************************************** 
/*   Process invocation sequence trace    
/*****************************************/ 
struct  IDtrace 
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 { 
     int     len; 
     char     eyecat[8]; 
struct pstack   * pstptr;    /* pstack pointer */ 
     struct pcell    * pptr;   
     int               pnum; 
  struct automata * invptr;   /* invalid processes */ 
     struct acell    * iaptr; 
  int               ianum; 
  struct automata * trctab;   /* Trace table */ 
     struct acell    * trcptr; 
     int               trcnum; 
    }; 
/****************************************** 
/*   Process stack  
/*****************************************/ 
struct  pstack 
 { 
     int      len; 
     char      eyecat[8]; 
  struct pstack   *  nxtpstk;    /* next pstack pointer */ 
     struct pcell       pcellptr[n];   
    }; 
/****************************************** 
/*    typedefs 
/*****************************************/ 
typedef struct acell acell; 
typedef struct scell scell; 
typedef struct stack stack; 
typedef struct automata automata; 
typedef struct IDtrace IDtrace; 
typedef struct pcell pcell; 
typedef struct pstack pstack; 
/******************************************* 
/*    System Anchor - main data area   
/******************************************/ 
typedef struct  
 { 
  int   len; 
  char      eyecat[8]; 
  stack    * stkptr; 
  scell   * sptr; 
  int        snum; 
  automata * autptr; 
  acell    * aptr; 
  int  anum; 
     IDtrace  *  IDptr; 
 }  anchor; 
 
A.3 PPTM Print Header file 
 
#define RESET        "\033[0m"         /* Reset Attribute */ 
#define BLACK       "\033[30m"         /* Black           */ 
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#define RED         "\033[31m"         /* Red             */ 
#define GREEN       "\033[32m"         /* Green           */ 
#define YELLOW      "\033[33m"         /* Yellow          */ 
#define BLUE        "\033[34m"         /* Blue            */ 
#define MAGENTA     "\033[35m"         /* Magenta         */ 
#define CYAN        "\033[36m"         /* Cyan            */ 
#define WHITE       "\033[37m"         /* White           */ 
#define BOLDBLACK   "\033[1m\033[30m"  /* Bold Black      */ 
#define BOLDRED     "\033[1m\033[31m"  /* Bold Red        */ 
#define BOLDGREEN   "\033[1m\033[32m"  /* Bold Green      */ 
#define BOLDYELLOW  "\033[1m\033[33m"  /* Bold Yellow     */ 
#define BOLDBLUE    "\033[1m\033[34m"  /* Bold Blue       */ 
#define BOLDMAGENTA "\033[1m\033[35m"  /* Bold Magenta    */ 
#define BOLDCYAN    "\033[1m\033[36m"  /* Bold Cyan       */ 
#define BOLDWHITE   "\033[1m\033[37m"  /* Bold White      */ 
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A.4 Testdata (automated data creation) Source Code 
/*********************************************************************************** 
/*  Tstdata - generate test data for PPT 
/*********************************************************************************** 
/*   
/*  Purpose of this program is to generate test data to test the PPT program  
/* 
/*  Developer: Robert Dahlberg - PhD candidate 
/*             Virginia Commonwealth University 
/*             Computer Science Department 
/*             School of Engineering 
/*             Prototype as partial fulfillment of PhD dissertation 
/* 
/*             January 2th, 2011 
/*   
/*********************************************************************************/ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <time.h> 
#include "Test.h" 
#include "print.h" 
/***************************************************/ 
/*             define global variables             */ 
/***************************************************/ 
 
const char blank[] = " "; 
 
struct ID 
 { 
   char ProID[3]; 
      char Pronum[21]; 
 }; 
char CallPro[24] = "        "; 
 /******************************************** 
 /*  CalledPro of link list scells          */ 
 /*******************************************/ 
struct  Pro 
 { 
   char MID[1]; 
   char MNum[23]; 
 }; 
  
char str[23];   
char TFile[200] = "train"; 
char tbuffer[80] = " "; 
int StrProc = 0; 
int y = 0; 
int x = 0; 
int Process = 0; 
 
main()  
{ 
 141 
 
 struct ID UID; 
 struct Pro CalledPro; 
 /*********************************************/ 
 /*  OPEN Training file "train"               */ 
 /*********************************************/ 
 printf("Start Tstdata \n"); 
 FILE *tfp; 
 if((tfp = fopen(TFile,"w")) == NULL)  
 { 
  printf("Cannot OPEN " BOLDBLACK "Train" RESET "file \n"); 
  exit(1); 
 } 
 printf("OPENed train file \n"); 
 /*************************/ 
 /* Initialize variables  */ 
 /*************************/ 
 x = 0; 
 strcpy(CallPro,"S"); 
 srand(time(NULL)); 
 /************************************************/ 
 /* Dowhile more stings are required             */ 
 /************************************************/ 
 while (x < NoIDs)  
 { 
  x = x + 1;       /*  add one to UID count  */ 
  strcpy(UID.ProID,"UID");  
  snprintf(UID.Pronum, sizeof(UID.Pronum), "%d", x);  
   
  /***********************************************************/ 
  /*    determine random number of processes in the  sting   */ 
  /***********************************************************/ 
  StrProc = 1 + rand() % NoProString; 
  y = 0; 
   
  /************************************************/ 
  /*    Dowile more processes needed in string    */ 
  /************************************************/ 
  while(y < StrProc) 
  { 
   memset(tbuffer,'\0',sizeof(tbuffer)); 
   /************************************************/ 
   /*       randomly determine a process ID        */ 
   /************************************************/ 
   Process = 1 + rand() % NoProcess; 
   /************************************************/ 
   /*sprintf(str, "%d", num);                                                  */ 
   /* str now contains "3" sprintf() is like printf() but outputs to a string. */ 
   /************************************************/ 
   strcpy(CalledPro.MID,"M"); 
   snprintf(CalledPro.MNum, sizeof(CalledPro.MNum), "%d", Process);  
   /*****************************************************************/ 
   /*     Construct training record and write to training file      */ 
   /*****************************************************************/ 
   strcpy(tbuffer,UID.ProID); 
   strcat(tbuffer,"  "); 
   strcat(tbuffer,CallPro); 
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   strcat(tbuffer,"  "); 
   strcat(tbuffer,CalledPro.MID); 
   strcat(tbuffer," \n"); 
   printf("[%s]\n",tbuffer); 
   fputs(tbuffer,tfp); 
   y = y + 1; 
   strcpy(CallPro,CalledPro.MID); 
  } 
  strcpy(CallPro,"S"); 
 } 
 printf("End of Tstdata \n"); 
 fclose(tfp); 
 return 0; 
} 
 
A.5 Test Header file 
#define NoProcess 100000 /* Number of processes to chose from  */ 
#define NoIDs 100000      /* Number of Stings in test data      */ 
#define NoProString 100  /* Max Number of processes per string */ 
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Appendix B: Glossary 
Abnormal Process Any process that does not accomplish or support the system‘s intended 
function. 
Abnormal Process 
Behavior 
 
The result of executing abnormal processes or executing normal 
processes in an invalid invocation sequence.  Abnormal behavior is the 
complement of normal behavior.   
Invalid Process 
Invocation Sequence 
The set of invalid process invocation sequences is defined as the 
complement of valid process invocation sequences.   
Critical Application An application that must not be interrupted. 
Critical System 
 
A server dedicated to run a critical application.    Interrupting, delaying 
or halting these systems can have dire consequences. 
External Process 
 
Those processes that have not been intentionally installed by a system 
administrator. 
Internal Process 
 
Those processes that have been intentionally installed on a computer 
system by a system administrator. 
Invocation When it is stated that, 'P1 invokes P2' it means that the CPU has 
executed an instruction from P1 and that the executed instruction has the 
intent of requesting the scheduler to place process P2 on the dispatch 
queue awaiting the CPU to execute P2‘s instructions 
Normal Process An internal or external process that conforms to the intended design 
specifications and/or supports the system‘s intended function 
Normal Process 
Behavior 
Normal system behavior is the result of executing only normal processes 
in a valid invocation sequence that supports a system‘s intended 
function.   
Valid Process 
Invocation Sequence 
 
Valid process invocation sequences are exactly those process invocation 
sequences that invoke a set of normal processes in a sequence that 
accomplishes or supports the system‘s intended primary function. 
Process A process is a program that is loaded into main memory and executed.  
Process Invocation 
Sequence 
 
A computer system does not just run a single process, but a sequence of 
processes.  One process will invoke another, and so on.  The execution 
of these processes should not occur in a random order.  These processes 
should execute in a predetermined order.   
Program A program is a set of machine instructions that are organized in a 
logical sequence to perform a task or process. 
System Integrity 
 
An attribute of a system maintained to execute only normal processes in 
valid process invocation sequences.   
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Appendix C:  ACF2

 Program Pathing Defintion Module 
No longer used by ACF2, ACF99@RB was a compiled program that provided a static 
dictionary of process invocation sequences that were authorized to gain access to resources. 
[ACF99] 
 
         MACRO                                                  ACF 310 00010000 
         ACF99@RB                                                       00020000 
ACF99@RB TITLE 'ACF2 STRUCTURE MODEL MODULE'                    ACF 310 00030000 
         PRINT ON,GEN,DATA             PRINT EVERYTHING         ACF 310 00040000 
         COPY  ACFDOC                                           ACF 22  00050000 
*********************************************************************** 00060000 
*                                                                     * 00070000 
*                                                             * TS89408 00070100 
* CHANGE LOG:                                                 * TS89408 00070200 
*                                                             * TS89408 00070300 
*        THIS MODULE DEFINES TO ACF2 THE STRUCTURAL                   * 00080000 
*        MODELS OF TSO COMMANDS AND MODULES TO ALLOW                  * 00090000 
*        FOR MACRO DEFINITION OF PATH CONTROL.                        * 00100000 
*                                                                     * 00110000 
*  TK52778  05/22/89  REL 5.2                                   TK52778 00115000 
*        NEW RELEASE OF MSPF VERSION 2.5                        TK52778 00115500 
*                                                                       00115600 
*  TK52021  09/27/89  REL 5.2                                   TK52021 00115700 
*        COMMENT CARDS WITHOUT SEQUENCE NUMBERS                 TK52021 00115800 
*                                                                       00115900 
*********************************************************************** 00120000 
         EJECT                                                          00120100 
************************   REL 6.0   ************************** TS89408 00120200 
*                                                             * TS89408 00120300 
*  TS88952  06/26/90                                          * TS88952 00120400 
*        INUSRE PROGRAM PATHING GET CORRECT PROGRAM NAME      * TS88952 00120500 
*        WHEN 'REXX' IS IN CONTROL.                           * TS88952 00120600 
*                                                             * TS88952 00120700 
*  TS89408  06/27/90                                          * TS89408 00120800 
*        ALLOW PROGRAM PATHING FOR PROGRAMS CALLED FROM TSO   * TS89408 00120900 
*        READY MODE.                                          * TS89408 00121000 
*                                                             * TS89408 00121100 
*  TS89418  06/27/90                                          * TS89418 00121200 
*        FOR ISPTASK IN ISPF, SET THE ACTIVE PROGRAM TO BE    * TS89418 00121300 
*        EITHER THE CURRENT PROGRAM, OR THE FIRST NON-APF     * TS89418 00121400 
*        PROGRAM, NOT THE PROGRAM TO WHICH ISPTASK PASSED     * TS89418 00121500 
*        CONTROL.                                             * TS89418 00121600 
*                                                             * TS89418 00121700 
*  TS89429  06/27/90                                          * TS89429 00121800 
*        CORRECT IPCS COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR ESA 3.1.          * TS89429 00121900 
*        ALLOW BLSUINI1 AND BLSQINI2.                         * TS89429 00122000 
*                                                             * TS89429 00122100 
*  TS89439  06/27/90                                          * TS89439 00122200 
*        PREVENT INV-CMD EFFECT WITH TSO/E V2 USING CLISTS.   * TS89439 00122300 
*        V2 BRANCH ENTERS A DEFINED MODULE AND DOESN'T CAUSE  * TS89439 00122400 
*        A PRB TO BE GENERATED.                               * TS89439 00122500 
*                                                             * TS89439 00122600 
*  TS90535  07/12/90                                          * TS90535 00122700 
*        ALLOW THE 'EX' FORM OF TSO EXEC COMMAND TO ACCESS    * TS90535 00122800 
*        CLIST LIBRARIES SET AS 'EXEC' FILES, AND NOT GET A   * TS90535 00122900 
*        READ VIOLATION.                                      * TS90535 00123000 
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*                                                             * TS90535 00123100 
*  TS90532 08/14/90                                           * TS90532 00123200 
*        PREVENT 913 MESSAGES WHEN JCLCHECK IN PROCESS.       * TS90532 00123300 
*        ALLOWS JCLCHECK TO VERIFY LOADLIBS AND NOT BE        * TS90532 00123400 
*        FLAGGED BECAUSE IDCAMS IS CHECKING LOADLIBS.         * TS90532 00123500 
*                                                             * TS90532 00123600 
*  TS90878 07/15/91                                           * TS90878 00123800 
*        VIOLATION OCCURRING AFTER TS91150 APPLIED.           * TS90878 00123900 
*        PROGRAM ISRPCP APPEARS AS PROGRAM FOR VALIDATION     * TS90878 00124000 
*                                                             * TS90535 00124100 
*  TS91161  07/16/91                                          * TS91161 00124300 
*        MODIFIY THE STRUCTURE PROCESSING TO GET THE PREVIOUS * TS91161 00124400 
*        RB IF PL/I PROGRAM.                                  * TS91161 00124500 
*                                                             * TS90535 00124600 
*  TS91189  07/16/91                                          * TS91161 00124700 
*        DEFINE 'EX' AS AN ALIAS FOR 'EXEC' FOR REXX.         * TS91161 00124800 
*        CHANGE WAS MADE ON THE @CMD FOR EXEC.                * TS91161 00124900 
*                                                             * TS90894 00125000 
*  TS90894  07/22/91                                          * TS90894 00125100 
*        DEFINE 'SASXA1' TCB, RB STRUCTURE FOR NEW SAS        * TS90894 00125200 
*        RELEASE 6.06.                                        * TS90894 00125300 
*                                                             * TS90894 00125500 
*  TS90537  07/22/91                                          * TS90537 00125600 
*        DEFINE JCLCHECK AND EDCHK TCB AND RB STRUCTURES.     * TS90537 00125700 
*                                                             * TS90894 00125800 
*  TS84746  10/11/91                                          * TS84746 00125900 
*        ADD SUPPORT FOR SISTER TCB'S WHEN USING TO SUPPORT   * TS84746 00126000 
*        APPLICATION MANAGER INTERFACE.                       * TS84746 00126100 
*                                                             * TS95683 00126200 
*  TS95683  04/03/92                                          * TS95683 00126300 
*        ADD SUPPORT FOR TSPLUS REL 4.  DEFINE NEW STRUCTURE  * TS95683 00126400 
*        'TSOSESS#' AND 'TSOSESS@'.                           * TS95683 00126500 
*                                                             * TS95670 00126600 
*  TS95670  04/03/92                                          * TS95670 00126700 
*        ADD ENDEVOR COMMAND STRUCTURE SUPPORT.               * TS95670 00126800 
*                                                             * TS95670 00126900 
*  TS93164  09/02/92                                          * TS93164 00127000 
*        DEFINE ISPICP UNDER ISPF.                            * TS93164 00127100 
*                                                             * TS93164 00127200 
*  TS95935  09/08/92                                          * TS95935 00127301 
*        ADD SUPPORT FOR TSO/E PLATCMD.                       * TS95935 00127401 
*                                                             * TS93164 00127503 
*  TS98124  10/01/92                                          * TS98124 00127603 
*        ADD SAS 6.06 AND 6.07 PGM SASHOST                    * TS98124 00127703 
*                                                             * TS98124 00127803 
*  TS95948  10/01/92                                          * TS95948 00127903 
*        ADD SUPPORT FOR SPIFFY PRODUCT                       * TS95948 00128003 
*                                                             * TS95948 00128103 
*                                                             *         00128200 
*************************************************************** TS89408 00129000 
         EJECT                                                          00129010 
************************   REL 6.2   **************************         00129012 
*                                                             *         00129014 
*  TA0378A  12/09/93                                          * TA0378A 00129016 
*        ADD IKJEXC2 AS ALIAS OF EXEC                         * TA0378A 00129018 
*                                                             *         00129020 
*  TA1028C  06/17/94  Z0006                                   * TA1028C 00129022 
*        ADD DB2'S DSN COMMAND STRUCTURE                      * TA1028C 00129024 
*                                                             *         00129026 
*  TA0946C  06/20/94  Z0009                                   * TA0946C 00129028 
*        ADD SASXAL7                                          * TA0946C 00129030 
*                                                             *         00129032 
*  TA1389C  06/20/94  Z0009                                   * TA1389C 00129034 
*        REMOVE #PLI,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK FROM 2ND SPF @TCB         * TA1389C 00129036 
*        TO REMOVE PGM-PATH INV-CMD VIO FOR JCLCHECK          * TA1389C 00129038 
*                                                             *         00129040 
*  TA1792C  11/17/94  Z0008                                   * TA1792C 00129042 
*        FIX TA1389, ADDED BACK #PLI,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK.          * TA1792C 00129044 
*        SOURCED FIX: REMOVE #ISRPTC FROM SPF @TCB.           * TA1792C 00129046 
*                                                             *         00129048 
* END OF LOG.                                                 *         00129050 
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***************************************************************         00129052 
         SPACE 1                                                        00130000 
ACF99@RB CSECT                                                  ACF 22  00140000 
         SPACE 1                                                ACF 22  00150000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00160000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00170000 
*        SPF COMMAND STRUCTURE                                  ACF 310 00180000 
*        ---------------------                                  ACF 310 00190000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00200000 
SPF      @CMD  ISPF,PDF,ISPSTART,MULTISPF,MSPF,ISRPCP,ISPICP    TS90878 00210000 
*                                                               TS93164 00211000 
         @TCB  (#SPF,#ISPF,#ISPSTAR,#PDF,#ISPICP,#ISRPCP,       TS74831X00220000 
               #MSPF,#MULTSP),                                  TS74831X00221000 
               (#ISPMAIN,#SPFMAIN)                              TS77767 00230000 
         @TCB  (#ISPTASK,#TSOSESS),                     TS95683,TS77851X00240000 
               (#MMAIN,#ISRYXDR,#ISPANRC,#IPNRECV,      TK52794,TA1389CX00251000 
               #PLI,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK,                     TK52794,TA1389CX00251100 
               #ISPXC,                  TS91161,TK52794,TA1389C,TA1792CX00251200 
               #ISPXP),                 TS91161,TK52794,TA1389C,TA1792CX00251300 
               FLAGS=SISTER                                     TS74452 00252000 
#MSPF    @RB   MSPF,CMD=CMD,                                    TK52778X00253000 
               NEXT=(RB,#MISPICP,#MISRPCP,#SPFMAIN,#ISPMAIN)    TK52778 00254000 
#MULTSP  @RB   MULTISPF,CMD=CMD,                                TK52778X00255000 
               NEXT=(RB,#MISPICP,#MISRPCP,#SPFMAIN,#ISPMAIN)    TK52778 00255100 
#MISPICP @RB   ISPICP,CMD=CMD,NEXT=(RB,#ISPMAIN,#SPFMAIN)       TK83561 00256000 
#MISRPCP @RB   ISRPCP,CMD=CMD,NEXT=(RB,#ISPMAIN,#SPFMAIN)       TK83561 00257000 
#SPF     @RB   SPF,CMD=CMD                                      TS77851 00260000 
#SPFMAIN @RB     SPFMAIN,CMD=CMD                                TS77851 00270000 
#ISPF    @RB   ISPF,CMD=CMD                                     TS77851 00280000 
#ISPMAIN @RB     ISPMAIN,CMD=CMD                                TS77851 00290000 
#ISPSTAR @RB   ISPSTART,CMD=CMD                                 TS77767 00300000 
#PDF     @RB   PDF,CMD=CMD                                      TS77767 00310000 
#ISPICP  @RB   ISPICP,CMD=CMD                                   TS77767 00320000 
#ISRPCP  @RB   ISRPCP,CMD=CMD                                   TS77767 00330000 
#ISRPTC  @RB   ISRPTC,CMD=(CDE,NEXTRB),END                      TK52794 00330100 
*                                                               TS77851 00340000 
#ISPTASK @RB   ISPTASK,LASTTCB,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                TS77851 00350000 
#TSOSESS @RB   TSOSESS*,LASTTCB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)               TS95683 00351000 
#ISRYXDR @RB     ISRYXDR,NEXT=(RB,#ISRYXX),CMD=CMD              TS77851 00360000 
#ISRYXX  @RB       ISRY**,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC,#ISPXP),              TS77851X00370000 
               LASTTCB,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                        TS77851 00380000 
#ISPANRC @RB     ISPANREC,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC)                      TS77851 00390000 
#IPNRECV @RB     IPNRECV,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC)                       TS51563 00391000 
#JCLCHK  @RB     JCLCHECK,RENT,SYSLIB,END,CMD=CDE               TS90537 00392000 
#EDCHK   @RB     EDCHECK,RENT,SYSLIB,END,CMD=CDE                TS90537 00393000 
#ISPXC   @RB   ********,LASTTCB,RENT,SYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),  TS89418X00400000 
               NEXT=(RB,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK,#ISPXC,#ISPXP)   TS90537,TS89418 00401000 
#ISPXP   @RB     ********,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB) TS74452 00410000 
*                                                               TS91161 00411000 
*        FOR PL/I ASSIGN THE NAME OF THE CALLING PGM            TS91161 00412000 
*                                                               TS91161 00413000 
#PLI     @RB   IBMBOP**,RENT,SYSLIB,LASTTCB,NEXT=(RB,#ISPXC),   TS91161X00414000 
               CMD=(CDE,PREVRB)                                 TS91161 00415000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00420000 
*                                                               TS74452 00430000 
*        EXAMINE COMMAND STRUCTURE                              TS74452 00440000 
*        --------------------                                   TS74452 00450000 
*                                                               TS74452 00460000 
#MMAIN   @RB   LTDMMAIN,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB,     TS74452X00510000 
               NEXT=(RB,#M###0)                                 TS74452 00510100 
#M###0   @RB   LTDM###0,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB,     TS74452X00510200 
               NEXT=(RB,#MS##0)                                 TS74452 00510300 
#MS##0   @RB   LTDM*##0,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),END          TS74452 00510400 
*                                                               ACF 310 00560000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00561000 
*        XC COMMAND STRUCTURE                                   ACF 310 00570000 
*        --------------------                                   ACF 310 00580000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00590000 
XC       @CMD  ,                                                R41P166 00600000 
         @TCB  #XC                                                      00610000 
#XC      @RB   ********,NORENT,END,CMD=CDE                              00620000 
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*                                                               TS95670 00622000 
*                                                               TS95670 00623000 
*        ENDEVOR COMMAND STRUCTURE                              TS95670 00624000 
*        -------------------------                              TS95670 00625000 
*                                                               TS95670 00626000 
NDVRC1   @CMD  ,                                                TS95670 00627000 
         @TCB  #NDVRC1                                          TS95670 00628000 
#NDVRC1  @RB   NDVRC1,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB                 TS95670 00629000 
*                                                               TS95670 00629100 
BC1PSRVL @CMD  ,                                                TS95670 00629200 
         @TCB  #BC1PSRV,(#ISPXC,#ISPXP)                         TS95670 00629300 
#BC1PSRV @RB   BC1PSRVL,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB               TS95670 00629400 
*                                                               TS95670 00629500 
BC1PSATT @CMD  ,                                                TS95670 00629600 
         @TCB  #BC1PSAT,(#ISPXC,#ISPXP)                         TS95670 00629700 
#BC1PSAT @RB   BC1PSATT,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),LASTTCB               TS95670 00629800 
*                                                               ACF 310 00630000 
*                                                               TK86602 00631000 
*        'PARALLEL TMP CALL' COMMAND STRUCTURE                  TK86602 00632000 
*        -------------------------------------                  TK86602 00633000 
*                                                               TK86602 00634000 
PTMPCALL @CMD  ,                                                TK86602 00635000 
         @TCB  (#EFF76,#PTCALL),NEXT=END                        TK86602 00636000 
#EFF76   @RB   IKJEFF76,NEXT=(TCB,#FIBCMDS)                     TK86602 00637000 
#PTCALL  @RB   ********,CALL,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CDE        TK86602 00638000 
*                                                               TK86602 00639000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00640000 
*        PARALLEL TMP FIB COMMANDS STRUCTURE                    TK86602 00641000 
*        -----------------------------------                    TK86602 00642000 
*                                                               TK86602 00643000 
#FIBCMDS @TCB  #EFF04                                           TK86602 00644000 
#EFF04   @RB   IKJEFF04,END,CMD='SUBMIT'                        TK86602 00645000 
*                                                               TK86602 00646000 
*                                                               TK86602 00647000 
*        QED COMMAND STRUCTURE                                  ACF 310 00650000 
*        ---------------------                                  ACF 310 00660000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00670000 
QED      @CMD  Q                                                        00680000 
         @TCB  (#QED,#Q)                                                00690000 
#QED     @RB   QED,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                                00700000 
#Q       @RB   Q,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                                  00710000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00720000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00730000 
*        EDIT COMMAND STRUCTURE                                 ACF 310 00740000 
*        ----------------------                                 ACF 310 00750000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00760000 
EDIT     @CMD  E,IKJEBEMA,IKJEBECO                                      00770000 
         @TCB  (#EDIT,#E1,#E2)                                  ACF 310 00780000 
#EDIT    @RB   IKJEBE**,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                           00790000 
#E1      @RB   EDIT,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                       ACF 310 00800000 
#E2      @RB   E,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                          ACF 310 00810000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00820000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00830000 
*        CALL COMMAND STRUCTURE                                 ACF 310 00840000 
*        ----------------------                                 ACF 310 00850000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00860000 
CALL     @CMD  SPFCALCP,IKJEFG00                                TK86608 00870000 
         @TCB  (#CALL,#SPFCALL,#KJEFG00,#TSOCALL,$TSOCALL),     TS89408X00880000 
               FLAGS=SISTER                                     TS84746 00881000 
#CALL    @RB   CALL,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                          00890000 
#KJEFG00 @RB   IKJEFG00,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)              TK86608 00890100 
#SPFCALL @RB   SPFCALCP,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)                      00900000 
*   CALLED PGM FROM TSO READY MODE                              TS89408 00900500 
#TSOCALL @RB   ********,END,CMD=CDE                             TS89408 00900600 
$TSOCALL @RB   ********,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CDE             TS89408 00900700 
*                                                               ACF 310 00910000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00920000 
*        ISPCALL COMMAND STRUCTURE                              ACF 310 00930000 
*        -------------------------                              ACF 310 00940000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00950000 
ISPCALL  @CMD  ,                                                TS77106 00960000 
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         @TCB  #ISPCALL                                         TS73712 00970000 
#ISPCALL @RB   ISPCALL,CALL,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)               TS73712 00980000 
*                                                               ACF 310 00990000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01000000 
*        VSAPL COMMAND STRUCTURE                                ACF 310 01010000 
*        -----------------------                                ACF 310 01020000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01030000 
*VSAPL   @CMD  ,                                                R41P166 01040000 
*        @TCB  #VSAPL                                           ACF 22  01050000 
*        @TCB  #VSTAR,FLAGS=SISTER                              ACF 22  01060000 
*#VSAPL  @RB   VSAPL,CMD=CMD                                    ACF 22  01070000 
*#VSTAR  @RB   ASVPSTAR,NOSYSLIB,END,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB)          ACF 22  01080000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01090000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01100000 
*        LIST COMMAND STRUCTURE                                 ACF 310 01110000 
*        ----------------------                                 ACF 310 01120000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01130000 
LIST     @CMD  L,IKJEBLI1,IKJEBLI2,IKJEBLP1,IKJEBLM1 XL,XLIST   ACF 22  01140000 
         @TCB  (#LIST,#L1,#L2)                                  ACF 310 01150000 
#LIST    @RB   IKJEBL**,END,CMD=CMD                             ACF 22  01160000 
#L1      @RB   L,END,CMD=CMD                                    ACF 310 01170000 
#L2      @RB   LIST,END,CMD=CMD                                 ACF 310 01180000 
*--------------------------------------------------------------*TS77534 01190000 
* IPCS COMMAND STRUCTURE                                        TS77534 01200000 
*--------------------------------------------------------------*TS77534 01210000 
IPCS     @CMD  ,                                                R41P166 01220000 
         @TCB  #IPCS,#IPCSSUB                                   TS77534 01230000 
#IPCSALL @TCB  #IPCSTSO                                         TS89429 01240000 
#IPCS    @RB   IPCS,CMD=CMD                                     TS77534 01250000 
#IPCSSUB @RB   BLS*****,CMD=CMD,NEXT=(TCB,#IPCSALL)             TS89429 01260000 
#IPCSTSO @RB   BLS*****,CMD=(CMD,NEXTTCB),END                   TS89429 01270000 
*                                                               TS89429 01270100 
*                                                               TS79065 01271000 
*                                                               TS79065 01271100 
*        SAS COMMAND STRUCTURE                                  TS79065 01271200 
*        ---------------------                                  TS79065 01271300 
*                                                               TS79065 01271400 
SASCP    @CMD                                                   TS79065 01271500 
         @TCB  #SASCP                                           TS79065 01271600 
         @TCB  (#SASLPA,#SAS,           TS98124,TS90894,TS79065,TA0946CX01271702 
               #SASXA1,                 TS98124,TS90894,TS79065,TA0946CX01271704 
               #SASHOST,#SASXAL7)       TS98124,TS90894,TS79065,TA0946C 01271706 
         @TCB  (#SASCALL,#SASLIB)                               TS79065 01271800 
#SASCP   @RB     SASCP,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CMD                 TS98124,TS79065 01271902 
#SASLPA  @RB     SASLPA,NOSYSLIB,CMD=CMD                        TS79065 01272000 
#SAS     @RB     SAS,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)        TS79065 01272100 
#SASCALL @RB     SASCALL,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)    TS79065 01272200 
#SASHOST @RB     SASHOST,END,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)         TS98124 01272302 
#SASLIB  @RB     SASLIB,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)     TS79065 01272400 
#SASXA1  @RB     SASXA1,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)     TS90894 01272500 
#SASXAL7 @RB     SASXAL7,END,CALL,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)    TA0946C 01272530 
*                                                               TA1028C 01273000 
*                                                               TA1028C 01273010 
*        DB2'S DSN COMMAND STRUCTURE                            TA1028C 01273020 
*        ---------------------------                            TA1028C 01273030 
*                                                               TA1028C 01273040 
DSN      @CMD  ,                                                TA1028C 01273050 
         @TCB  #DSN                                             TA1028C 01273060 
         @TCB  #ECP10,#DB2MASK                                  TA1028C 01273070 
#DSN     @RB   DSN,CMD=CMD                                      TA1028C 01273080 
#ECP10   @RB   DSNECP10,CMD=CMD                                 TA1028C 01273090 
#DB2MASK @RB   ********,END,NORENT,NOSYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)   TA1028C 01273100 
*                                                               TS88952 01275000 
*                                                               TS88952 01275100 
*        REXX COMMAND STRUCTURE                                 TS88952 01275200 
*        ---------------------                                  TS88952 01275300 
*                                                               TS88952 01275400 
EXEC     @CMD  EX,IKJEXC2                               TA0378A TS91189 01275500 
         @TCB    (#EXEC,#EX,#EXC2),FLAGS=SISTER         TA0378A TS89439 01275600 
#EXEC    @RB     EXEC,END,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)                     TS90535 01275700 
#EX      @RB     EX,END,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)                       TS90535 01275800 
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#EXC2    @RB     IKJEXC2,END,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)          TA0378A TS90535 01275810 
*                                               LINE DELETED BY TS89439 01275900 
*                                                               TS95948 01276003 
*        SPIFFY CMD                                             TS95948 01276103 
*        ----------                                             TS95948 01276203 
*                                                               TS95948 01276303 
SPIFFY   @CMD  ,                                                TS95948 01276403 
         @TCB  (#SPIFFY)                                        TS95948 01276503 
#SPIFFY  @RB   SPIFFY,LASTTCB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB)                 TS95948 01276603 
*                                                               TS95935 01276701 
*                                                               TS95935 01277001 
*        SUPPORT FOR TSO/E PLATCMD                              TS95935 01278001 
*        -------------------------                              TS95935 01279001 
*                                                               TS95935 01279101 
IKJFCP03 @CMD  ,                                                TS95935 01279201 
         @TCB  #KJFCP03,FLAGS=SISTER                            TS95935 01279301 
#KJFCP03 @RB   IKJFCP03,LASTTCB,RENT,SYSLIB,CMD=(CDE,NEXTTCB),  TS95935X01279401 
               NEXT=(RB,#JCLCHK,#EDCHK,#PLI,#ISPXC,#ISPXP)      TS95935 01279501 
         EJECT                                                  ACF 310 01280000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01290000 
*        COMMAND CROSS REFERENCE TABLE.                         ACF 310 01300000 
*                                                               ACF 310 01310000 
         @CXREF                                                         01320000 
         SPACE 2                                                        01330000 
         @ID  ,                                                         01340000 
         SPACE 1                                                        01350000 
         MEND                                                   ACF 310 01360000 
         ACF99@RB                                               ACF 310 01370000 
         END    ,                                                       01380000 
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Appendix D: Process Authentication 
A method for authenticating that some other process is not masquerading as a process 
previously authorized to invoke another process, is essential to PPTM.  This section outlines 
some possible to explore in future research for adding process authentication to the resulting 
PPTM solution model.  This present research assumes all processes presented to the scheduler 
have been correctly authenticated. 
An authentication verifies identity.  Traditional authentication methods determine whether a 
user or resource is what it claims to be.  Authentication of a user is traditionally determined by 
one or more factors such as ownership, knowledge or inheritance [Harr03].  Ownership usually 
translates into ―something you have‖ such as a certificate, token, key or some such object that is 
uniquely issued to the user.  Knowledge usually translates into ―something you know‖ such as a 
password, the answers to a series of personal questions or an answer to a challenge.  Inheritance 
usually translates into ―something you are‖ such as a fingerprint or some other biometric 
signature; something that is physically unique the user.  These factors were intended for user 
authentication and are not all appropriate to authenticate a process. For example, a process 
cannot ―know‖ something and therefore cannot be authenticated by this factor.   
Processes can be authenticated by inheritance and ownership factors.  For instance, a process 
can have a certificate, thereby authenticated by ―what it has.‖ A process can also be 
authenticated by ―what it is‖ using process characteristics, such as size, number of invocations or 
an associated hash value.   
Additional authentication factors have emerged and are occasionally applied to users: social 
networking, web-trust, location-based and time-based [Harr03].  The authentication of processes 
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can use some of these factors, especially location-based and time-based factors as good 
indicators in authenticating processes. 
In a process invocation sequence, each process must be authenticated to verify that the 
process is assigned the appropriate symbol from the alphabet .  The process name alone is not 
sufficient for authentication, since a process can masquerade as another process by using the 
same name.  This is an area of the research that has not been addressed by other researchers. The 
three factors that would most likely best serve process authentication would be ownership, 
inheritance and location-based.   
D.1 Ownership Authentication Factor 
Process authentication could be effected using the ownership factor, if all processes had 
certificates as do some JAVA processes using JARS.  However, this entails that all software 
development be required to start using digital certificates whenever a module is created, and this 
would be difficult to do. 
D.2 Inheritance Authentication Factor 
Using the inheritance factor in process authentication has potential. A digital hash such as 
SHA2, SHA1 or MD5 could be taken of a process at the time it is identified as a process and first 
scheduled for execution in a process invocation sequence.  Then, whenever a process using the 
same name is encountered subsequently, a digital hash can be taken and compared to the hash 
taken when that named process was initially determined to be a normal process in a valid 
invocation sequence.  If these two hashes match, then there is a very high likelihood that it is the 
same process.  The only problem with this approach is that hash is CPU intensive and could 
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cause performance problems, although in some applications system criticality might justify the 
cost of additional hardware for this purpose.   
The inheritance method can be found as a feature in Computer Associates CA Access 
Control
®
 software.  CA Access Control
®
 [CAA08] creates hashes of all executables in the 
system and authenticates them before they execute.  As maintenance is applied to these 
processes, new hashes are taken.  Using CA Access Control
®
 with the solution model described 
in this research could satisfy the authentication requirement.  
D.3 Location-based Authentication Factor 
The third method usable for process authentication is location-based.  Identifying the 
directory from which a process is loaded is a good authentication method, if good access control 
is followed.  If directories are well managed, then a directory from which a process is loaded is a 
good indication that the process being executed is the process intended.  A process loaded from 
another directory would suggest that the process differs from the one intended to run.    This is a 
preferred method, as it would not take much additional processing time to determine.  
Unfortunately, the Linux and UNIX OS do not save the name of the directory structure from 
which a process was loaded.  The OS loader is independent of the OS scheduler.  At the time the 
OS loads a file (for execution or otherwise) it does not know if the file is a data file or one that is 
used by the scheduler for execution.  In the scheduler, the directory from which the process was 
loaded is not available in any of the data areas.  Therefore, to authenticate a process with this 
method in these OS would require a modification of the OS kernel. 
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Appendix E: Is                  = { }? 
Because the DFA is built incrementally, it is not known at any time t whether L(DFAt) = Lv. 
However, the strings in the set called the white list are in the non-empty intersection L(DFAt)  
Lv. Because the white list is also built incrementally it cannot be claimed that the set of strings 
called the white list is the set of stings L(DFAt).  Furthermore, it is not known whether the set 
L(DFAt) merely forms a non-empty subset of Lv.  L(DFAt)  could contain a set of strings that are 
not a subset of Lv.  That is, it is not known whether there exists another non-empty subset of 
strings both in L(DFAt=5) and outside Lv.  More formally, it is not known whether         
          = {  }.  This remains an open theoretical question and a topic for future research, as 
described in chapter 9.    
The PPT model uses domain knowledge both to build DFAt and to determine whether strings 
known to be in L(DFAt) are also in Lv. In this way the PPT model incrementally builds the non-
empty intersection of L(DFAt) and Lv called the white list. However, the PPT DFA may also 
accept sequences that are invalid. 
10.4  Other Approaches Making Assumptions similar to Is                  = { } 
Hofmeyr-Forrest [Hof98] and Ball-Larus [Ball92] assume that inferred strings are valid and 
recognizes this as an unproven assumption in later research [Ball96] [Laru99].  Hofmeyr-
Forrest‘s n-gram approach used substrings of process invocation sequences to create patterns.  
Empirically they discovered that an n-gram of eleven processes was sufficient to discover 
anomalies in process invocation sequences.  However, they did not validate whether the prefix n-
gram preceding or the suffix n-gram following an n-gram were authorized.   
 154 
 
Ball-Larus make the same assumption [Ball92].  They do not entertain the notion that the 
structure might infer paths that have not have been encountered.  Ball-Larus use edge profiling to 
count the number of times a process path has been used.  They hadn‘t identified 1) that they‘ve 
made an assumption or 2) that once path between two processes is valid it is always valid 
regardless of whether or not there are prefix paths or suffix paths that were ever encountered.  
Larus discovers this assumption in later research [Laur99] and suggests that the whole process 
invocation sequence be validated.  Over a series of articles he offers a number of solutions, such 
as process sequence probability and edge profiling. 
E.2 Impact of the Assumption 
One of the reasons why mapping valid process invocation sequences are so difficult to 
profile is due to all the possible invocation sequences that must be generated by a running a 
critical system as if it were in production.  Each invocation sequence can have any number of 
variations, such as invoking processes for system or application services.  These all produce 
multiple variations of an invocation sequence and must all be profiled.   
It is almost impossible to profile all the possible valid invocation sequences due the 
complexity of all the various code paths in an application.  Take for example an application that 
has error recovery processes that only gets invoked if an error occurs, or a process that only gets 
invoked if specific data is presented to the invoking process.  These are process invocation 
sequences that are valid, but are not be profile-able in every case.    
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Figure E-1: Process Invocation Example 
Using the potential DFA shown in figure E-1, assume that sequences p1p2p3 and p1p2p5 are 
valid process invocation sequences and that P2 invokes P5 only in rare occasions when an error 
occurs.  The string p1p2p3 and p1p2p5 are both profiled by the PPT model because P2 was caused 
to fail.  Also consider that p4p2p3 is profiled, but forcing p4p2 to fail so it profiles the valid 
process invocation sequence p1p2p5 is difficult and therefore was not profiled because P2 could 
not be forced to fail when invoked by P4.  Using domain knowledge, it is known that p1p2p5 is a 
valid process invocation sequence, but it was unsuccessfully profiled.  In the PPT model 
assumption, this sequence is accepted by the language and considered a valid process invocation 
sequence because p4p2p5 is inferred.  In this case the inferred process sequences, using domain 
knowledge, are valid.  It is accepted by figure E-1, and if                 proves true, all process 
invocation sequences accepted by PPTM are valid whether or not the sequences was previously 
encountered or inferred. But what if domain knowledge were to decide that p4p2p5 is not valid?  
Because the answer to this question requires domain knowledge, it is unlikely a purely 
theoretical solution to the question would be satisfactory. 
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